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Philosophical introduction to ethics: an



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# A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS

*AN ADVOCACY OF THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLE  
IN ETHICS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF  
PERSONAL IDEALISM*

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## PREFACE

The series of lectures of which this book is composed was in the first instance delivered as an Inter-Collegiate Course at Westfield College, University of London, during the Michaelmas term, 1903. Apart from an occasional rearrangement of the subject-matter the lectures remain practically in the form in which they were originally given.

My sincerest thanks are due to Prof. G. F. Stout for kindly reading through the proof-sheets and for suggesting some important improvements.

## SYLLABUS

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**SUBJECT :** A Philosophical Introduction to Ethics ; an advocacy of the spiritual principle in Ethics from the point of view of Personal Idealism.

**LECTURE I. :** Introduction.

“The Problem of Conduct.” Prof. Taylor’s rejection of the spiritual principle in Ethics.

**LECTURES II & III.** “The Problem of Conduct” continued. The Scientific and the Philosophic points of view. Prof. Taylor’s position in the light of concrete idealism.

**LECTURE IV.** “The Prolegomena.”—Green’s defence of the spiritual principle in Ethics. Expository statement.

**LECTURES V & VI.** “The Prolegomena” continued. Formal Epistemology and the concrete analysis of experience.

**LECTURE VII.** “The Prolegomena” concluded. Criticism of Green. Self-consciousness. The Eternal Self. The “Otherness” of God.

**LECTURE VIII.** The spiritual principle in Ethics. Constructive Statement. Pragmatism as Concrete Personal Idealism.

**LECTURE IX.** Constructive Statement continued. The true Prolegomena of Moral Philosophy : a philosophical logic and a philosophical psychology.

**LECTURE X.** Constructive Statement concluded. Ethics and Metaphysics. Absolute and Personal Idealism.

## PREFACE TO INTRODUCTION

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Does Ethical Science render superfluous a Philosophy of Morals? No, for the spiritual element in any moral fact, though pre-supposed by Ethical Science, is yet necessarily ignored on methodological grounds. In Moral Philosophy, on the other hand, the spiritual element is duly recognised as the dominating factor in conduct. From the point of view of Personal Idealism it is the individual's own inviolate spiritual experience which is the central fact in Moral Philosophy and in our human philosophy generally.

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## INTRODUCTION

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In the following pages an attempt is made to justify the existence of a Moral Philosophy. Ethical Science, in the opinion of many distinguished writers, renders superfluous any philosophy of Morals. The metaphysically-minded gleaner—so we are bidden believe—who counts on what the inductive reapers in these fields of research can legitimately spare, will find nothing but chaff at his disposal, and had better spare himself the ungrateful labour.

This repudiation of the metaphysician by his inductive colleague is no doubt extremely genuine, nor has the latter as a rule any inkling that like the proverbial dog

in the manger he is warning the former off material he can never utilize himself. Is there any *fact* of morality, argues Mr. Leslie Stephen, outside the scope of a pure science of Ethics, and do not these facts possess in themselves a definite moral significance which is quite independent of whatever ultimate meaning may be attributed to them by metaphysicians. "The great forces which govern human conduct," he eloquently writes, *The Science of Ethics*, "are the same that they always have been and always will be. The dread of hunger, thirst and cold ; the desire to gratify the passions ; the love of wife and child or friend ; sympathy with the sufferings of our neighbours ; resentment of injury inflicted upon ourselves—these and such as these are the great forces which govern mankind. When a moralist tries to assign anything else as an ultimate motive, he is getting beyond the world of realities." These are forceful words, and were the metaphysical moralist really seeking for a substitute that should replace our human fears and loves, our sympathies and resentments by motives more desirable and more potent, his would indeed be a hopeless and superfluous quest. But even though there be nothing else, nothing to add to the list of moral motives, Philosophy has yet, in the same field as Science and upon the same material, its own important task to perform : that namely of strengthening and deepening the import of these same facts by pointing to the spiritual element present in them all, but beyond the self-limited purview of scientific insight. When the fact puts on its invisible cloak, Science detects no difference, and can therefore never suspect that the cloak makes any difference to the fact. A philosophical analysis is needed to prove that the fact in its invisible vesture is a fact transfigured, snatched from the realm of mechanism into that of teleology, and from the outwardness into the inwardness of our individual experience.

It is in truth the supreme function of philosophy to give a worthier meaning to the facts of life by revealing within them the presence of Spirit. It aims primarily at detecting and elaborating certain instruments called Categories, the more potent of which when applied to the interpretation of facts have precisely that transfiguring

influence over them which has just been referred to. To what extent it succeeds in thus enriching the meaning of life, and thereby justifying its suzerain's claim over the science of conduct, must be left for the sequel to disclose.

The term "Spiritual principle" as used in the pages that follow stands primarily for the unifying agency in personal experience, and should in all cases be teleologically understood as an end or ideal which, as expressive of the person's inmost nature, tends to regulate and consolidate the whole developing life. It is that final cause in immediate personal experience which is so constitutive of it that to deny its felt presence is precisely to deny the possibility of such experience. We leave it to the context to elucidate any more specific and derivative meanings with which the term may be invested.

One more point comes within the legitimate scope of this Introduction. The philosophical standpoint adopted has been identified with that of Personal Idealism and this may need a brief word of explanation. Defining Idealism generally as the doctrine which finds the ultimate reality of the universe in spiritual life, and its end in the perfecting thereof, the differentia of Personal Idealism is its insistence that such ultimate reality can be sought or reached in and through our own personal experience, and in no other way. It lays emphatic stress on "the infinite significance and value of the ethical life," and claims, in the words of one of its most distinguished representatives, that "here only in the life of ethical endeavour is the end and secret of the universe to be found." Its view-point is personal, teleological, concrete—concrete in the truest idealist sense, and such is the view-point maintained. and developed throughout the present volume.

With regard to the disposition of our argument, we may characterize it as the dialectical attempt to reach a constructive solution through a critical consideration of the various difficulties which the subject-matter naturally offers. This criticism centres round two typical and opposed views concerning the problem of the philosophical idea in Ethics, the views developed in the "Prolegomena to Ethics" and the "Problem of Conduct"

respectively. Of these, the former stands to the constructive sequel rather as a prop, the latter rather as a foil. The argument is thus developed partly through opposition, partly through sympathetic elaboration. I hasten to add that my radical disagreement with Prof. Taylor's main contention in no way diminishes the respect I feel for his work. The "Problem of Conduct" is a book that commands, and will continue to command attention and respect, through the directness and sincerity with which all the most vital issues are faced, the ability with which these issues are handled, and the clear, fresh and interesting way in which they are presented to the reader.\* And it has the additional attraction to the present writer of coming from the pen of an old school-fellow and class-mate.

As regards the attitude taken towards the author of the "Prolegomena," it is essentially that of the Personal towards the Absolute Idealist, an attitude, in the main, of friendly though emphatic difference. What the difference precisely amounts to, will, I hope, be made clear as the argument proceeds.

As it is always well to hear an opponent's case first, I have opened the enquiry by considering Prof. Taylor's unambiguous rejection of the spiritual principle in Ethics.

\* Cf. especially ch. viii., on "Beyond Good and Bad."

# LECTURE I



## PREFACE

PROF. TAYLOR maintains in his 'Problem of Conduct' that ethics neither requires nor permits of a metaphysical basis.

Being a departmental science, ethics no more *requires* such a basis than does astronomy or biology. In so far as it is rooted elsewhere than in its own specific facts, it is in the facts of psychology and sociology.

The fallacy in Prof. Taylor's argument here lies in his inadequate conception of 'Moral Experience,' as something that can be completely studied by inductive methods and from the abstract scientific standpoint. Its true inward character can be grasped only from the concrete, more inclusive standpoint of philosophy, and in the light of a teleological method. The fundamental question here is, in a word, the following:—What are we to understand by 'a fact of experience?' We say fundamental, for

the datum determines both method and point of view. Philosophy and science are essentially distinguished by the way in which this 'datum' is conceived.

The helplessness of philosophy when it adopts the scientific point of view from which to philosophize is well illustrated by Dr. MacLennan's theory that ideas are mere symbols and are regulative over experience without being constituents *in* it. This conclusion is inevitable if the fundamental conception of a 'fact of experience' is understood, as it is by Dr. MacLennan, in the scientific sense. From this abstract point of view thought-systems are mere symbolic languages that serve indeed an interpretive function but do not share the reality of that which they interpret. They stand to the concrete sense-reality much as the circles of latitude and longitude stand to the earth itself. But once the philosophic view-point is accepted, meanings and values and the principles which these illustrate are recognised to be no longer symbolic but real—no longer merely regulative in function but essentially constitutive of the experience they control. Another instance of what essentially amounts to the confusion of the philosophic and the scientific points of view is given by Dr. Hodgson's review of the status and prospects of

philosophy in his recent Presidential Address before the Aristotelian Society. Dr. Hodgson, starting with the simplest sensations as the ultimate data of experience, and philosophizing upon these data, ends in an attitude towards the spiritual marked both by theoretical agnosticism and blind practical belief. These consequences lose their cogency however, once philosophical experience is studied in the light of its own appropriate categories; since the philosophical datum, the datum, that is, as revealed to the insight dominated by the category of consciousness, includes the spiritual principle which Dr. Hodgson, from his abstracter point of view, discards as a *flatus vocis*.\*

In the preceding discussion we have assumed the *legitimacy* of a philosophical treatment of ethics. This assumption, argues Prof. Taylor, is invalid.

2° Ethics does not *permit* of a metaphysical basis. For an ethics founded on metaphysics, *i.e.*, on *absolute truth in formal outline*, would be an ethics in whose conception no root of self-discrepancy existed. But there is a radical discrepancy between self-service and others' service, the fundamental ethical distinc-

\* A further discussion of this crucial distinction between the scientific and the philosophical datum is given in Lecture III.

tion. Hence ethics cannot be based on metaphysics.

The fallacy here, to be considered in a later lecture, lies in a complete misconception of what idealism means both by "metaphysics" and a "metaphysical basis." Idealistic metaphysics is not the most formal but the most concrete of all sciences, and by 'metaphysical basis' is essentially meant the philosophic datum, the fact of experience integrally conceived. Advocacy of this concrete datum is at the same time a vindication of the spiritual factor as the guiding principle in conduct.

Attacking Prof. Taylor finally on his own ground as a representative of scientific ethics, we would point out, in answer to his moral pessimism that the inductive moralist cannot abandon the guiding postulate of uniformity without transcending his inductive enquiry. Moral uniformity should be an article of scientific faith. To dispute it is to dispute the power of ethical science to deal adequately with the facts of morality.

## LECTURE I

### “THE PROBLEM OF CONDUCT”

In “The Problem of Conduct”\* Prof. Taylor considers the relation of ethics to metaphysics and endeavours to prove that ethics neither requires nor permits of a metaphysical basis.

In briefest outline Prof. Taylor’s argument runs as follows :—

“If ethics is rightly regarded as a body of inferences from finally true and valid metaphysical principles, we ought to find in all the diversified forms of moral conduct the coherent and systematic development of a *single* type of behaviour. But what do we find? The study of the origins of human conduct reveals to us the presence of two classes of instinctive acts with divergent tendencies, the one set developing in the direction of egoistic sentiment, the other in the direction of altruism.

A critical discussion shows that we have here two different aspects of the good which are perpetually tending to diverge from one another, consequently a

\* “The Problem of Conduct : A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics,” by A. E. Taylor. Macmillan & Co., 1901.

radical cleft in the moral ideal which cannot be radically healed. The moral ideal as a principle of action is essentially a compromise; 'moral progress is progress towards the realisation of an ideal built on compromise—an ideal that falls to pieces the moment it is subjected to serious and honest philosophical analysis.' And the compromise consists in a persistent attempt to adjust the demands of egoism and altruism. This is the only solution and it is a mere arrangement for working purposes. 'To live for self-culture in real earnest is to discover in the end that you have worn yourself out in the pursuit of a chimæra. To devote yourself to disinterested public activity is to create suffering as well as to relieve it.' There is no single self-consistent type of moral behaviour. Hence as moral ideals, far from being self-consistent and harmonious, are riddled with self-contradictions, the science of ethics *cannot* be based on metaphysics. Ethics is a science resting entirely upon a basis of everyday generalisation from experience, and its hypotheses are purely provisional. It is a mere departmental science and should be treated as such.

Prof. Taylor's main point has been stated as concretely as possible, so as to make its purport the more readily intelligible. We must now consider his whole argument more closely. It has a positive or constructive as well as a negative or critical side. Our author's aim is to show not only that ethics cannot be based on metaphysics, but also that without any

help from metaphysics, an adequate science of ethics can still be worked out.

I. It will be convenient to deal first with Prof. Taylor's positive contention that a science of ethics can be worked out without any help from metaphysics.

On this positive constructive side, our author approaches us in the spirit of Hume and Avenarius urging the claims of a 'pure experience.' "Our main philosophical contention" [on its positive side], we read, "is indeed identical with that of Hume; like him we have urged that in so far as a proposition is true, it must directly or indirectly be a statement about Erlebnisse—things which either actually form the contents of an experience, or would, under definitely known conditions, form the contents of an experience, and that concepts which cannot stand the test of reduction to such a statement, must contain a greater or less amount of 'illusion of the mind.'"

The purport of the ideal as thus enunciated is to purify the conceptions and phraseology of science of every non-experiential element. But what is meant here by 'experience?' If 'experience' were used in a perfectly unrestricted sense so as to cover such experience as develops itself under 'philosophical' insight, the ideal of a 'pure experience' might be unconditionally accepted. As used by its exponents, however, it presupposes the narrower view of experience to which we are confined in physical science, as

consisting exclusively of facts that can be objectively handled and experimented upon and form a touchstone of scientific verification. It therefore requires the elimination of all conceptions that do not correspond to facts of experience so conceived. Conceptions that sin against this requirement of pure experience are termed 'symbolic,' e.g.,  $\sqrt{-1}$  and the circular points at infinity in mathematics, and in the concreter sciences such concepts as 'force,' 'causation,' 'activity,' 'free-will,' 'unconditional obligation.'

As Prof. Taylor handles this principle of pure experience, it fulfils at least two functions :—

1. It furnishes the positive ideal of scientific explanation in the departmental sciences. 'In so far as

p. 19. any science falls back in its search for explanations upon . . . mere symbols of unknown processes, it falls short of the true ideal of scientific explanation, and its account of phenomena fails to reach the level of "pure" experience . . . Science,

p. 25. in fact, at its different levels is nothing more or less than experience in the process of becoming fully consistent with itself and free from all admixture of "symbolical" or non-experiential hypothesis.'

2° It is presented as furnishing the ideal which a critical metaphysic sets before itself in its after-work

p. 28. upon the assumptions of the various sciences.

p. 28. 'As a critical discipline, the business of metaphysics is to test the various theories and propositions which pass for true in our everyday thinking

or our sciences by comparison with the standard of a "pure" or perfect experience.'

Science and critical metaphysics are thus represented as regulated by one and the same ideal, that of 'pure experience,' and the distinction between phenomenology and metaphysic reduces itself to one of scope and generality only.

Herein lies an essential defect. Science is surely not self-critical even in the interests of pure experience. The main business of science is to explain *facts*, whence its characteristic subordination of the interests of system to that of fact, its ready acceptance of any working hypothesis, however symbolical, provided it works well. It may be that the hypothesis works better in proportion as it is 'purer,' but the point is that what science is primarily concerned with is the fruitfulness of its application and not the purity of its expression. If a symbolically expressed hypothesis such as that of the undulating ether admits of deductions being drawn from it that can themselves be so expressed as to satisfy all the necessary conditions of verification, the symbolism of the original hypothesis will be a matter of very secondary importance to science.

This tendency to represent science as primarily and essentially concerned with its systematic coherency and purity is no doubt natural to the philosopher, who is apt to lay first insistence everywhere on the claims of system and the laws of thought, but it surely results in misrepresenting the ideal of science, except of course in scientific text-books where the preference

is given to system over fact in the interests of mere exposition. In its heuristic work however, science consistently subordinates system to fact, and is tolerant, on principle, of the working hypothesis. This tolerance in fact is the very expression of its phenomenism.

The best positive use to which our author has put his guiding principle is, we think, to be found in his skilful attempt to express the concepts of ethics in purely experiential terms. Indeed we accept Prof. Taylor's chapter on 'the Roots of Ethics' as a most interesting contribution to ethical science. From the evolutionary point of view he develops in an excellent way the significance in terms of pure experience of the concepts of obligation, conscience, right and wrong, responsibility, moral personality, merit.\*

And yet we cannot consider that these analyses, excellent as they are, really go to the heart of the

\* I think, too, that in insisting on the greater importance for scientific ethics of the moral sentiment or the moral judgment of approbation and disapprobation over the act of will or the motive inducing it he has done good service to ethical science strictly so-called. The standpoint of ethical science even in Introspection being *external*, that of the spectator not that of the inward experiencer, the expression of approval or disapproval is far more definite a subject of investigation than the motive. We know whether we approve or disapprove, we rarely know our own true motives. Further, as Prof. Taylor points out, the approvals and disapprovals of primitive communities are embodied in a large number of popular generalisations, and form an indispensable starting-ground for a critical science to operate upon, which would be lacking were the 'motive' the phenomenon insisted on.

moral problems they deal with. Prof. Taylor has not proved that the *full* significance of the ethical facts has been seized by the application of his principle ; he has not proved that if you go to the moral facts with your insight controlled by the idea of a spiritual whole you will not see the facts more truly and more deeply. We would maintain on the contrary that inasmuch as Prof. Taylor's view of a 'fact of experience' does not rise beyond the requirements of the inductive level, the process of purifying experience really comes to purifying experience of what is deepest and most inward in it,—that much that is to him 'symbolic' is 'symbolic' only from the restricted point of view of natural science, but ceases to be so when one's grasp of facts is widened by philosophical reflection.

This criticism has been excellently developed by Dr. Bosanquet in a paper entitled 'Recent Criticism of Green's Ethics' recently delivered before the Aristotelian Society.\* Dr. Bosanquet would admit with Prof. Taylor that so long as one remains at the level of common sense—the level of the scientific categories—the facts are as Prof. Taylor describes them, but insists that in proportion as philosophical insight is brought to bear upon this sphere of common sense the area of 'facts' widens, and much becomes 'fact' which was previously a merely symbolic notion. The scope of 'facts' depends on the ideas which go in search for them. Once you have a grasp of what is

\* *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* New Series.—Vol. ii. p. 25 sq.

meant by a true organic whole, an identity in difference, a true unity of self, you will thereby be enabled 'to observe and analyze experiences which without these ideas cannot be noticed or recorded.' Common sense has no *organs* for such experiences. 'Common sense, or, in technical language, the categories of the natural sciences, are unable to apprehend these elements, and when confronted with them simply report a blank. So that, unless you have recourse to some of the more concrete ideas or standpoints furnished by philosophy, you have not the eyes to see the objects of your study.' This transcending of the facts of ordinary experience, far from implying a lessened vision of fact, a skeletonizing of life's flesh and blood, means an enriching of experience. It means starting the investigation of fact with a *completer* conception of what a fact of experience is than is possible to the inductive scientist, to whom nothing that implies a relation of subject to object—a relation not to be understood at all in the light of a scientific category such as that of causation—can be a possible fact of experience. The meaning of fact is wonderfully deepened when one catches sight of the *inward* aspect of facts of experience, an aspect not amenable to inductive treatment, and therefore *unseen* in the light of the inductive ideal.

The distinction we are here concerned with between the two meanings of 'a fact of experience,' the scientific and the philosophical, is so important and so far-reaching in its consequences, that it will be

worth our while to spend some time in pointing out what some of these consequences are. This we can perhaps best do by considering certain recent examples of philosophy's attempt to do itself justice by erecting its philosophical superstructure upon the *scientific* interpretation of a datum or fact of experience.

We may take first a recent discussion by Dr. MacLennan on the function of ideas in experience. ('Mind.' Jan. 1903 'Existence and Content'). Dr. MacLennan's main point, which is developed in a most lucid and instructive way, is that this function is essentially 'symbolical.' Ideas, we are repeatedly told, are mere symbols that are in no way *constitutive* of real experience. They are the instruments by which we control our concrete, *i.e.*, our sensational experience, but they are no real part of that experience itself. Experience is not made more concrete through their effective presence and service. Dr. MacLennan presents us with a world of sense-feeling-experience on the one hand which is real, and a world of meanings, of systematised symbols with a purely regulative function on the other, which is not real, *i.e.*, not a constituent factor of real experience. *Meaning* is essentially, inherently regulative, and is in no way constitutive of reality.

These conclusions appear to me to exemplify most clearly the results which philosophy inevitably reaches when it accepts the abstract view of what constitutes a fact of experience as its starting-point, and as the given concrete, completed reality, requiring not to

be *enriched* through philosophic insight but simply rendered more determinate. It is the sure condition for making philosophy the minister of science, and knowledge the slave of feeling and sensation. For since reality is taken as already *given* in what is experienced, it follows that whatever additional factors are brought in to explain it, are not in themselves real. As a matter of philosophical history they have come to be termed 'symbolical.' Nor can they be *constitutive*, for real experience is substantially complete without them, and they can but render it more determinate, not in any sense more concrete. But what is neither real nor in anyway constitutive of reality must obviously serve the interests of what *is* real or disappear into the phantom world from which it has been rescued solely in virtue of the regulative function experience requires it to fulfil. Ideas are not regulative in their own right, but mock-rulers, like the queen-bee in a hive. They are *instruments*, not principles of control; they are of the shadow, not of the substance.

It is in this light that Science regards its working hypotheses, and the sciences themselves quā systematic structures. A science is an organised symbolism for the proper determination and control of facts. And for *science* to so regard its system of explanation is both reasonable and inevitable. For the experience that science professedly studies and endeavours to understand does not include the *meanings* whereby it is understood. Such meanings simply symbolize scientific fact in the form of theory more or less systematised, but

permanently and exclusively symbolical and extra-real in character. Science is just the symbolical language of real fact. And from this point of view we can see clearly why it is that science subordinates system to fact. Fact is real, system symbolical, and the symbol is surely subordinate to that which it symbolises.

Now if we but take our stand on the fact of experience, philosophically understood as including the subject-object relation in every item of its developed structure, all these conclusions are at once overborne and transfigured. Ideas are no longer *symbols* but *real powers*: symbols for science, they are unifying principles for philosophy; they are no longer regulative only, \* but essentially and fundamentally constitutive. It is true that meaning, even from the philosophical point of view cannot *constitute* reality, but it can and must be a constituent *factor* of reality.† It is true that philosophy cannot dispense with symbols, but for philosophy *words*, not ideas, are symbols. For science, both words and ideas are symbolic, and this double symbolism is just the inherent limitation which philosophical insight can alone remove. If we 'change regulative principles into constitutive entities,' argues Dr. MacLennan, we 'destroy their significance.' For science, yes, not for philosophy. From the concrete view-point of the latter, we first see

\* They are regulative of course only on the understanding that they are conditioned by what they regulate.

† For a luminous discussion concerning the philosophical significance of ideas cf. Prof. Henry Jones's First Article on "Idealism and Epistemology" Mind. N. S. ii., 1893, p. 294-306.

regulative principles aright when we apprehend them as the most intimately real factors in the experience to which they intrinsically belong.

The distinction between the two standpoints, the scientific and the philosophical,—is thus emphatically the fundamental distinction apart from which there is in philosophical study nothing but repeated vexation of spirit. The comparison between the theoretical and the moral consciousness—a favourite philosophema—leads as a rule to self-contradictory results simply because ‘theoretical consciousness’ is made to stand indifferently for ‘scientific consciousness’ and ‘philosophic consciousness.’ We can accordingly hardly emphasize too much the importance of clearly grasping what we mean by a fact of experience philosophically conceived.

In Dr. Shadworth Hodgson’s presidential address, read before the Aristotelian Society (Nov. 2, 1903), we have another illustration of the pass to which philosophical thought is brought when it starts from that inadequate conception of experience as equivalent to the experienced which characterizes the standpoint of science and common sense. Dr. Hodgson fitly and rightly maintains that human speculative knowledge cannot extend to worlds beyond that for which human experience gives us data. Speculative activity is limited

by its data. What then are these data, for  
p. 13. that is the philosophic crux? Our ultimate data, we read, are ‘the simplest sensations.’ They are in fact data as science conceives them. Starting from this basis we find, logically enough, that such

concepts as 'substance, power, agent, agency, subject, self' are *mere* 'summaries of classes or p. 9. series of human experiences,' *i.e.*, the *flatus vocis* of nominalism, and further that a speculative theory of the universe cannot be more than vain imagining. And then, with logical consistency, if the *reductio ad absurdum* of an abstract philosophy with all its inevitable contradictions can be called logical—the practical consequences of these conclusions are interestingly developed. We are to experience in the first place the great relief of never thinking any longer beyond a certain point, for the attempt to do so has been shown to be radically incapable of leading p. 10. ing to any theoretical knowledge whatsoever.

'To be finally relieved from following up attempts to frame a speculative theory of the universe, attempts which from the nature of the case are foredoomed to failure, is surely to be counted a gain, a benefit, an advantage to human thought.'

In the second place, the surrender of all such meta-physical effort finds us taking up with regard p. 13. to the universe a practical *instead* of a speculative attitude. The inevitable scepticism of philosophy when it philosophizes from the scientific standpoint is relieved by the sheer will to believe in the trustworthiness of the unknowable. Theoretical scepticism is transfigured into blind practical faith.

Dr. Hodgson seems to think that humanity will settle down thus to the inevitable and be no more troubled by speculative disquietudes. But he fails to

see in the first place that the 'practical attitude' recommended, which he alludes to in his con-  
p. 15. cluding words as 'a certain kind of practical attitude towards the speculatively unknown and unknowable regions of the universe' could never be a satisfying attitude, for the simple reason that it is not practical. How can faith in the unknowable be termed a *practical* attitude? And he further fails to realise that the metaphysical nisus is fundamentally the mind's legitimate aspiration after self-knowledge, simply because his view of what constitutes our 'philosophical' experience is so abstract. It may readily be admitted that were such experience reduced to the dimensions required by the nature of the data we are limited to by Dr. Hodgson, we should soon settle down contentedly, so far as theoretical enquiry goes, to our *scientific* aspirations for no deeper aspirations could intelligibly characterize such experience. It is true that Dr. Hodgson believes that the constituents of a genuine philosophical experience will

still remain to us. It will remain to us in the  
p. 11. shape of 'phenomena of human feeling, emotion, desire, action, and practice, the nature and justification of the conception of moral right and wrong, and the grounds, if any, which man's practical and moral nature affords for his entertaining ideas concerning his relations to those unseen portions of the universe, a speculative knowledge of which he has surrendered as unattainable;' but he fails to see that the very reason which renders such speculative

knowledge visionary and unattainable precludes the existence of a philosophic standpoint altogether. Given the data just enumerated, the possibility of a philosophy is given with them, but as the spiritual principle is with Dr. Hodgson entirely unknowable, there is no other course open but to study them *scientifically*. With these data we may frame a science of ethics, but not a moral philosophy.

But granted that we have come to feel the presence of the spiritual principle in our lives, and the presence of its unifying function, how shall we then be able to refrain from philosophising in ways that would cancel as inadequate all Dr. Hodgson's conclusions? When we ask the forbidden question we shall then feel that it is "the pressure of the answer" that urges the question itself into existence. 'Console-toi,' says Pascal's God in answer to Pascal's troubled prayer. "Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m'avais déjà trouvé." And what is the  $\pi\rho\hat{\omega}\tau\sigma$   $\psi\epsilon\hat{\nu}\delta\sigma$  underlying all this dismal stultification of philosophic interest and purpose? I find it in Dr. Hodgson's inadequate view of what constitutes a "fact of experience," or to express my objection in a form Dr. Hodgson would prefer, I consider that what renders his reasoning philosophically defective, is the covert assumption that experience can be taken as a datum of philosophical study apart from any adequate Epistemology or Theory of the Categories. A datum or fact *per se* is general and abstract. The concrete datum is the datum - in - relation - to - a - category - of -

explanation, datum = datum-in-relation-to-category. The philosophical datum is the datum-in-relation-to-philosophical-categories such as that of Spirit or Self-consciousness. The real battle between the physical and the metaphysical philosophies, between Naturalism and Idealism centres round the categories.

2. We pass on now to Prof. Taylor's main point as outlined at the beginning of the lecture, his direct attempt at proving that ethics cannot be based on metaphysics.

Prof. Taylor defines the function of metaphysics as nothing more mysterious than the complete and consistent *description* of the facts of experience as a whole in the purest and simplest terms possible. And at the same time it cannot aim at being more than a purely *formal* science. Metaphysics on its constructive side can only hope to discover the formal conditions of experience in general.

cf. p. 7. cf. p. 29. We have here two characteristics emphasized, the "descriptive" and the "formal," and the requirements are surely incompatible. For in becoming *formally* descriptive, metaphysics becomes descriptive in name only. A description with all detail missed out, a description in outline only, a mere abstract of experience, how can this be called description? Prof. Taylor, however, lays little stress on these two attributes, but emphasizes rather the further fact that metaphysics, if it can be said to exist at all—and the metaphysical moralists of course presuppose its

existence—must in its own formal way give the “absolute” truth. “If it is possible to discover with certainty even the most general and formal characteristics which would belong to the contents of a ‘pure’ or completed experience as such, the science which deals with these characteristics, though far from being identical with ‘the absolute truth about the world,’ would at least be a kind of knowledge which, unlike any other, was so far final that its

p. 29. outlines would be in need merely of filling in with detail, and not of actual alteration, in order to make them the ‘absolute truth.’”

Metaphysics then, according to Prof. Taylor, must be not only “descriptive” and “formal” but “absolutely true” so far as it goes.

Had Prof. Taylor laid greater stress on what he firmly believes to be an inseparable attribute of metaphysics, namely its purely formal quality, I cannot but think that the most natural and consistent proof he could have given of his main thesis would have been somewhat as follows:—“Constructive metaphysics is essentially formal. Hence, if ethics is deducible from metaphysics it must also be of a purely formal character. But a formal ethics is impossible, for all formal ethics, *i.e.*, metaphysical theories of ethics, are practically Kantian in character and the logical impotency of these has been made abundantly clear by the critics of Kant from Hegel downwards. Therefore ethics cannot be based on metaphysics.”

cf. p. 38. cf. p. 351.

Once the formal character of metaphysics is conceded, I cannot see how this brief argument can be met. Prof. Taylor would then naturally have devoted his main energies to substantiating his views concerning the essentially formal character of metaphysics—the speculative science that is “beyond the good and the bad”—in which case it would have enabled us to point out that once the change was made from a formal to a concrete metaphysics the difficulty of recognising a metaphysical basis of ethics might in principle be already overcome.

The line of criticism which Prof. Taylor actually adopts, is founded, however, on the third of the three characteristics of metaphysics already alluded to. When Prof. Taylor refers to the basing of ethics on metaphysics he means, by metaphysics, the absolute philosophy in its formal outline. Unless there is “insight into ultimate truth,” and that of the

p. 240 metaphysical kind, *i.e.*, pure and all-compre-

prehensive, there can be no talk of basing ethics on metaphysics, for there is simply no basis to start from. “Is ethics capable of being based on meta-

physics?” simply means “Is ethics capable of

cf. p. 37 being based on a genuine metaphysical

knowledge of the ultimate character of reality as a whole?” If so, it should show traces of its absolute origin. Ethics should prove on analysis to

p. 239 be “a body of systematic and coherent deduc-

tions from a single principle,” consequently perfectly free from all self-contradiction. It must show

itself to be a perfectly self-consistent and a perfectly defined whole. Prof. Taylor furnishes a whole array of other requisites, but self-consistency cf. p. 36-37 is the essential. As sharing the nature of the absolute it must be *non-contradictory*.

The line of criticism thus marked out, our author, guided still by his empirical ideal, proceeds to show with great thoroughness and in ample detail that once ethical concepts and ideals are properly purified and empirically understood, they afford by their inherent inconsistencies, when pressed beyond a certain point, a multiplied disproof of the metaphysical assumption of a single supreme good. Were this "supreme good" a metaphysical fact, moral experience should not present us with these insoluble problems, but show us the moral life as the working out in detail of a single principle. In particular, as already indicated, there would be no irreconcileable duality between our egoistic and altruistic ideals, no necessity for working compromises. In realising ourselves we should at the same time lose nothing. Self-assertion and self-sacrifice would be converging, not diverging ideals of conduct. Whereas, as a matter of fact, "the id. p. 307 moral ideal, so far as it is practicable at all, is essentially a compromise. From beginning to end the assumptions of ethics are arbitrary and conflicting and its conclusions only satisfying so long as you do id. p. 279 not think too closely about them." "It were scarcely less bold to assert that the English constitution can be deduced from the principles of

ultimate metaphysical science, than to say the same thing of our convenient practical assumptions about self-realisation and self-sacrifice, culture and benevolence."

It seems strange that Prof. Taylor should not have realised what all this argument amounts to: simply to this, that moral experience, as it is, is far from satisfying the postulate of perfection. This is perfectly true. But it does not justify the conclusion: The ideal of a *Summum Bonum* is therefore a delusion.

We may give a sharper point to this objection by translating it into the abstracter language proper to the inductive level. Moral experience, we repeat, may indeed be far from satisfying the postulate of moral uniformity, but we ask whether the scientist who meets with apparent contradictions in his attempt to understand Nature is justified in abandoning his guiding principle of uniformity as the simplest way out of the difficulty? The suggestion is absurd, but the postulate of uniformity is surely as indispensable in ethical inquiry of the strictly inductive kind, as in any other branch of 'Natural' science.

## LECTURE II



## PREFACE

PROF. TAYLOR'S simultaneous renunciation of the principle of moral uniformity and of the philosophical factor in ethics leaves him, logically, no ground to stand on. But his method betrays his true position. Not only is it anti-inductive as we have seen, but it is positively and essentially philosophical, as we hope to show in the next lecture. Prof. Taylor's own dialectic drives him into the philosophical position.

The teleological point of view, characteristic of true moral philosophy, is well represented by its dominant question: How do facts express, not "natural law"—this is the inductive question,—but "spiritual purpose?" Prof. Taylor's teleology is not so concrete or so explicit as this, but, as we hope to show, it is formally implied in his whole method of criticism.

Reverting to Prof. Taylor's main argument, we see that it resumes itself in the follow-

ing challenge to the philosophical moralist: first, make quite sure of absolute truth in formal outline, develop then your body of ethical doctrine from it, convince me that it is entirely free from self-discrepancy, and I will admit your contention that ethics is rooted in metaphysics. The whole stress is laid here on the outward form, and the true contention of the philosophical moralist ignored; namely, that what is wanted in ethical theory is not an arid, futile perfection of lifeless form—"splendidly null, dead perfection, and no more," but the recognition of the effective in-dwelling of the idea of perfection as the one standard and ideal of moral conduct.

In his masterly defence of the spiritual idea as the practical standard which we can effectively apply to all cases of conduct,\* Professor Bosanquet meets Mr. McTaggart's objection that the idea of perfection is useless as a criterion, and in particular maintains the dignity of the supreme good as the sole ultimate standard.

The standard with which every action is compared is the insight of our systematised convictions into the individualised situation. Such insight may be justifiably intuitionist. If our habits and associations have throughout their formation been informed with the spiritual

\* The idealist substitute for casuistry and its moral code.

idea, they will have earned the right to represent for the individual concerned, at any moment, in the appropriate circumstance and in their own intuitionist way, that accumulated and organised wisdom which, as functional and directive in his conduct, is, for him, the *Summum Bonum*.

## LECTURE II

WE may take it that every investigator who has facts to deal with and wishes to treat them scientifically, will postulate that the phenomena he investigates are free from such caprices as would baffle the attempt to bring them under law. "I will go on the assumption," says the investigator, "that the facts are expressive of rigid law, and I will make it my business to discover what these laws may be. If I find what seems to be an exception to a well-established law, I will accept the omen as pointing not to a freak of free agency on Nature's part but to an ignorance on mine of what the laws of Nature precisely are." Progress is made in the inductive sciences, not by abandoning at any stage the guiding idea of unbreakable law, but by such loyal adherence to that idea as compels us to assume that the apparent exception does not mean deviation from law but deviation from theory.

I should accordingly be only too ready to insist that in so far as moral facts are attacked with the

inductive weapon, a similar attitude should be observed towards them as is observed by the astronomer in dealing with the movements of planets and stars. Let the attitude be duly marked by a supreme faith in law, let the demon of free agency be impressively ignored, let the whole investigation, in short, be marked by the profound regulative belief that the harmonious systematization of the moral facts under law is only a matter of time and patience, and that apparent exceptions, far from being grounds of despair, are the opportunities for deeper insight into the meaning of law in the moral world.

There is no pessimism possible so long as ethical science is true to its inductive spirit. And even when the persistently refractory nature of its material induces a suspicion of its regulative principle, nothing less becoming is called for than a little scientific modesty. The conclusion may indeed be reached that there is something in a "moral fact," that the inductive methods cannot attain to, that the "fact," is actuated by an "ideal," and that in the dim recesses of the fact there is an incalculable demon of freedom to be reckoned with; but the resources of reason are happily not exhausted when one method gives way in dealing with a certain type of fact. If the fate of reason were conceived as bound up with that of the inductive method in such a way as to yield to the irrational, just in proportion as the latter yields up the supremacy of its guiding

principle, then pessimism could never be far off from the open-eyed student of morals.

Prof. Taylor's pessimism accordingly leaves him in an awkward position. As inductive moralist, he has no right to be pessimistic and in so far as he loses faith in his science and the inductive postulate, he exposes himself to the just remonstrance of the more loyal and logical devotees of the method. But in so far as he acknowledges the limitations of the method in matters moral, his further advance must take him in our direction. For to be thus pushed towards some point of view that transcends the inductive standpoint with its proved inadequacies, is to admit that the attempt to understand moral facts eventually necessitates a critical revision of the resources of our reason, in order to discover what this transcending point of view may be. And this is to move out of ethical science into moral philosophy.

How shall we picture to ourselves a transition of this kind? It would be misleading to liken it to movement up a height whereby more extensive views are commanded in proportion as one ascends, for it is not the horizon that is extended but the significance of the facts at one's feet. But it would be still more misleading to liken it to a total change of view-point in the sense that the field of vision in the one case differed entirely from that in the other, as though it meant moving from one side of a mountain to the other.

What is gained in the transition is depth of insight.

Science has no right to say to philosophy: "The facts are in my possession, you can have what's over. You may, if you so please, suggest ultimate ends and categorical imperatives, it is for me, as sole custodian of fact, to test whether your suggestions are approved by the facts." For in any such statement there lurks the fallacy, the fundamental fallacy, of supposing that science with its inductive postulate or Avenarian conception of experience can possibly see the facts in such a way as to justify philosophical insight. The facts cannot be sieved through the inductive apparatus and retain the characteristics impressed upon them by philosophy, for it is the avowed function of such machinery to purify away all unmanageable transfigurations of the facts with which it deals.

It would take us too far from our main track were we to endeavour to substantiate forthwith, and in adequate detail, our view of philosophy's contribution to ethics. We content ourselves here with the following brief indication that in recognising the philosophical idea of perfection as indispensable for conduct, we conceive it as a teleological ideal, the question asked from this new view-point being no longer, as on the inductive level: how does this fact express natural law? but the teleological question: how does this fact express spiritual purpose?

The teleological point of view, more especially characteristic of moral philosophy, is at once the more inward and the more complete point of view, the

point of view which transcends that proper to inductive enquiry by taking an inward and concrete instead of an external and abstract view of its object, a view of moral action, that is, which *includes* its self-determination in accordance with an ideal as absolute as is our own spiritual nature. When we talk then, somewhat loosely, of transcending experience as we pass from the point of view of science to that of philosophy, what we mean is the transcending of an abstract conception of experience by taking in neglected elements, the neglected elements being the more inward and in that sense the more essential elements.

There is no *opposition* between the inductive and the teleological methods. The inductive method is applicable to all classes of fact, but only in the case of facts that are not "products of experience" can it be said to be an *adequate* method. The teleological method can be applied only where a system is conceived as in process of self-articulation, when an experience is held as developing in the light of some guiding ideal, conceived as a supreme good. Where both methods are applicable, the facts dealt with by the former gain all their ultimate meaning and value from the facts as conceived by the latter.

We must not lose sight, however, of Prof. Taylor's main argument, which, as we have seen, ran briefly thus:—"If ethics were founded on metaphysics, it would be capable of being developed as an exact science that never falls into contradiction with itself,

for to have a metaphysics at all is to have absolute truth in formal outline. As it is impossible, however, to find a *Summum Bonum* that is void of self-discrepancy, this shows that the *Summum Bonum* is not a metaphysical idea but an empirical notion raised to the rank of an ideal and under no form capable of fulfilling its supreme office."

We can hardly fail to notice that Prof. Taylor has so stated his case as to be from the outset certain of victory. He requires that the philosophical moralist shall accept his own definition of metaphysics as already giving absolute truth in form complete. To establish ethics on a metaphysical basis one must proceed, according to Prof. Taylor, from a system of unshakeable certainties and deduce therefrom one's system of ethics in formal outline. Such a claim might with some decency have been made on the Cartesian Rationalist, but to press it on the Concrete Idealism of to-day is preposterous. The contention of the latter is not that ethics is a deduction from an achieved metaphysic but that some kind of philosophical enquiry—which we may provisionally agree to refer to as metaphysical—is imperative if we are to justify the indwelling presence of a spiritual principle in the moral life.

Prof. Taylor has indeed weighted us with a task fit for omniscience! What mortal can hope to preface his treatise on morals with a completed metaphysics which he can guarantee to be in outline absolutely true? Surely an unachievable ambition, and quite as

useless as it is unachievable. For from a formal metaphysics none but a formal ethics can be deduced, and a formal ethics is, on Prof. Taylor's own confession, impotent. Hence even if the philosophical moralist *could* prove what Prof. Taylor requires of him, he would, in establishing ethics on its metaphysical basis, have systematised a set of principles essentially inapplicable to the facts of the moral life.

Prof. Taylor in fact confuses formal outline with inward essence in his statement of the relation between the two sciences. If ethics is based on metaphysics, there should be, in his opinion, no uncertainty of any kind as to the *boundary-lines* of the science. *id p. 31.* “The sphere and subject-matter of ethics should be defined with exceptional exactness.”

But it is upon the *inward essence* that the idealist contention turns, upon the effective presence of the spiritual idea in life, upon the part played by that idea in the practical guidance of conduct. Can the postulate of perfection or principle of a supreme good really dominate conduct? Can it efficiently play the part of a *standard* or criterion of right action? These are the fateful questions, and if we can answer them in the affirmative, we shall have given the true and the relevant answer to Prof. Taylor's denials.

On this crucial question we have an excellent and very recent statement by Prof. Bosanquet,\* and I will try and develop his main point. It is the attempt to

\* ‘Hedonism among Idealists’—*Mind*, April and July, 1903.

explain the sense in which a metaphysical principle enters into the concretest possible relations with the actual moral life as an immanent regulative principle, and continues to play the part of a supreme moral standard throughout all the vicissitudes of moral development.

The two articles taken together, as readers of *Mind* will know, are intended as a criticism of a chapter in Dr. McTaggart's book, "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology." The chapter is entitled "On the Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion.

Dr. McTaggart believes in a Supreme Good, and is thus fundamentally at one with Prof. Bosanquet in maintaining the philosophical idea in Ethics;\* but he contends, strangely enough, that the Supreme

\* This belief in a *Summum Bonum* is apparently not shared by all idealists. In a spirited article in *Mind* (July 1900) Mr. Sturt mercilessly criticises the conception of a highest end. 'That unfortunate doctrine of a *Summum Bonum*' is, we are told, a recrudescence of Paganism, and its supporters blinded by an excessive admiration for the age of Pericles. And yet it is hard for the reader to convince himself that Mr. Sturt is not himself a perfectionist, since he holds that the realising of the *Social* self is a perfectly legitimate end of moral action (*id.* p. 382). The *Summum Bonum* is surely conceded. What is not conceded is a certain conception of the moral end. The cult of character, the self-regarding ideal, these are identified by a converse fallacy of accident with the *Summum Bonum*, and the *Summum Bonum* made to bear the brunt of an attack that only affects one of its formulæ: that of self-realisation in one form or another. I should like therefore to think that perfectionism is still logically justified in claiming Mr. Sturt as a supporter.

Good may be one thing and the criterion of morality, another. The practically operative criterion of morality he asserts to be hedonic. We have, therefore, as the *operative* moral standard, not the supreme good, but pleasure, the idea of perfection being too abstract and remote from everyday issues to give us the guidance that we need. We have here three main points :—

1. The moral criterion *may* be other than the Supreme Good itself, *i.e.*, other than the idea of perfection.
2. The idea of perfection is useless as a criterion.
3. The hedonic computation of pleasures and pains does give us a definite criterion, right or wrong.

Prof. Bosanquet's first article is mainly devoted to the criticism of the third of these three points, the second article deals mainly with the second point. The first point is touched on in both articles. We shall briefly consider it first and then turn our attention exclusively to Prof. Bosanquet's criticism of the alleged uselessness of perfection as a criterion.

A good criterion, argues Prof. Bosanquet, must be essential, not extraneous. "It is a very serious matter indeed for the mind to be preoccupied throughout its practical deliberations with ideas which are not of the *essence* of what it really aims to I. p. 204 achieve," since these extraneous ideas tend in such case to assume that essential influence over

one's conduct to which they confessedly have not a just claim." Moreover if the moral life is to be fruitful, analogy shows that it is the essential element which should be kept as a type or pattern before the mind, and not the accessory factors. "Ideas become fruitful,

I. p. 204 say in law or politics or science, just in proportion to the precision with which essentials as opposed to concomitants are retained before the mind."

Thus if pleasure were really the moral end, it would be absurd to argue with Mill that the way to attain it was to look away from it, as it is only truly found by those who don't go in quest of it. Mill's recipe for finding happiness is no doubt an excellent one, but this only goes to prove that pleasure is *not* the moral end. The moral ideal should be kept in the apple of one's eye, at the focus of clearest vision and not at the blind spot. Only in this way can it have its full effect upon the life, become a nucleus for emotions, memories and associations, and the controlling power in one's destiny. I do not see how we can help agreeing with Prof. Bosanquet when he points out that in all intricate matters of conduct, e.g., in law or politics, where varying and important emergencies press upon us, it is of the very first practical importance to keep the right principle and not the wrong one before the attention, and that the

habit of so doing makes constantly the whole \*cf. II. difference between good and bad work.\*  
p. 305.

We conclude then that the moral criterion and the *Summum Bonum* must coincide. The

*Summum Bonum* once granted, it cannot take a second place in the moral life.

There seems little doubt that if Dr. McTaggart had clearly seen how the idea of perfection *could* play the part of a practical criterion of moral conduct, he would not have suggested this separation of the kingly function from the kingly office. If the rightful ruler is impotent, his viceroy must represent him, but if his rule can be shown to be powerful, persistent and actual, there is no possible reason for transferring the reins of government. This brings us to the main point in Prof. Bosanquet's criticism.

Prof. Bosanquet admits at the outset that if the use of the idea of Perfection as a means of guidance is to consist in a mere comparison between the perplexities of some particular situation on the one hand and the dictates of an abstract rule of perfection on the other, Dr. McTaggart is right ; the comparison is futile, and the idea of perfection an ineffective counsellor who speaking a universal language, the language of all time and of all men, has yet no word that can reach to the heart of the individualised situation.

The fallacy lies, as Prof. Bosanquet clearly points out, in taking the principle apart from the stages in which its nature is revealed, instead of seeing it embodied

cf. II. though imperfectly, at every stage of our  
p. 306. experience. The idea of perfection must be conceived, not as hovering over our experience but as working within it. Above all, it is

absurd to conceive of it as a pure principle revealing at every stage to the inner eye that looks to it for guidance the radiance of ultimate reality. "The shape it takes would not do for ultimate reality," but it <sup>II. p. 307</sup> is just as true, as the writer pertinently adds, that the shape it might take for ultimate reality will not do for the given stage of experience. We are bidden remember that what might appear inadequate from the point of view of life's realised whole may be perfectly adequate to the part.

The idea of perfection, then, is to be considered as active, relatively to the capacities of our imperfect experience, whatever they may be, and not as an empty form, but as the meaning of the gathered moral experience which at a given moment and under given conditions, embodies it. A French writer of the Revolution, Rivarol, has spoken of nature as working from within outwards, the various forms taken by her being just the limits which this inner working has temporarily reached. So Professor Bosanquet, in respect of the moral ideal. The shape of the moral life at any moment, he writes,\* <sup>cf. p. 307.</sup> "is the idea of perfection working in experience down to that moment, as a striving after the completest harmony possible under all the conditions."

It would be misleading then to say that our moral life is realised under the light and inspiration of a changeless ideal, for the progressive realisation of moral life *is* the progressive realisation of the

meaning and power of the Supreme Good. Prof. Bosanquet quotes from the *Republic*, 505 E, a passage which he interprets in this very sense. "The good, which every soul pursues, as the end of all its actions, divining its existence, but perplexed and unable to apprehend satisfactorily its nature;"—a passage implying that the Good is our guide throughout, but changes as we pursue it.

Prof. Bosanquet gives a concrete illustration of his point which may help us better to realise and fix his meaning. Dr. McTaggart had maintained that the schoolmaster's idea of his station and its duties did not teach a schoolmaster how to deal rightly with a particular boy on a particular occasion. Prof. Bosanquet remarks that Dr. McTaggart is here reducing the idea of one's station to a general conception of one's place in society as distinct from other places, and this, he affirms, "is a very poor idea of one's station." "Who says 'schoolmaster,' says a 'walking theory and practice of education.' This is 'what it is to be' a schoolmaster. His conception of his position as distinct, say, from that of the clergyman and the parent, is just the outline of an idea which theory and experience have filled in and adapted in detail, till his position involves for him a distinct conception of his individual duty to each individual boy who is entrusted to his charge, and this again carries with it the reaction of his trained

II.p.313.

nature upon every occasion and situation which arises."

We are prepared to see now what a vital difference II. p. 306. there is between the abstract and the concrete conceptions of the Supreme Good. "By recognising the idea of perfection only in the abstract shape which presents itself as the result of [formal] metaphysic, and failing to insist that this abstract shape is imperfect until charged with the life and power of all reality, the idea of perfection is made a particular instead of a universal. It becomes a hard atom, which takes up an attitude of exclusion to the world whose *core* it should be."

On the other hand by recognising the idea of Perfection in its concrete shape we are able to see the true inner significance of Mr. Bradley's conception of "My station and its duties," to understand how the Supreme Good may penetrate one's view of morality, and realise the living sense in which the idea of Perfection, individual in its application, may abide with us as the permanent standard of

II. p. 204 moral action. "The application of a criterion to actual moral conduct must always be of the same nature as the application of scientific principles to the solution of a highly individualised problem. Such a solution is 'universal,' because it brings to bear the spirit and content of a highly organised system upon a single point; but it is not 'general' in the current sense of the word. The criterion, therefore, *as applied*, must be a concrete

system, according to which solutions are framed to  
satisfy complex individual groups of con-  
II. p. 315. ditions."—"The idea of perfection is for  
conduct what the idea of system is for science."

## LECTURE III



## PREFACE

THE distinction between the inductive method of Science and the teleological method of Philosophy is primarily determined by the difference between two ways of conceiving a fact of experience. If the fact of experience is identified with the object known through the experience, we are in a position to treat it by inductive methods. We can get outside it and so observe it, experiment with it, theorise upon it and verify our theories by appeal to it. Thus our object, the sense-world, confronts us as a system of facts subsisting in permanent independence of the theories tentatively superinduced upon them in the attempt to explain them. Such theories must aim at expressing *natural laws*, for theories concerning spiritual purpose in this sense-world of nature are incapable of verification. We may be able to prove that a certain group of facts behaves *as if* it expressed a certain purpose, but

we can never verify the existence of the spiritual purpose itself as we *can* verify the subordination of matter in motion to rigid law.

But if we take the fact of experience concretely as including the relation between ourselves, who experience, and the objects experienced, we have in the spiritual factor in that experience the very presence of purposive activity, so that to take experience in its integrity necessitates our treating it teleologically.

From this difference in standpoint other differences follow. Science appropriately subordinates the interest of system to that of fact. Hypotheses must correspond with facts or be condemned as untrue. Philosophy, on the other hand, gives the primacy to system, accounting no end achieved save in so far as it brings harmony and cancels contradictions. Thus the postulate of the systematic unity of nature is a philosophical postulate, involving a teleological conception of the Universe, whereas the true inductive postulate is the postulate of uniformity, of nature's uniform obedience to rigid law.

The contrast between the two points of view may be exhibited as follows in tabular form :—

## SCIENCE

## PHILOSOPHY

1. The <i>postulate</i> of uniformity.	1. The <i>postulate</i> of systematic unity.
2. The <i>test</i> of correspondence.	2. The <i>test</i> of consistency and harmony.
3. The principle of verification.	3. The principle of realisation.
4. The supremacy of <i>fact</i> .	4. The supremacy of <i>system</i> .
5. Inductive method.	5. Teleological method.

The principle of non-contradiction once accepted as the formal principle of all teleological method, it follows that its exclusive use by Prof. Taylor as a test of truth implies his acceptance of the teleological point of view as authoritative in ethics. Prof. Taylor's whole treatment of conduct thus presupposes the philosophical idea.

As regards Prof. Bosanquet's teleological handling of the problem of conduct, it is, as we have seen, far more concrete and explicit than Prof. Taylor's. We do not however consider that the logic of the Self as he conceives it does justice to the fact of Personality. To see to it that such justice is done is the avowed purpose of Personal Idealism, in whose eyes Monism" and "The Absolute" stand out essentially as problems still awaiting a satisfactory solution.

## LECTURE III

These last citations from Professor Bosanquet's articles have introduced an analogy between morality and science on which the writer lays stress throughout. I have purposely refrained from pressing it in my development of his apologia for the *Summum Bonum*, partly because I do not agree with the way in which it is pressed, but mainly because a separate discussion of it at the present juncture may serve to shed additional light on the vital distinction between the teleological method of philosophy and the inductive method of science which we have already noticed.

The natural tendency of the human mind in quest of explanation is to seek for it in the direction of means adjusted to ends. To explain a thing, in the most fundamental sense of the term, is to point out the purpose which it serves. Hence the anthropomorphic tendency in the primitive explanation of natural phenomena. With the Greek, too the prevailing tendency was to look upon phenomena not as expressive of law but as expressive of purpose. The

essential discovery of modern science is that its ideal, the thorough understanding of *nature*, can be reached only by subordinating the idea of end entirely to that of law. Even in the biological sciences where the notion of function is so predominant, sole stress is laid on the mechanism of function. In the "atom" of biology, the protoplasmic germ-cell, biology recognises a complex mechanism the details of whose structure and function are continually becoming more intelligible in the light of embryological and histological research. But of the "vital forces" that direct this mechanism biology can say nothing beyond recognising the necessity of recognising them, for biology can treat of "purpose" only in so far as purpose is discoverable as law. In natural history, again, on its evolutional side, sole stress is laid on the *mechanism* of the interaction between organisms and their environment, and principles of explanation such as that of natural selection become operative in the science—quā science—only in so far as they are divested of any teleological significance.

The apotheosis of law in modern science is at the same time the apotheosis of fact. Respect for fact and reverence for law, the two great scientific emotions, have one and the same root, for if it is true that laws are to be respected only in so far as they are verified by the facts, it is equally true that scientific reverence for fact does not extend beyond the point at which fact is amenable to law. A fact that expresses a purpose is no longer a scientific fact, unless it expresses

a law as well, and if it expresses the latter it is indifferent to modern science whether it expresses the former or not.

Now it is most important to realise that the sciences of nature (as opposed to the sciences of mind) are, by the very nature of the case, obliged to approach their subject from the outside if they wish to do justice to it. Whatever life or mind may constitute the inner being of so-called inanimate nature the scientist cannot share it in such a way as to make any knowledge of its procedure as a purposeful agent a basis for his investigations. He starts with facts which, as given facts, do not reveal any inward principles of unity, mere facts of sense-perception, so we say. By experimenting with these facts he discovers laws which serve to render the behaviour of these facts intelligible. But as the fact itself is never in a position to append its signature to the discovery of these laws and affirm that what is law to the scientist is, in itself, a realised fact, an experience of its own being, the explanation still remains external to the fact. Hence "truth" comes to mean for science "correspondence of theory with fact," a theory being true just in proportion as it is far-reaching in explanatory power, and the *opposition* between fact and theory, or between fact and system remains as a *permanent* requirement of scientific method.

The real nature of this relation between fact and theory is clearly brought out in the scientific requisite of verification. The paramount stress laid on this

requisite by science not only evidences the subordination of the claims of system in science to the claims of fact, but also the nature of the test of truth in the sphere of science: the test, not of self-consistency but of fruitfulness in accounting for fact.

In the case of the sciences of mind there is of course no longer the *necessity* for approaching the facts in this way. The scientific treatment of psychological problems on the basis of the uniformity principle is here subordinate to the essentially teleological treatment of the same problems, characteristic of the apperceptionist psychology, *e.g.*, of Professor Stout's psychology with its theory of conation. This question of method in psychology will come in for further handling later on. It may suffice at this point just to notice this essential distinction between the physical and the psychological sciences, that whereas the only fruitful way of approach to the former lies through the inductive method, the latter may be approached either inductively as in experimental psychology and ethical science, or teleologically, as in apperceptionist psychology and moral philosophy.

We feel ourselves justified then in affirming that the respect for system in the physical sciences is just the respect given to the most economical and effective means for explaining *fact*.\* Once system comes to

\* It is, I think, from this point of view that Prof. Bosanquet's righteous indignation against Jevons's description of the specific sciences as "special logics" [*Essls. of Logic*, p. 45-47] receives

be respected for its own sake we have abandoned the inductive ideal for that of teleology, the inductive criterion of verification for the teleological criterion of self-consistency, and the inductive postulate of uniformity for the teleological postulate of a harmonious whole, a systematic unity.

Now the uniformity principle is the principle of science just in so far as it is inductive and non-teleological. It is the postulate of inductive method, the stipulation that if Nature is to be grasped scientifically at all it must be studied on the assumption that its facts are in minutest details amenable to law. It presupposes that external attitude of the theorist to his facts which we emphasized at the outset as imposed upon the physicist by the very nature of his material; for it is just the essential impossibility, due to this external relation between fact and theorist of directly investigating and developing the facts of nature as expressive of inward purpose, that forces upon the scientific investigator the conviction that his chance of understanding nature depends on nature behaving according to law. Hence the deterministic postulate—that Nature's facts express its most natural justification. For to refer to a science as a "special logic" is precisely to give the impression that it is essentially concerned with thinking consistently in its own sphere whereas its true concern is, not with itself as a logical system, but with the facts and their adequate explanation. As such its function is essentially not that of a special logic. It is aiming at material truth, not at formal consistency, nor indeed, directly, at systematic coherency of any kind.

changeless uniformities—is the natural, the inevitable working principle for regulating a research that approaches its facts tentatively from the outside. The postulate of “uniformity,” the test of “correspondence,” the principle of “verification,” the supremacy of “fact” over “system,” the use of “inductive method”—these are all features of one and the same system of requirements imposed on the investigator who is precluded by the very nature of his facts from approaching them teleologically from within.

It is of course profoundly true that science’s fidelity to fact has always shown itself to be the condition of its own systematic development. Fact, by its very nature, compels a systematic interpretation, so that to be controlled by the facts involves being shaped into systematic coherency through the essential coherency of fact itself. But to aim *directly* at being systematically coherent would be to forfeit the true objective system to which *fact* is the one and only key, and to win partial systematizations of a hopelessly subjective kind. The common aim of both Science and Philosophy is to give the objective supremacy over the subjective. This requires of Science that it should put fact before system, and of Philosophy that it should put system before fact; and this difference in requirement depends again on the characteristic difference between the respective points of view of Science and Philosophy, the mechanical, namely, and the teleological.

The idea of “system” assumes the primacy so

soon as the teleological method is justified and adopted. For the notion of a *systematic whole* is the starting-point, ideal and criterion of every purposive adaptation of means to ends. In so far as a science is governed by this ideal of systematic unity it is a philosophical science with a teleological method, and its supreme test is no longer the now impossible one of "verification," but the simple one of self-consistency, a test which in its most general, formal aspect is that of non-contradiction; in its concrete aspect, conformity to the good of the spiritual whole.

It has been urged that the principle of uniformity in science is not so fundamental a postulate as that of the systematic unity of Nature. This is no doubt the case, but it is important to insist that the latter cannot take the place of the former as the regulative principle of inductive method. It is a self-consistency principle, a principle of non-contradiction, not a principle of conformity to fact. When therefore Prof. Bosanquet suggests that the idea of perfection is for conduct what the idea of system is for science, he is stating what can only be true of science teleologically conceived and governed by the idea of systematic unity, whereas he is undoubtedly referring to science as governed by the postulate of uniformity. I cannot but believe that there is an important confusion here between the two requirements of uniformity and unity, and that the analogy between the principles of perfection and of uniformity fails so

soon as we realise that the uniformity principle cannot, like the principle of system or perfection, be conceived as a concrete universal or dialectical idea. It is a demand that does not change its character with the growth of inductive science, as do the ideas of perfection and system in proportion as their purpose gets more adequately realised, but remains like the principle of contradiction, a demand to be unceasingly complied with in one and the same unchanging sense. It is a formal, not an indwelling principle. Hence when Prof. Bosanquet refers to the logical idea which works in the sciences of chemistry and biology, it is surely the idea of system which is meant, and not, as one gathers from the context, the principle of uniformity.

If we are prepared to grant that the principle of non-contradiction is the formal principle of all teleological method, Prof. Taylor's method of proving that ethics is independent of a philosophical basis appears in a curious light.

I may preface that Prof. Taylor, oblivious of the peculiarities of the scientific standpoint and of its radical respect for facts defines "a fact of experience" in such a way as to commit himself to the teleological standpoint. "A fact of experience," we read, "seems

id. to mean the contents of a *true* description

p. 12. of our experience and by a true description,

again, we mean an account of the matter which is, so far as we can see, free from internal confusion or discrepancy, in fact, a con-

sistent narrative. Truth is altogether a matter of internal consistency." The adherence to the teleological point of view could not be more frankly or loyally given. There is, it is true, considerable hesitancy on Prof. Taylor's part as to the relation between the two logical claims of self-consistency and of pure experience. Prof. Taylor gives the impression

at the outset, of intending to use both  
cf. id. p. criteria, but it becomes quite clear, towards  
33-34. the end especially, that the symbolic elements in descriptions of experience owe their unsatisfactoriness to their formal characteristic as self-discrepant; in other words, the ideal of pure experience, as was really inevitable on the basis of a definition of a "fact of experience" as given above, passes away without remainder into the ideals of self-consistency and systematic coherency. Thus on p. 495 we find the ideal of pure experience explicitly defined as one of "all comprehensiveness and complete internal coherency;" and on the preceding page, the phrase "ultimately non-experiential, therefore self-contradictory." So again p. 441. "all that metaphysics\* demands of the absolute world-system is that it should satisfy the logical demand for comprehensiveness and freedom from contradiction." †

\* i.e., The analysis of the formal characteristics of experience.

† cf. also p. 490 lines 23-30, and p. 306, where we are told that what the speculative intellect demands for its permanent satisfaction is "an account of facts which shall be all-inclusive and finally free from internal contradiction."

The test of self-consistency is applied by Prof. Taylor throughout his work as the one supreme test for deciding whether ethics has a metaphysical basis or not. As the so-called principles of ethics are all found to be self-discrepant, the conclusion is that it

<sup>id. p. 497</sup> has not a metaphysical basis. And at the close of the book Prof. Taylor challenges his critics in the following significant words : "Our refusal to accord to any of the categories of ethics ultimate validity or even intelligibility for metaphysics can only be met in one of two ways, either by showing that our analysis is false or by proving that the contradictions it has detected are not really contradictory."

Prof. Taylor, then, uniformly employs the self-consistency test, and this, in my opinion, is equivalent to surrendering the very point he wishes to prove. The test of non-contradiction presupposes the adoption of the teleological point of view, for it presupposes the aiming after harmony or internal consistency, *i.e.*, perfection. Prof. Taylor's whole method of dealing with moral facts presupposes therefore the presence of the philosophical idea in conduct.\*

\* I can think of only one plausible rejoinder, the protest namely that the *method* adopted is purely critical and in no sense constructive. But the plea, even if valid, could avail nothing. For once the postulate of moral uniformity is discredited, ethical science is doomed and Prof. Taylor's positive contention falls away. He is no longer proving that ethics cannot be based on metaphysics but simply that there is no such thing as ethical science. For a science with an irrational, discredited postulate is simply a dead science. With the flight of inductive faith goes the

One more word on Prof. Taylor's book which may serve to wind up the present lecture and to introduce the next. We have already seen how Prof. Bosanquet's concrete conception of Idealism justifies itself as against Dr. McTaggart's abstracter conception of it, in the vindication of the *Summum Bonum* as the moral criterion. The same powerful conception is used by Prof. Bosanquet in dealing with Prof. Taylor's more radical dismissal of the philosophical idea from the sphere of morality. In Prof. Taylor's case the main consequence of attempting to dispense with the philosophical idea in ethics is to be found in his insistence that the moral life is divided into two heterogeneous halves "in such a way that morality can fairly be termed an unprincipled compromise, and the possibility of theorising moral situations denied."\* There is, according to Prof. Taylor, an opposition between service of self and the service of others, between self-affirmation and self-sacrifice that can only be overcome by a process of moral patch-work. Prof. Bosanquet justly points out that this conception of scientific spirit. In losing its postulate a science loses both its *method* and its *test* of adequate explanation. It degenerates into a motiveless, clueless quest "where but to think is to be full of sorrows and leaden-eyed despairs," from whose hopelessness we therefore take refuge in the honest attempt to give up thinking about our morals altogether. And this is the logical issue of Prof. Taylor's sceptical pessimism.

\* Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1901-1902, p. 51.

the fundamental antithesis of the moral life is not Mr. Bradley's. With Mr. Bradley the id. p. 53 distinction amounts to that between self-systematisation and self-dissipation ; *i.e.*, between two forms of self-realisation, one direct, the other indirect. On this view there is no ultimate disparateness between the two great aspects of morality, only a divergence in the finite application of one and the same principle.

Prof. Bosanquet adopts this view and interprets it in his own way. The central interest in his view is id. p. 52. that it compels us to fall back on a larger conception of self-hood,—that self-consciousness or infinite totality “whose inmost nature is to be itself and another in one.” It is manifest that from this Copernican shifting of the centre of self-consciousness from the finite to the absolute, it follows that what were otherwise, from the merely personal standpoint, divergent ends or ideals of conduct, become convergent means for the progressive realisation of this deep-centred self. “In all our mind, then, and id. p. 54. throughout all our actions, there will be variable elements of self-affirmation and of self-negation, according to the situations and their possibilities. When the situation involves so much contradiction that the best attempt to harmonise it still denies a great part of our existing self, we may call the act self-sacrifice ; when it admits of completeness and self-organisation, the act will be called proper self-affirmation or self-assertion. But in both cases alike we are,

in acting for the best, impelled by the *logic of the self*, i.e., by the nature of the totality which has roots in our actual being. It can take, in our finite lives, innumerable shapes, corresponding to the variety of situations in a finite world. But all of them are attempts to realise our nature as a whole, in terms of our working theory of the situation as it stands. The logic of the self is the nature of the whole working through our given mental formation and our circumstances."

And the gist of all this, the true significance of this conception of the logic or dialectic of the self is—if I do not mistake Prof. Bosanquet's meaning—that a theory of the *Summum Bonum* as the philosophical foundation of ethics presupposes a theory of the absolute Self of whose irresistible dialectic we finite personalities are the organs or the channels.

In this relation of self to absolute we have the most fundamental of all the problems of modern idealism, and the watershed between the two streams of tendency known as absolute and personal idealism respectively. Both types of idealism agree in being typically concrete in their tendency, with a strong respect for experience. Wherein they precisely disagree is a more difficult matter to settle. Each is less a definite system than it is an aggregate of tendencies. What is perhaps most distinctive of Personal Idealism is, 1°, its psychological bias, involving an emphasis of the volitional aspect of personality which is lacking on the absolutist side; 2°, its diffidence of the absolute and

its experiences—by no means to be mistaken for atheism—a diffidence which in certain representatives amounts to the frankest aversion.

“I take the word happiness,” says Prof. Bosanquet, “to be primarily the name of a *problem*.” As the name of a problem, Personal Idealism would not only be prepared to tolerate, but, in the writer’s own case, at least, would welcome the word “absolute.” I would consider it, however, as a problem to be approached from the standpoint of free personality. So long as a personality philosophy means an irreducible pluralism such as Professor James recommends, it has indeed not finished its work. A Monism seems ultimately indispensable. But to identify it with the Absolute in such a way as to narrow the significance of personality, by denying, for instance, to finite persons all claims to creative initiative, and a share in the shaping of destiny, is to accept a solution that has not transcended but simply evaded the legitimate contentions of a pluralistic philosophy. Let us therefore, for the present at anyrate, consider the terms “absolute” and “monism” as indicating *problems*. In such an attitude as this, we may find the best security for helpful co-operation between absolute and personal idealists.



## LECTURE IV



## PREFACE

GREEN'S Prolegomena is essentially a criticism of the naturalistic theory that our spiritual interests are derived by direct evolution from our animal wants. As against this position he argues both that a process of change cannot give rise to a knowledge of change, and that a series of wants and their sequent impulses cannot give rise to a consciousness of wanted objects. Knowledge and desire, to have any spiritual significance at all, must be self-originated. A self or spiritual principle is necessary to the existence alike of knowledge and morality.

Green's critical method is essentially the same as Kant's. What are the conditions, he asks, of a possible experience? This is the famous transcendental question. It starts with an abstract conception of *experience* as equivalent to what is experienced, i.e., to *nature*, and proves that the conception, to be conceivable at all, presupposes the self as a unifying sustaining principle. If we start with a *concrete* conception of

experience as including the relation between the experient and the experienced, the question takes another and a truer form. "What are the structural factors in an actual experience?" We hope to show in a later lecture that this is really the form in which Green's meaning is usually expressed.

Adopting the question in its abstract transcendental form, Green shows first that the fact known necessarily implies the knowing subject, and further that this knowing subject must remain self-identical through all the changes of which it is aware. Knowledge of sequence implies the permanence of the knower throughout the sequence.

That the principle of unity involved in the very conception of knowledge is self-conscious, Green proves from an analysis of the conditions which such a principle must satisfy. Only self-consciousness, for instance, can unite a manifold without effacing the severality in which the manifold consists. Self-consciousness is the only true principle of unity in difference.

This spiritual principle in mind and in nature, the principle at once of intelligence and intelligibility, Green identifies with the absolute spirit. He conceives the relation of the divine to the individual consciousness as an incarnation

whereby the divine consciousness reproduces itself under finite conditions, the finite becoming thus *organic* to the infinite. Proceeding to characterise the eternal consciousness, the attributes of "timelessness," "spacelessness," "immobility," "immateriality," are inferred from its spiritual function as rendering possible a time and space series, a world of matter in motion. That which renders the time-series possible cannot be itself in time; such is the form of argument adopted.

Green's argument for a spiritual principle in morality is of precisely the same kind as his argument for a spiritual principle in knowledge. His main attention is directed here towards emphasizing the absolute difference between an idea of personal good and a consciousness of animal wants. The *motive* is just this idea of personal good, so that in being determined by motives, we are self-determined by our own adopted idea and not in any other way. We are determined spiritually not causally, self-determination being in no sense a link in the endless phenomenal chain of cause and effect. A *motive* of action is the *direct* expression of the spiritual principle in our nature, and as self-governed by motives we are absolutely free.

Such is the gist of Green's criticism in Books

I. and II. of the *Prolegomena*. Such discussion is in Green's eyes indispensable. To pass over the question of our relation to nature and to God is to ignore what lies at the root of ethical enquiry and run the risk of wasting our labour.

## LECTURE IV

### GREEN'S PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS

GREEN opens his great work with the recognition that in coming forward as the champion of moral philosophy as opposed to ethical science, he is going against the prevalent opinion and must therefore adopt a critical and defensive attitude. He feels that "he must justify his claim to have something to say that lies beyond the limits of the man of science."

The prevalent view of moral theory which Green has in view is our typically national system of ethics, the ethics of moral sentiment, as maintained, for instance, by Hume and developed in the 19th century along evolutionary lines. A main thesis of this national ethics had been the derivation of moral interests from animal wants, the explanation of morality by means of its natural history. Now so long as this history had to be traced within the limits of the single life it was not easy to make this naturalistic theory look very plausible, but once evolutionary theory had broken down the narrow bounds of individual and of species, and justified its theories by

irresistible appeal to facts, the gulf between the moral man and the greater ape seemed at last bridged over. Evolutionary ethics was now prepared to give a purely naturalistic account of the origin of man's susceptibilities, and further to erect an art of moral practice on the basis of this natural science. The laws of moral conduct once discovered, the counsel was to seek our happiness by living according to these laws.

It is against this latter attempt to introduce the normative quality into ethical science that Green applies the thin edge of that impressive criticism of naturalism which plays so important a part in the *Prolegomena*. Can this injunction to conform conduct to the discovered laws of his own being have

any meaning, asks Green, on naturalistic Proleg. premisses? "No," he answers, "to one

p. 9. who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." The consistent naturalist, argues Green, once he has reduced the speculative, philosophical part into a natural science should abolish the practical or preceptive part altogether. He must content himself with explaining how the serviceable illusion of an "ought" arose. This reduction of the sentiment of duty to a useful social illusion, to which the natural-

istic theory compels us, is however "of a id. p. 11. kind to give us pause." We revert to the basis of the theory and enquire whether a being that was merely a result of natural forces *could* frame a

theory of those forces as explaining himself. In short, we are thrown back on an analysis of the conditions of knowledge. "Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature, in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge?" If not, then "man, in respect <sup>id. p. 11.</sup> of the function called knowledge, is not merely a child of nature . . . ." We shall have ascertained the presence in him of a principle not natural, and a specific function of this principle in rendering knowledge possible. We shall then be led on to ask the further question whether the same principle does not also alone render *morality* possible.

This is Green's position in outline. "His whole system," to quote the words of a distinguished critic,\* "centres in the assertion of a Self or Spiritual Principle as necessary to the existence alike of knowledge and morality."

The method which Green adopts in his attempt to meet the naturalist is practically that created by Kant for the purposes of his Critique, and known as the transcendental method. To give a transcendental proof of a spiritual principle in experience is to show that such a spiritual principle is implied in the very possibility of that experience. A transcendental enquiry, far from being an enquiry that goes outside experience for its facts is precisely an enquiry that moves within the given fact of experience. Its aim is

\*Prof. A. S. Pringle-Patterson 'Hegelianism and Personality' p. 4

just to discover the indispensable, constitutive elements of experience, to make what Prof. Bosanquet might call a morphological analysis of experience, an investigation of its essential structure. What are the conditions of a possible experience? What are those structural factors apart from which no such thing as

Hegeli-  
anism  
and  
Person-  
ality id  
p. 17

experience would be possible? The trans-  
scendental method is therefore essentially  
analytic, not genetic. "Taking the fact of  
knowledge, as it finds it, it does not inquire  
how that fact was realised or came into  
being; but, moving always within the fact, it  
asks what are the conditions of its being what  
it is, what in other words are its essential elements."

Green, adopting in the main this Kantian method, takes the naturalistic conception of nature and analyzes it with a view to discovering the conditions of the conception being a possible, *i.e.*, a thinkable or intelligible one. He finds that if you conceive nature as the evolutionary naturalist does, as a process of change which eventually gives rise to the phenomenon known as a consciousness of change, you are attempting the unintelligible. For if by "nature" is meant "mere nature," *i.e.*, nature purified of all reference to consciousness, "nature" becomes *eo ipso* inconceivable.

Proleg.  
p. 13.

If it could be admitted that matter and motion had an existence in themselves, or otherwise than as related to consciousness, it would still not be by *such* matter and motion, but by the matter and motion which we know, that the

functions of the soul, or anything else, can for us be explained. Nothing can be known by help of reference to the unknown. In other words, the "nature" of the naturalist must be nature as known.

Now if we ask what is the necessary condition of nature being known at all—as it must be if it is to mean anything intelligible—the presence of the *knower* must be granted. There cannot be thoughts without a thinker, nor a known nature without a knower. An analysis of nature as a fact of knowledge shows that the fact known necessarily implies the knowing subject.

The main point however is to justify the further step that this knowing subject must be a subject that remains identical with itself through all the changes of which it is aware, and to show this by proving that unless this also be granted, knowledge of nature is not possible.

Green gives many variations of this proof. We may take the following as typical:—

Consider our consciousness of a relation of succession between two objects, A and B. Since consciousness of succession is not itself a succession, but only a consciousness of a relation, it follows that the subject which apprehends A and B as succeeding each other in time does so through a single apprehension and not through a succession of these. The subject therefore remains single throughout its apprehension of the succession.

This argument obviously holds good when the objects related are many and complex. The singleness or unity of the subject must be correlative to the systematic oneness of the experience. If all cf. id possible experience of related objects—the p. 35 experience of a thousand years ago and the experience of to-day, the experience which I have here and that which I might have in any other region of space—forms a single system; if there can be no such thing as an experience of unrelated objects; then there must be a corresponding singleness in that principle of consciousness which forms the bond of relation between the objects.

Why does Green feel himself justified in referring to this principle of unity in experience or knowledge of nature as a principle of consciousness? Green draws this conclusion from an analysis of the conditions which such a unifying principle must satisfy. It must unify its objects in such a way as not to destroy the singleness of the related objects relatively to each

other. There must be no fusion of A with id. B, otherwise “there could be no relation p. 31 between them—nothing but a blank, featureless identity. There must, then, be something which is both other than the manifold things themselves, does not blend with, *i.e.*, distinguishes itself from them, and which further combines them without effacing their severality.” “With such a combining agency,” Green goes on to say, “we

are familiar as our intelligence." Thought, spirit or self consciousness, as Green adds elsewhere, <sup>id. p. 32</sup> is the only agent that we know as maintaining <sup>p. 37</sup> an identity with itself throughout a series of changes, or as a principle that can unite a manifold without cancelling its multiplicity.

In this way Green proves that there is a self-conscious principle of unity involved in the very conception of knowledge. Such a principle is at the same time the spiritual principle in nature, since, in Kant's language, it is our understanding that makes

<sup>cf. id.</sup> nature in the sense of enabling us to conceive that there is such a thing at all. From this <sup>p. 22.</sup> point of view the dualism between nature and knowledge disappears. It is not that first there is nature, and that then there comes to be an experience and knowledge of it. Intelligence, experience, knowledge, are no more a result of nature than nature of them. If it is true that there

<sup>id.</sup> would be no intelligence without nature, it is equally true that there would be no <sup>p. 37</sup> nature without intelligence. The principle of intelligence is at the same time the principle of intelligibility.

Green concludes by identifying this unifying principle of self-consciousness and of nature <sup>cf. id.</sup> with the absolute spirit. This appears to <sup>p. 38.</sup> Green to follow immediately once we recognise the absurdity of supposing that nature comes into existence in the process by which this person or

that begins to think. There must be an eternal consciousness, a single divine subject, to whom nature in its completeness eternally exists, and the consciousness which constitutes our knowledge is just this eternally complete consciousness as so far realised through the bodily conditions of our human existence. Green pictures the growth of our knowledge as the gradual development in us of the consciousness of an eternal order in the universe, and inasmuch as this order cannot exist apart from the consciousness of it, an eternal consciousness must be operative in us to produce the gradual development of our knowledge.\* Green speaks of this divine eternal consciousness as "analogous to ours," though it is hard to see from his statement that it can differ from our own self-consciousness in anything but comprehensiveness of outlook upon the universe.

Green himself is quite aware that this view of the relation of the individual to the divine consciousness is stated rather than justified. "Why the whole," he says, "should be what it is, why the mind which the world implies should exhibit

\*cf. id. p. 38. "The difference between what may be broadly called—experienced world."

cf. also p. 75. "We must hold then that there is a consciousness also for which the relations of fact, that form the object of our gradually attained knowledge, already and eternally exist; and that the growing knowledge of the individual is a progress towards this consciousness."

itself in a world at all, why it should make certain processes of that world organic to a reproduction of itself under limitations which the use of such organs involves—these are questions which, owing perhaps to those very limitations, we are equally unable to avoid asking and to answer. The wonder in which Philosophy is said to begin will not cease when [these conclusions are] arrived at; but, till it can be shown to have left some essential part of the reality of the case out of sight and another conclusion can be substituted for it which remedies the defect, this is no reason for rejecting it.”\*

At the close of his first chapter on “The Spiritual Principle in Nature,” Green refers to this principle in *id. p. 57.* the following terms: “neither in time nor in space, immaterial and immoveable, eternally one with itself, the principle necessary to the possibility of the world of phenomena.” How does Green deduce these attributes? Green’s answer is given in § 52: The general ground he adopts is that the relations by which phenomena are determined through the activity of the principle are not relations

\* cf. p. 103 § 100. “The old question, why God made the world, has never been answered, nor will be. We know not why the world should be; we only know that there it is. In like manner we know not why the eternal subject of that world should reproduce itself, through certain processes of the world, as the spirit of mankind or as the particular self of this or that man in whom the spirit of mankind operates. We can only say that, upon the best analyses we can make of our experience, it seems that so it does.”

of it, but simply relations *for* it.\* Thus "the relation of events to each other as in time implies id. p. 55. their equal presence to a subject which is not in time. There could be no such thing as time if there were not a self-consciousness which is not in time. As little could there be a relation of objects as outside each other, or in space, if they were not equally related to a subject of which outsideness to anything is not a possible attribute; which by its synthetic action constitutes that relation, but is not itself determined by it. The same is true of those relations which we are apt to treat as independent entities under the names matter and motion. They are relations existing for a consciousness which they do not so condition as that it should itself either move or be material." Hence the spiritual principle in our conscious life is timeless, spaceless, immobile, immaterial.

In Book II, Green passes from the metaphysics of knowledge to what he calls the metaphysics of moral action. But in passing from the speculative to the practical point of view his argument for a spiritual principle remains essentially the same. Green's

\*cf. p. 59. "There is not such relation between components of the consciousness as there is between the events of which it is the consciousness. (They form a process in time. If *it* were a time-process, it would not be a consciousness of them as forming such a process)."

Also p. 69. Our self-consciousness "*for* which many things indeed are external to each other but *to* which nothing can be external."

main argument, we saw, was that a process of change could not give rise to a knowledge of change. As adapted to moral action this argument runs as follows: "A series of wants and their sequent impulses cannot give rise to a consciousness of wanted objects." "The transition from mere want to consciousness of a wanted object, from the impulse to satisfy the want to an effort for realisation of the idea of the wanted object, implies the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it and is constant throughout successive stages of the want." The essential element in this consciousness of wanted objects is the *motive*, which is always "some idea of the man's personal good—an idea absolutely different from animal want."

Green makes his proof of the freedom of the will hinge on the nature of this motive. He insists cf. p. 106. emphatically on conduct being determined, determined by *motives*, or more generally, by the person's character and circumstances. Everything depends however, according to Green, on how you interpret such determination. "That moral action is a joint result of character and circumstances," he writes, "is not altogether an inappropriate statement of it. It would be better [however] to say id. p. 111. that moral action is the expression of a man's character as it reacts upon and responds to given circumstances," and to note that the character *is* the man, the determinant that reacts upon circumstance, and, as such, cannot belong to the same causal series

as that to which the circumstances belong. To be determined by one's character is to be self-determined. The motive through which a man's character expresses itself, though it necessarily determines the act, *is* the act itself "on its inner side." It is *toto genere* different from the unadopted desires, the possible motives of action, that solicit a man's preference; for it is *first constituted* by the reaction of the man's self upon these, and its identification of itself with one of them, as that of which the satisfaction forms for the time its object.\* It is thus the direct expression of a man's self-consciousness, of the spiritual principle in man, and as such is absolutely free. For self-consciousness, as we have seen, cannot be, in any of its expressions, a link in the chain of natural becoming, but must be self-originated. It is in fact, according to Green, the eternal consciousness reproduced in some individual focus, and this eternal consciousness, which is the whole, cannot be determined by aught but itself: for being the whole, there is nothing external that could possibly determine it from the outside. Logically, the validity of Green's defence of freedom depends on his theory of the relation between the individual self-consciousness and

\* cf. id. p. 148. "The important real distinction is that between the direction of the self-conscious self to the realisation of an object, its identification of itself with that object, on the one side . . . and, on the other side, the mere solicitations of which a man is conscious, but with none of which he so identifies himself as to make the soliciting object his object—the object of his self-seeking—or to direct himself to his realisation."

the absolute self-consciousness. To share the essential nature of the Absolute is to share his spiritual freedom. If we are satisfied with Green's theory of this relation, we have overcome the main difficulty in accepting his doctrine of freedom; if we are not satisfied with it, we shall still continue to ask whether it is we, individually, who are free and responsible, or whether it is the absolute who is free through us and for us and takes all our responsibility: two very different aspects of the problem of freedom.

It should be added that, with Green, the will is the *personality* considered as active, not in any sense a faculty of the man, but the man's inmost self. "The will," says Green, "is simply the man, and an act of id. p. 158. will the expression of the man as he at the time is." It is an act in which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realisation of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self-satisfaction, and the will itself, in actuality, id. p. 160. is just the self-conscious individual *as so* directing himself.

We have now briefly summarized the main points in Green's metaphysics of knowledge and moral action. Of the necessity of such discussion for an ethical system Green entertains no doubt whatsoever. To id. p. 54. have arrived at some conclusion in regard to the relation between man and nature, is, he insists, essential if we would be sure "that any theory of ethics, in the distinctive sense of the

term, is other than wasted labour." For it is only when this discussion has led to the realisation of the spiritual principle in nature that we are in a position to consider the question which, as Green puts it,

<sup>id. p. 59.</sup> "lies at the root of ethical enquiry," namely

the following: "In what relation do we

ourselves stand to the one self-distinguishing subject, other than nature, which we find to be implied in nature?" The problem of man's relation to nature involves that of his relation to God. Coming to the

problem of conduct, and viewing it still on its formal

<sup>id. p. 116.</sup> side, Green points out how a vindication of

man's freedom as a spiritual agent is necessary to give any meaning to the idea of moral progress, and that the essential privilege of freedom, that of presenting a highest good to one's self, is the primary

<sup>id. p. 105.</sup> moral fact on which conduct depends. The

*Summum Bonum*, that is, is the source of all distinctively moral activity. Finally, in Book III.

which deals with "The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress," Green introduces us to the *concrete* distinction which, as he puts it, "must lie at the root of

<sup>id. p. 160.</sup> every system of ethics," the distinction

between the good and the bad will; and we enter upon those concrete discussions in which the function and value of the idea of perfection in moral action is more especially and more specifically insisted on.

Waiving these concrete issues, we propose to follow up the bearings of Green's more formal enquiries on

our main theme: the philosophical significance of moral experience.



## LECTURE V



## PREFACE

GREEN'S insistence that spirit cannot be derived from Nature, whilst it seems at first sight to meet the contrary contention of naturalism in the most direct manner possible, proves to be a mistaken line of attack. It cannot be justified on any possible interpretation of the word "Nature." If "Nature" be taken in that comprehensive sense in which it is inclusive of spirit, Green's proposition is of course untrue. If "Nature" stands for a conception of the universe as existing prior to the spirit which naturalism claims it gave birth to, it is, as such, unknowable. Again, if "Nature" stands for the Nature that we know, for Nature as an object of knowledge, then, standing as it does in such necessary organic relation to the spiritual knower, it is not non-spiritual, and Green's contention falls flat. Finally, the conception of Nature as a phenomenal series of "events" is inadequate for the purpose, for since "events" can only be known as "facts," the Nature here

in question is again not a Nature that excludes the spiritual principle. That Green's retort is as futile as the naturalist's view which it attempts to refute, is admitted by Green himself at the close of the discussion when he insists that spirit can have no origin at all.

Professor Pringle-Pattison has objected to Green's making the discussion turn on the *origin* of spirit instead of on its *nature*, on the ground that the transcendental method employed in the discussion does not permit of being used for such a purpose. He fails to notice however that the formal character of this Kantian method is not only an epistemological defect, but is itself largely responsible for its misuse at the hands of Green. To treat the conditions of a possible experience as mere logical presuppositions is to suggest that the experience investigated has a certain existential independence of these conditions, and so to constitute it into a *conceivable* origin of spirit. It is Green's merit that in eventually setting aside the purposeless quest of the origin of spirit, he at the same time gives to Kant's question as to the nature of experience, its true, concrete, philosophical significance. Green takes experience as an organic whole, and practically, if not always verbally, analyzes it in its concrete

totality. Kant's logical preconditions are thereby reinterpreted as structural, indwelling factors of experience. We are thus brought back to the true philosophical view-point, the function of Philosophy being, not to support an abstract experience with an equally abstract substratum of logic, but to reveal the spiritual significance of our actual experience.

## LECTURE V

WE have just been noting what, in Green's view, constitute the essentials of ethics. We have now to point out that from whatever point of view Green views the moral problem, whether it be man's relation to Nature or to God, his freedom, his self-direction through the indwelling idea of perfection, or the fundamental distinction between the good and the bad will—the vindication of man's spiritual *origin* is his one main preoccupation throughout. This question of origin is, according to Green's own explicit declaration, the real question at issue, as between moral philosophy and ethical science. Is man a spirit or a product of Nature? Is he spiritual or natural?—that is, in Green's opinion, the essential crux. Or to put it in another way, what must, above all, be proved, is that a process of change cannot *give rise to* a knowledge of change, and it is only when Green feels that he can confidently say *id. p. 75.* that "every effort fails to trace a genesis of knowledge out of anything which is not, in form

and principle, knowledge itself," that he considers his main position to be secured.\*

That Green should make his use of the transcendental method turn on a question of origin rather than on a simple question of nature may appear to involve an unjustifiable use of that method which, as we saw, is an analysis of the nature of knowledge, not of its genesis. Moreover, Green explicitly asserts that the method upon which he founds his theory of the action of a free, eternal mind in man is the analysis of knowledge, in the sense of an analysis id. p. 88. "of what is implied in there being a world to be known and in our knowing it." The question therefore presses itself upon us:—"Was Green justified in practically identifying an analysis of the *nature* of knowledge with a vindication of its spiritual *origin*?" How are we to reconcile the essential requirement of the transcendental method, that it should just analyze out the conditions which guarantee the unity of the experience it analyzes, with an analysis such as Green's, which apparently ends in drawing an absolute line of cleavage between two of the factors of that experience whose essential unity

\* Cf. Especially § 84, p. 88. "Till some flaw can be shown in the doctrine previously urged," he writes, "we must hold that there is an absolute difference between change and the intelligent consciousness or knowledge of change, which precludes us from tracing any development of the one into the other, if development implies any identity of principle between the germ and the developed outcome."

was the very fact to be explained. We propose to consider this difficulty more closely.

Green's whole argument, as we have seen, is in form determined by his antagonistic attitude towards Naturalism. The feature of that doctrine on which Green tenaciously fastens, is its derivation of spirit from nature. The problem is thus made to turn upon the *origin* of spirit, instead of on its *function* in the unity of experience, and the analysis of knowledge, in Green's hands, just becomes an exposure of the absurdity of considering that the object of knowledge can bring forth the knowledge of which it is the object.

The evil consequences of thus mistaking the real issue are apparent from the very outset.

When the naturalist argues that nature, as a process of change, gives rise to spirit as knowledge of change, he should mean, if his words are to mean anything, that nature prior to its production of spirit is nature as it would be exclusive of or without a spiritual principle. And it is thus that Green undoubtedly understands the naturalist's position when he argues against it and insists that spirit, on the contrary, has an entirely different origin from nature. For this argument is not valid if nature is conceived as having anything in common with spirit. Unless the nature here referred to is conceived of as non-spiritual, exclusive of the spiritual, the origin of spirit could not, under any circumstances, be entirely non-natural.

Nature then, if Green's contention of spirit's difference of origin is to mean anything, must be at any rate that which exists independently of spirit. But as so existing, nature, as Green points out in the very opening of his treatise, is simply not knowable and is certainly not the nature the naturalist has in view when he talks of Nature. Now this remark, while it exposes a weak spot in the naturalistic contention, takes Green's ground from under his feet. For he is seen now to be contending that spirit must have a different origin from that which has no knowable existence at all. Hence, so long as nature implies exclusion from spirit, Green's apology for the non-natural origin of the soul falls entirely flat.

Green saves himself from this difficulty only through an invalid identification of two uses of the term "Nature." He identifies "Nature" as that which is considered without "the inclusion of the spiritual principle which it implies," with "the system cf. id. of phenomena as such." Nature is conceived p. 57. as phenomenal, as a connected series of events, and quâ connected, to that extent animated by a spiritual principle. Nature is taken as equivalent to the time-flow of sensible experience. We must note that Green distinguishes between events and facts. The characteristic of sensible events is that they are related to each other in the way of antecedence and consequence, form, that is, a causal nexus. Facts (and acts), on the other hand, are not so related. It is only in virtue of a man's self-

consciousness that he can be aware of facts as facts. Facts are united logically (not causally), in a system of mutual determination. The order of connection among events is thus different from the order of connection among facts. A fact is an element in a system of knowledge, an event an element in the system of nature.

It is of course perfectly true that, on Green's own view, to know nature as an event is at the same time to know it as a fact. Green does not believe in a state of consciousness called "sensation" wherein nature is apprehended as a series of events, and another called "perception" wherein it is apprehended as a system of facts. But if we are to conceive the nature from which spirit cannot take its origin as "nature conceived by spirit as a system of facts," Green's position becomes absurd. It would be like saying that spirit could not originate from spirit. The nature, then, from which spirit cannot originate is "phenomenal" nature, the nature of science and of common sense, the object of the external and internal senses, the time-flow of events whether physical or psychical.

It is not to our present purpose to consider whether this view of nature as an ordered phenomenal series answers to anything real or not. For Green, it must correspond to a definite order of existence if the attempt to show that spirit could not originate from it is not to be reduced to the futile occupation of showing that it cannot originate from our own abstract thinking.

Green has thus placed himself, by his unfortunate insistence on the *origin* of spirit, in the following predicament:—If nature be taken as excluding *in toto* the spiritual principle, then the question of *origins* has no point, for nature out of relation to consciousness is absolutely non-existent for us. Can an unthinkable thought give birth to the very principle of thinking itself? If, on the other hand, nature be taken as already in relation to consciousness, then the antagonism between nature and spirit no longer exists, and there is no need to justify the reality of spirit by insisting on its difference of origin.

What then are we to conclude? Simply this, that in making his transcendental quest a disquisition on origins instead of on the nature of the one seamless fact called knowledge, Green took the wrong path. There can be no doubt, judging from the after-work of the *Prolegomena*, that had Green felt himself free to attack the whole question of knowledge on its own merits, instead of in antagonism to the naturalists; if, that is, he had formulated the problem in the way most natural to him, instead of accepting the problem as formulated by naturalism, his transcendental analysis *would* have been an analysis of the nature of knowledge, an analysis precluding speculations as to origin.

Indeed, Green's final answer to naturalism precisely amounts to the statement he might have made and defended at the very start, that the question has been wrongly set by them, that it is absurd to speculate on

the origin of consciousness, since consciousness cannot possibly have had any origin at all. "Should the question be asked, If this self consciousness is not derived from nature, what then is its origin? the answer is that it has no origin. It never began, because it never was not. It is the condition of there being such a thing as beginning or end."<sup>119</sup>

This remark forms the natural transition to the sounder concreter view of the relation of nature to spirit, the view Green habitually reverts to when unembarrassed by his anti-naturalistic bias.

The gist of this happier outlook upon the meaning of experience is that experience is one organic whole, and that no part of it can therefore be considered as *really* existing in separation from the rest. "We cannot indeed suppose any real separation between the determinant and the determined. The order of becoming is only an order of becoming through the action of that which is not in becoming; nor can we think of this order as preceded by anything that was not an order of becoming. As little, on the other hand, can we suppose that which we only know as a principle of unity in relation, to exist apart from a manifold through which it is related."<sup>71</sup> Again, referring to the self-distinguishing characteristic of consciousness, Green writes "That the unifying principle should distinguish itself from the manifold which it unifies, is indeed the condition of the unification; but it must not be

<sup>119</sup> *id. p. 80*

supposed that the manifold has a nature of its own apart from the unifying principle, or this principle another nature of its own apart from what it does in relation to the manifold world. Apart from the unifying principle the manifold world would be nothing at all, and in its self-distinction from that world the unifying principle takes its character from it; or rather, it is in distinguishing itself from the world that it gives itself its character, which therefore but for the world it would not have.”\*

This concrete view of the factors of experience as mutually implicating each other is not accidental in Green’s philosophy, but essential to it. It is the soul of his excellent treatment in Book II, Chapter II, of “Desire, Intellect, and Will,” and is implied in his whole treatment of the function of the moral ideal in moral progress.

We may then well ask in what essential ways Green’s results would have been affected had he consistently adhered throughout to this conception of experience as an organic unity. In two essential ways. In the first place, the metaphysical problem of the origin of consciousness would not have arisen at all. Inasmuch as phenomenon and principle do not really exist in separation from each other, it is obvious that where the one is, the other is.

\* cf. also §100. “Just as we hold . . . presents to itself,” and §91 §114, and the telling expression “provisionally called natural,” on p. 83.

To consider whether one factor of such an experience could or could not *give rise* to the other factor is like asking whether the object as known, could give rise to the subject as knowing, or vice-versa.

The analysis would, in the second place, have afforded no justification for defining the nature of the spiritual principle as "timeless, spaceless, immaterial, immobile." The doctrine of the eternal consciousness, for instance, could not be established by such an analysis. These criticisms must be justified at some length.

In his "Hegelianism and Personality," Prof. Pringle-Pattison has given a most lucid criticism of the tendency among idealists to erect abstractions into entities, and thereby, as he puts it, to give a metaphysical interpretation to the results of a purely formal theory of knowledge. I propose to briefly consider the purport of his criticism so far as it bears on our present subject. In one essential respect I find myself unable to follow it, as I shall presently endeavour to show.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison takes us back to Kant's transcendental analysis, the main result of which was to show that in analysing a process of experience in general, with a view to determining the conditions of its possibility, the necessity of a central principle of connection—a synthetic unity of apperception, could be demonstrated. Hume had failed to find such a self, because in searching experience in order to dis-

cover its whereabouts, he had looked for it as for a particular among other particulars, a perception or object added to the other contents of consciousness. As such, it is, of course, nowhere. But to the analyst who guides himself by Kant's leading question, this self is found to be everywhere, "the very condition of all these particular perceptions, given along with each of them, and essential to the connecting of one with another."

As Prof. Pringle-Pattison points out, Kant is in one essential respect perfectly aware of the formal limitations of this critical investigation. If the object of one's study is "consciousness in general," the only form in which analysis can reveal the unifying principle essential to it, is as a formal subject or centre of reference, the necessary point of view from which experience in general can be unified. As

Prof. Pringle-Pattison reminds us, "Kant  
id. p. 36. refuses to recognise the transcendental ego  
as constituting the real self even of the individual human knower," and is still further removed  
cf. id. p. 242. from the audacity of erecting into a god, as  
Green in his opinion does, the mere form  
of self-consciousness in general. The supreme condition of the possibility of knowledge is the  
unity of the pure ego, but this pure ego is  
cf. id. p. 31. no actual knower, whether human or divine.

The self reached by the critical analysis of knowledge, according to Kant, has a merely logical

character, and he explicitly deprecates in set terms  
the mistake of confusing the logical exposi-  
cf. id. p. 38. tion of a thought in general for a meta-  
physical determination of the object.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison is of opinion that this strictly logical attitude of Kant's is unimpeachable, and that he has definitely mapped out the proper natural limitations of a critical Theory of Knowledge. I cannot however see my way to erecting this formal interpretation of the critical method into a model for Epistemologists. Its formalism, it seems to me, is in itself a limitation, a valuable one in so far as it conduces to the simplification of the problem of Knowledge or Experience, but otherwise a mere device for approaching a problem which is really extremely complex and concrete in its most general, abstract form.

Is it essential, we may well ask, that the legitimate office of a Theory of Knowledge should be *merely* critical, "ruling out," as Prof. Pringle-  
id. p. 35. Pattison suggests it should do, certain solutions as inadmissible. Surely the establishment, or ruling in, of the unity of apperception, a distinctly positive service of formal epistemology, is just as valuable a service as that of ruling out the thing in itself as an unthinkable. Even if its office is formal it is not therefore necessarily critical and negative. It may well be, and is, constructive and positive in its own formal way. The real question at issue then is whether in analyzing Knowledge or Experience according to the transcendental method we must

respect Kant's formal limitations to the constructive possibilities of the method.

I should be perfectly ready to admit that if it is "experience in general" that is thus to be analyzed, and if such experience is understood in some essentially abstract logical way, the conclusions that can be drawn about its constitution, by the use of any method whatsoever, must be correspondingly abstract and logical. Kant was limited by the abstractness of his starting-point. If we are dealing with formal conceptions all through, nothing but formal conceptions can issue in the result.

If we abide by the terms in which the critical enquiry is usually framed by Kant, the search for the conditions of a possible experience, we must admit that what is required of us is just an unearthing of the "logical conditions" which underlie the possibility of experience. We accordingly interpret our results as "necessary presuppositions"—a phrase which satisfies the logical sense, but of course leaves such necessities as the pure Ego or Transcendental Unity of Apperception mere logical notions.

But, I ask, is not this way of framing the fundamental query tantamount to confessing that one does not expect to be able by any analysis of experience to discover the actual indwelling *presence* of a spiritual principle? I am quite aware that there was no such prejudice in Kant's mind. He, like Green, had the naturalism of Hume to deal with, and the critical enquiry takes its form largely from the necessities

and requirements of destructive criticism, and for such a purpose it is enough to establish the necessity of a unifying factor in knowledge in a purely formal way ;—yet, what may be a just limitation of a method under certain specific circumstances need not be its just limitation under all circumstances. Let us grant that in a first draft of the use of a method, a certain formal simplicity is essential ; still, when the method in its outline has once been well grasped and some idea of its possibilities gained, we are justified, surely, in seeking to develop it in the sense of rendering its application less and less formal, more and more concrete.

If we ask ourselves what this “experience in general” can really mean, we are bound to confess that it must be one’s own experience, viewed as it were structurally and in outline. But on such a view of “experience in general,” the “conditions” become “constituents,” and this transformation constitutes the first essential step in the “concretion” of the transcendental method. Instead of investigating the *conditions of a possible experience*, we analyze *the fact of experience in its concrete totality*, and instead of discovering a logical principle of unity, we find, say, unity and continuity of interest in an object as the essential inworking element of the fact of experience itself. The unifying conceptions which make experience possible are thus seen to be, not preconditions of a purely logical kind, but *forms* in the Aristotelian sense, factors apart from whose indwelling presence

experience as we know it would be simply non-existent.\*

In illustration of my present meaning, I proceed to point out how I would remodel the following typical statement of Green's. "There can be neither proof nor disproof of such necessity as is claimed for any conception but through analysis of the conditions which render this experience possible." I should prefer to say: "There can be neither proof nor disproof of such actuality as is claimed for any indwelling principle, but through analysis of the factors which constitute the fact of experience."

When Prof. Stout introduces a principle of unity of interest into the very vitals of the processes whereby associations and habits are formed, it is not through an analysis of the conditions that make association and habit possible, but through a deeper analysis of the facts of habit and association than has been previously made, and this deeper analysis implies a deeper grasp of the true nature of the psychical experiences concerned. Such work results in deepening and strengthening our grasp of facts. It reveals facts to us in concreter, richer form and compass.

\* Critical philosophy, in my opinion, differs from analytic science only in this, that its fact, experience, is taken concretely, in its totality, and that, consequently, that verification of theory with *outstanding* fact, so essential to inductive procedure, is here impossible on account of there being no *outstanding* facts to serve as external tests of verification.



## LECTURE VI



## PREFACE

THE tendency to treat the spiritual factor in experience as an indispensable presupposition instead of as an essential constituent results, when drawn out into its logical consequences, as has been recently done by Prof. Hicks, in the denial that we can have any consciousness whatsoever of mental activity as such. The conclusion is that mental states are not facts *of* which we are aware, but ways or modes *in and through* which we become aware. In experience there is that which is experienced and that which experiences. This latter factor, argues Prof. Hicks, is unknowable. Mr. Bradley, however, accuses this view of being an absurdity. The mental activity *is* known and known quā part of the whole content of experience. It can be known quā subjective activity moreover and not only quā experienced object. We may put the matter thus : Our awareness is of contents or phenomena, but not all phenomena are objects given to a self ; they include felt subjective

activities as well, *quā* felt. Now of these felt activities we are certainly aware, and to that extent at least can know them. Accepting Mr. Bradley's argument as valid, we conclude that Prof. Hicks's contention that subjective activities are not knowable is disproved. Mr. Bradley's vindication of the spiritual principle as something that can be *felt* bears out, in the directest way possible, our contention that the spiritual principle is a real factor in experience and not a mere inferred necessity. That which is felt is however not the same as the mere feeling of it, and the true function of the spiritual principle in experience must be the discovery of philosophy, and not of science which can only handle phenomena. Prof. Stout's view of mental activity agrees, substantially, with the views above indicated. Through his vigorous contention, as against Professor James's cephalic movement theory, that mental activity is a "total activity" and cannot therefore be identified with any particular component feeling or sensation, he has left the critical problem of self-feeling in its most approachable and suggestive form.

## LECTURE VI

THE difficulty we inevitably encounter when we endeavour to see clearly what a "purely logical" discussion of experience in general really means, may be illustrated by a recent attempt on the part of Prof. Hicks to give it an adequate interpretation. It is the most honest attempt I am familiar with to give a really definite meaning (somewhat in Lotze's sense), to Kant's formal procedure, but it seems to me to provide a convincing instance of the dangers that lurk in formal epistemology, and to give the death-blow to presuppositions that are not also actually *constituents* of experience. The paper in which Prof. Hicks's views are developed is modestly entitled : "A restatement of some features in Kantian Transcendentalism," and was read before the Aristotelian Society in May, 1903. Its central theme is that the supreme condition which renders experience possible is the thinking activity of the subject, and that this mental activity, being in-

trinsically subjective, is *eo ipso* inexperienceable. We can only be aware of objects, and that which is pure subject and the condition of there being any objects at all, cannot itself be an object. It therefore cannot be known. This is indeed precisely what Kant implies when he affirms that we "cannot know that as an object which we must presuppose in order to know any object." It follows

Arist. Soc. Proc. 1902-3. p. 148. then, writes Prof. Hicks, "that in knowing we never know our mental states, as mental states, any more than in seeing we see the organ of sight." "Mental states are not facts of which we are aware, but ways or modes in and through which we become aware." . . . "It is therefore truer to say," he adds, "that the conscious subject is his mental states than that he has them." id. p. 150.

cf. id. p. 159. All that we experience is content, content apprehended, and being a content is not an existent. We cannot know existence either in our subjective activity or in nature. This distinction between the content we are aware of, aware of in the forms of meaning and of value, on the one hand, and the existence or psychical mechanism through which we become aware of contents apprehended is indeed, as Prof. Hicks asserts,

only a distinction within a whole. Neither can be without the other. There is no having such contents or objects apart from the process of apprehending itself. Prof. Hicks is true to the transcendental spirit, but the two factors are in *nature*

sundered by "the whole diameter of Being." "The mental state *exists*, it *occurs*, and by its occurrence we are aware; the content, on the other hand, conceived of it in abstraction from the mental state, is neither an existent nor an occurrence, but a portion of the wider whole to which we give the name of knowledge.

That there is an enticing neatness and simplicity in such a solution I would be the first to admit, and the difficulty it endeavours to cope with is a genuine one. We have but to try a little introspection, and having got knower and known well together in the focus of mental vision, ask ourselves "what is it that knows the knower?" in order to realise that there is a genuine difficulty involved.\*

I cannot do better here than refer to an article by Mr. Bradley entitled "A defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology," *Mind*, Jan., 1900, an article to which I shall have occasion to refer subsequently in another connection.

Mr. Bradley puts the theory we have been considering into the mouth of a supposed objector, and compendiously sums it up as follows:—"The experienced . . . is but one aspect of experience, and the other aspect consists in the activity of the self. This activity is itself not perceived and does not

\* The proper reply to this inevitable query would, I think, be this:—The question is wrongly put, the *scientific* point of view being presupposed in the asking of it, whereas the occasion requires the adoption of the philosophical point of view.

itself enter into the experienced content, and is not and cannot itself be made into an object."

This view Mr. Bradley urges, is, in the first place contrary to plain fact. Take a pleasure. This is certainly *felt*. "But to insist that beside being felt, it cannot also be made an object at all, seems in plain collision with fact." "And in desire and conation the felt presence of a self, which is not experienced wholly as an object, seems, really, when we reflect, to stare us in the face." It certainly does. "The self feels itself, and it feels itself as something concrete, and it feels the presence of an object or objects given to this self which is so far not an object and yet is experienced. . . . But how I can feel myself [to be active or passive] if I am not aware of myself as something over against my objects, and how I can be so aware of my self if my self is itself not experienced, seems an insoluble puzzle."

Mr. Bradley goes on to show that the view simply amounts to a denial of the fact of self-consciousness. If the self cannot be experienced, how can self-consciousness be a fact? And yet such it surely is.

"We rightly or wrongly then are in fact aware of a self, which self, we are told, on the one hand, cannot be experienced . . . . But how in that case we can become aware of it, and by what process the idea or the motion, or whatever you prefer to call it, is ever to enter into our minds, seems impossible to discover."

There seems no doubt in my mind that Mr. Bradley's criticism is sound and that, further, it applies to Prof. Hicks. How, we may ask, can that of which we are not aware be of any concern to us? What right have we to qualify it as existent, much less as the sole existent? Prof. Hicks tells us that in the experiences mediated by these unknowable psychical events we have the nature of the content-marks to serve as a clue to the nature of the psychical event itself. But there can be surely no sense in talking of marks, signs or symbols, unless we start with some knowledge *of* what these are to be the signs. The significate is logically, *i.e.*, by way of knowledge, antecedent to the sign. If the thing signified is unknowable it must be surely illegitimate to conclude that it is a psychical fact at all.\*

Moreover, on Prof. Hicks's rendering of the facts I do not see how this inexperienceable presupposition of all experience could be identified with the *self*, or even if identified with a self, how we could distinguish between the personal selves and a divine self. The self in fact seems to be left as much in the background as it is in all inductive investigation, so that the result of the transcendental enquiry would seem to be the justification of the purely phenomenal attitude of Science as the only one possible!

This whole discussion is so important that we may

\*cf. Arist. Soc. Proc., 1902-1903, p. 164. "What we call existence," sq.

perhaps profitably recapitulate it in a more systematic way.

We may distinguish three stages in the argument:—

1. Mental activity is the condition of knowledge but in itself inexperienceable. (Prof. Hicks).
2. Mental activity cannot be known but may be *felt*.
3. Mental activity may be *known* quā subjective feeling.

From this point forward the argument takes a different turn. Mr. Bradley insists that a *psychological* study of immediate experience so conceived, if it is to be effective, must be as phenomenalist as is the study of any natural science. We purpose maintaining in the sequel that the facts of immediate experience will adequately support a teleological, philosophical psychology, and that such a psychology is imperatively called for in the interests of philosophy itself.

**STAGE I** : We cannot be *aware* at all of our mental activities but only of what we experience through them. Prof. Hicks refers to what is thus alone experienceable as the *content* of experience. "Content," therefore is thus identified with "object presented," with the object over against the unknown mental activity of the self.

As we have seen, this view really comes to saying that the abstract, scientific point of view is not only a methodological, but an absolute necessity of the reason. It restricts us within the agnostic

limits of the first Critique taken in isolation from the second and third.

**STAGE II:** We cannot *know* our mental activities but they are not therefore inexperienceable, for we can *experience* what we cannot know at all.

This view can be made intelligible if understood in either of two senses, but in being thus rationalised it loses its essential force. Thus it may be taken to mean in the first place that we can *feel* our mental activities without attending to them at all, that is, that we can feel and yet not be aware that we feel. This amounts to saying that we can only be *sub-consciously* aware of our mental activities, for we can, I suppose, sub-consciously feel that to which we do not attend. But this interpretation does not do justice to the view under discussion which asserts that we can *feel* that which is *incapable of* being known. Sub-conscious phenomena are *not* incapable of being known. They lie beyond the grasp, but not beyond the reach of attention. They are "claimants for our attention." Hence if mental activities were simply sub-conscious activities, it *would* be *possible* for us to do more than feel them.

A similar objection must be made to the attempt to identify the statement that "we can feel what we cannot know," with the statement that "experience is more than knowledge."

This latter contention must surely be admitted.

We don't know feelings *quā* feelings any more than we know sensational qualities *quā* sensational qualities. The blue quality we *feel* is not blue as we know it in relation to other colours and the rest of our systematised experience. So again, the feeling of existence as a spiritual self is not, *quā* feeling, a bit of knowledge.

But no idealist, least of all, Kant—would suggest that the universe we experience is a mere thought-structure, consisting of thoughts and thoughts only, or their meanings and values. Intuition without understanding, we read, is dumb, understanding without intuition, blind. What must be insisted on, however, is that there can be no experience of which we cannot become aware. I am manifestly *aware* of the blue sky as I experience it and such awareness is knowledge in embryo ; similarly I am aware, *through* feeling, no doubt, but not as pure feeling, of myself as a spiritual existent. What I feel, I know, though it be ever so true that to know is not to feel. This second interpretation does not support the contention that we feel what it is impossible for us to know.

**STAGE III : Mr. Bradley's view.** Mr. Bradley's contention is that our immediate consciousness of experience includes, or may include, a consciousness, both of our mental activity and of *its* object. In both cases it is a consciousness of *content*.\* With Mr. Bradley the psychical datum experienced, whether it be a subject-datum or an

\* *Mind*, January, 1900, pages 36-41.

object-datum, is referred to in this article as *content*. The term "object" is restricted to that use of it in which it stands in antithetical relation to subject, and is equivalent to the object held before the mind. Hence Mr. Bradley's view amounts to the assertion that though all we experience presents itself to us in the form of *content*, we are not limited to an experience of objects. We may and do experience our subjective activities quā subjective activities, and he refers approvingly

p. 40. to Prof. Pringle-Pattison's broader conception of feeling as "no longer *mere* pleasure or pain, but the immediate awareness on the part of the self of its own being and activity." It is important to notice that when Mr. Bradley uses the expression "*mere* feeling," he means "*experienced* feeling," "feeling of which we are aware as content, though not as object." So far as (a) pleasure is felt merely, it is, I agree," he says, "so far not an object and does not come before the mind, and to urge that in being made an object it must to some extent be modified is at least a reasonable contention." In the mere feeling here alluded to there is no reference to sub-conscious feeling and still less to that inconceivable experience, the experience that we cannot know. It is just a feeling of which we are immediately aware.

As another instance of the view to which Mr.

Bradley's conclusions are diametrically opposed, we may cite that of Dr. MacDougall [*Mind*, July, 1902. *Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process*]. Among the reputed factors of the Attention-Process, he includes a peculiar self-determining activity of the soul that can, as it were, give the casting vote and turn in this way or that the balance of the effects of the other contending factors.

"As to this last factor," he writes, "it may be confidently asserted that its reality can neither be established nor disproved by any expression of opinion however pious or philosophical, and that we can obtain evidence for or against the reality of this factor by one method only, namely, by the method of residues, *i.e.*, by the elucidation of the workings of all other factors and the demonstration that, when in any particular case their effects are fully allowed for, there still remains or does not remain an inexplicable factor, through the influence of which the direction of attention is other than the resultant of the influences of all those known factors. We may therefore profitably leave the consideration of it on one side until such time as our knowledge of the other factors shall have made immense progress, merely keeping our minds open to the possibility of its reality."

According to this view we can at best only hope to *infer* the reality of spiritual activity by

first exhausting the resources of science. Even then it remains only an inexplicable *x* whose function it is to account for what the other less microscopic factors have failed to explain. It is even then a problematical particular, and doubly objectionable from our point of view. For spiritual activity as felt is no longer problematic, and in its function as a unifying principle it is not a particular but that which by its informing, pervading presence makes possible our experience of particulars.

We may take it, I think, that Mr. Bradley has successfully maintained that mental activity is not an unknowable. It is at least knowable, *quā* content of experience. It was not, however, to Mr. Bradley's purpose to give his readers more than a critical revision of the data of Introspection as approachable by the accepted methods of Empirical Science. But he has indirectly established the very fact we are endeavouring to drive home, viz., the felt presence of the spiritual principle. The feeling which is "the immediate awareness on the part of the self of its own being and activity," is at least something experienced, and that this should be clearly recognised is a matter of the utmost importance. For if spirit cannot be in any way *felt*—I do not say "sensed" *qua* kinaesthetic sensations, for instance, but *felt*, in a unique acceptance of the term "feeling"—then the spiritual principle must sink back into its unknowability or into its purely logical existence as a necessary presupposition.

But the feeling we have of this spiritual activity of ours, the feeling we have of the unifying factors in our lives, of these real universals, which, be it well understood, are only felt in so far as they are functionally active in giving concrete reality to the particulars, the details of our experience—is not the function itself. The spiritual principle is not a mere feeling, however different that feeling may be from mere pleasure-pain. We are not to infer from Mr. Bradley's conclusion that the philosophical *x* which so worries our natural scientists has at last been equated to a mere feeling, and that the panacea for all the embarrassments of Naturalism has been found in this simple extension of the phenomenal to the sphere of subjective activity. Phenomenalism still remains the abstract *Weltanschauung* of science and the due recognition of the *function* of the felt spiritual principle in experience still remains the test of metaphysical insight.

Professor Stout's treatment of mental activity in his "Analytic Psychology" will be familiar to many readers. The chapter-heading "Concept of Mental Activity" is misleading, as it is the mental activity quā immediate experience that is the subject of discussion. Prof. Stout emphatically holds, in opposition to Prof. Hicks, that mental activity is knowable. "Mental activity exists in being I. p. 160. felt. It is an immediate experience. The stream of consciousness feels its own current." Further he would admit that to feel is also to be

aware that one feels, provided we include under "awareness" the sub-conscious awareness cf. id. of the anoetic consciousness, and do not p. 159, restrict the application of the term to and thought involving objective reference. Finally in his trenchant criticism of Prof. James's reduction of mental activity to "a collection of cephalic movements" (id. p. 162-166) Prof. Stout deprecates the identifying of the activity of the id. p. 163. self "with certain particular items of our conscious experience to the exclusion of other items." To Prof. James's assertion that it was difficult for him to detect in the introspected self-activity any purely spiritual element at all, Prof. Stout makes answer that he is looking for his spectacles when he has them on. "He is seeking for his own 'palpitating inward life,' the activity in which his very being consists, and he expects to find it in certain particulars, certain special contents id. p. 162. of presentation, distinguished from other contents as blue is distinguished from green. It is like the identifying of the life of an organism with certain functions of certain parts of an organism. id. p. 163. . . . It is like inquiring in what part of a body its extension is located." This objection is stated however in its most fundamental form when Prof. Stout informs his readers (id. p. 164) that the thesis against which he is contending is "that a total activity can be identified with certain of its component parts." The feeling of mental activity is

a feeling of total activity, which in the case of ideational process becomes a feeling of the self's total activity, of that total activity in which the self's conscious being consists.\*

And here we are left. What this self-feeling precisely is, still remains a pressing and fascinating subject for psycho-philosophical enquiry. Its uniqueness, its unlikeness to pleasure-pain seems, *prima facie*, to be its most striking characteristic. But that the conscious function is more than the experienced feeling, *qua* experienceable object, must be obvious to anyone who does not care to suppose that "nothing" can be conscious of "something."

\* This view connects itself interestingly with Prof. Stout's well-known theories of "total apprehension" and of "total dispositions."

## **LECTURE VII**



## PREFACE

WE come now to Green's own conception of Experience and of the epistemological problem.

Avoiding both Kant's purely formal use of the transcendental method and the attempt subsequently made by Prof. Hicks to give to Kant's formal argument a *real* interpretation, Green accepts experience as an organic whole, and spirit as a factor in the real of experience. It is true that he terms his procedure "a formal analysis of experience," but it is only formal to the extent of not taking into account the distinction between the good and the bad will. The structural factors of experience are all present in the experience which Green analyzes. Under risk of misconception we may state Green's procedure concisely by saying that even if he treats experience *formally*, he does not treat it *abstractly*.

In his attempt to define in relatively formal terms the *nature* of our spiritual experience, Green insists both on its unity and its inward-

ness. Its unity, he maintains, can only be understood as of the kind which guarantees the integrity of self-consciousness, a unity which maintains itself, not despite of, but in and through the mutual externality of objects to each other in time and space, and the self-distinction of the subject from each and all of them.

As regards the *inwardness* of personal experience, it can, as Dr. Rashdall points out, be understood only when we realise that the essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. Green recognises in his own way, this characteristic of inwardness by insisting on the intrinsic inviolateness of the self, and it is upon this view of the self's spiritual integrity that he bases his doctrine of free will.

Green's eternal self, as Professor Bosanquet rightly insists, is not to be conceived as "an atomic nucleus within each finite centre of consciousness." It is systematic in the profoundest sense of the term. But Green completely fails to prove that it must be eternal in the sense of being out of time. Such proof rests on the untenable Kantian distinction between the empirical and the pure ego, and loses all its meaning once that distinction falls away. Granting then the singleness of self, it must further be insisted, in the spirit of Aristotle, that

such a self can be equipped with a time-form only so far as such time-form is *functional* in time-experience. "A mere capacity is nothing," so that the picture of an inoperative time-form in the self with the self itself out of time is a mere fiction. Time, change, and progress, are therefore not phenomenal, but real, as real as self-consciousness.

With regard to Green's contention that God's existence is implied in the structural facts of knowledge and morality, we would readily admit that Nature's independence of our finitude combined with its permanent dependence on mind for its very existence, show that idealism means Theism; and we would further contend that it implies a Theism which is not a Pantheism, the "otherness" of God being guaranteed by the inviolate nature of conscious existence. Where there is immediate experience, there is an otherness which is both ultimate for human thinking and a condition of closest organic intimacy. In so far as this mutual otherness of the eternal and the finite self is not respected, Green's theory of a universal incarnation of God in man leads logically to Pantheism.

## LECTURE VII

### GREEN'S OWN TREATMENT OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

I do not know of any indication given by Green which would lead us to suppose that he treated his critical enquiry as one of a purely logical kind, affecting only the relations of conceptions to each other. It is not knowledge in general or experience in general which

he professes to be concerned with, but with  
Proleg. "what is implied in there being a world to  
p. 88. be known and in *our* knowing it."

And when he talks of "implications" and "conditions,"\* he has in mind not mere logical presuppositions but real, concrete, active principles. Thus in § 29 he refers to the intelligence as "a factor in the real of experience;" and in § 56 he pointedly refers to "that kind of activity undoubtedly exercised by us, implied in all distinctively intelligent and moral experience."

Prof. Pringle-Pattison would no doubt insist that in positing an active principle of any sort as the result of a critical enquiry he is going beyond the

\* Cf. close of § 29, and elsewhere.

legitimate limits of the purely epistemological enquiry in which he is confessedly engaged, quite as much, indeed, as when he attributes to this principle an origin different from the manifold it unifies. I do not see however that this criticism could be justly applied to Green except on the condition that what Green is analyzing is the notion of experience in general. This he undoubtedly is not doing, and the real question we have, I think, to ask ourselves, before passing judgment on Green for transgressing the natural limits of his method, is:—What does Green include under what he refers to as a “formal analysis of experience.”

At the opening of Book III., § 154, we find the limitations of a formal analysis of the will clearly defined. The result of what Green explicitly asserts to be “merely a formal account of willing and the will” is to lead up to the following definition of an act of will, as giving “what is common to all acts of willing.” It is “one in which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realisation of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self-satisfaction.” What lies outside the limits of the formal enquiry is mainly the study of the distinction between a good and a bad will. The formal account, says Green, “does id. p. 161. not tell us the real nature of any act of will, or of any man as willing, or of any national will—if there be such a thing as one will operating in or upon the several members of a nation—or of the human will, if again there be such a thing as one will operating throughout the history of mankind. For the real

nature of any act of will depends on the particular nature of the object in which the person willing for the time seeks self-satisfaction. Self-satisfaction is the form of every object willed ; but the filling of that form, the character of that in which self-satisfaction is sought, ranging from sensual pleasure to the fulfilment of a vocation conceived as given by God, makes the object what it really is. It is on the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction that the quality of the will must depend. It is here therefore that we must seek for the basis of distinction between goodness and badness of will." The delimitation traced here between the formal, transcendental enquiry, and the specifically, concretely ethical enquiry seems fair enough. And it leaves us at the close of the "formal" enquiry which precedes the "practical" discussion of the *good* will, not with a logically indispensable conception, but with a self, aiming at the realisation of ideas with which it has identified itself. We may therefore, in my opinion, view with approval the following outline sketch of what we may specifically call *Green's* transcendental method.

1. The acceptance of experience, the subject-matter to be analyzed, as a concrete whole.
2. Concentration on the general features of such experience.
3. The justification of a spiritual principle as an indispensable factor in the constitution of every such experience.

4. The definition of the nature of this spiritual principle (as deduced from the general characteristics of experience).

In passing on now to this 4th item in Green's scheme, we proceed to develop (and criticise) Green's ideas under two heads :—

1. The unity of spiritual experience.
2. The inwardness of spiritual experience.

#### I.—THE UNITY OF THE SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLE.

Green's determination of the nature of the spiritual principle as self-conscious seems to me to be perfectly justified in the light of his own conception of a theory of knowledge. However abstract and morphological an analysis of experience may be, provided it is an analysis of experience considered as real, one's own experience, therefore, in its inmost structure, must it not dawn upon the analyst, sooner or later, that his analysis of experience as real, *i.e.*, as *most* real, is just an analysis of the meaning of a true principle of unity?

Now what is it that holds the parts of experience together as co-factors in a seamless texture of reality? It must be more than mere co-existence in space or sequence in time, for space and time as *principia individuationis*, maintain the severality of existents as it were in perfect looseness from each other. It is only as we apprehend the time-space world more concretely, bringing it under the unifying conceptions of law and of life that we can realise this severality of existence as

a systematised severality, as a many in one. But "law" and "life" are still inadequate categories. They do indeed imply the relation of spirit to the content of the time-space world, but inadequately. *Law* is a spiritual order *superinduced* upon its material, and to explain the universe in terms of nothing higher than law is to leave the law-giver in unexplained isolation from that to which he legislates and the material brought under law in unexplained relation to that which is its principle of order. The conception of life again is that of a spiritual order *subinduced*, shall we say, within the time-space world,\* and giving to the presence of law in the universe an immanental significance. Properly understood it presents the universe to us as a development according to law in space and time. But still such a purely immanental grasp of reality is inadequate. *Mind* stands outside the scheme just in so far as it refuses to be one with its object in this indwelling sense, and we are driven on to that which is more than law, more even than life under law, to mind or self-consciousness, the truly concrete category. And with what result?

Essentially this: *A true philosophic insight into the meaning of unity*. Once a philosophical analysis of the meaning of experience as we know it has transformed the truism of the world's intimate relation to our consciousness of it into a profound truth, so that we can look upon the structure of experience as the ever-

\* According to certain recent speculations (Professor Bose), *everywhere* within it.

present revelation of mind's own nature, many of the old perplexities of philosophy fade away like thin ghosts into the ignorance that alone brought them forth and sustained them. In particular, the idealism which is the expression of the spiritual whole of experience as seen from this illuminating view-point is seen to guarantee all the just demands of realism. For what are the *facts* of knowledge, concretely conceived? First a knower, a consciousness, that systematizes its object, the world, at the same time as it distinguishes itself from it, and from every part of it, and this even more truly in reflective thought than in sensation. The so-called externality of Nature is not a mere "appearance" that is overcome in the light of idealistic philosophy, but as I understand the true idealism, its externality under the form of space is an essential requisite of the profound type of unity which experience reveals to us when considered as the revelation of the meaning of mind. Not that we can logically prove the *necessity* of such a form of experience. On the contrary, in grasping the significance of the unity which mind's presence imposes on the universe, we are grasping the essential structure of mind itself, behind which we can hardly hope to move with open eyes. It will be time enough to do that when further development brings us the oversoul, and with it a deeper grasp of the nature of being. That objects should be mutually separate and have natures of their own the laws of which remain to be *discovered* by us, appears to me to be as essential a

condition of the possibility of experience as we know it, as is the presence of mind itself as principle of unity. I take it that analysis of experience, accepted as a spiritual whole, is the process through which we learn what mind really is, and that what we learn is not only the "duality of subject and object within the unity of experience," but the mutual externality of objects to each other and the self-distinction of the subject from each and all of its objects—the subject in its object, the world, becoming as it were, an object to itself. These are the structural *facts* of self-consciousness as made clear by philosophical analysis.

## II: THE INWARDNESS OF SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE

The self-distinguishing characteristic of self-consciousness leaves us still with an all too formal conception of its significance. One other fundamental characteristic at least is essential to its barest definition. It is a consciousness of ends, a teleological principle, and, as such, intrinsically free. It is in its relation to morality that the self-conscious principle reveals itself more emphatically as a principle of freedom. The practical self-conscious experience reveals to the analyst of its structure the self as purposive agent in process of shaping circumstance to the requirements of practical ends. The self-distinguishing characteristic of self-consciousness becomes extremely marked as we approach this more inward point of view. "Each Self," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, "is a unique

existence perfectly impervious . . . to other selves—  
 Hegelian-impervious in a fashion of which the im-  
 ism and penetrability of matter is a faint analogue  
 Person- . . . The Self . . . resists invasion . . . Each  
 ality.  
 p 227 man has a centre of his own, which we  
 [others] cannot occupy, and from which he  
 looks, as it were, upon the inner side of his acts and  
 id. p. 243 words." In a recent essay I have ventured  
 on the following illustration with a view  
 to bringing home this supremely important fact of  
 the unininvadable\* inwardness of self-experience. "The  
 Personal participants in an orchestral concert may be  
 Idealism divided into three classes, those who are out-  
 p. 171- side the walls of the concert hall and have at  
 172. best only the sounds at their disposal to  
 symbolise what is going on within the walls, the ticket-  
 holders inside who not only hear the sounds but see  
 how they are being produced, and finally the  
 performers themselves who are not only aware of the  
 sounds and the processes that give them, but inwardly  
 realize the hidden unities of purpose and interest of  
 which all else is but the means or the expression.  
 Thus at any moment of the performance the outer  
 spectator, we will say experiences a sound, the inner  
 spectator, in addition, the workings to which the sound  
 is due, and the performer himself the inspiration of the  
 musical purpose and interest which is the source and  
 fountain-head of all that is happening."

\* This unininvadability I hold to be an indispensable condition  
 or true intimacy between one person and another.

In the same series of Oxford essays, in an able article on "Personality Human and Divine," Dr. Rashdall enforces the same truth. "The *esse* of a person is to know himself, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his own knowledge and to know that he acts . . . . The essence of a person is not what he is for another, but what he is for himself. It is there that his *principium individuationis* is to be found—in what he is, when looked at from the inside. All the fallacies of our anti-individualist thinkers come from talking as though the essence of a person lay in what can be known about him, and not in his own knowledge, his own experience of himself . . . . However much I know of another man, and however much by the likeness of my own experience, by the acuteness of the interpretation which I put upon his acts and words, by the sympathy which I feel for him—I may know of another's inner life, that life is for ever a thing quite distinct from me, the knower of it . . . . If per impossible two disembodied spirits, or selves, were to go through exactly the same experiences—knew, felt and willed always alike—still they would be two and not one," \*

I have emphasized this peculiar inwardness and privacy of the individual consciousness, as I feel convinced that the true meaning of personal freedom and the difficulty of reaching beyond a pluralistic solution of experience to a monistic Absolutism are

\*cf. especially *id.* footnote. p. 384.

not properly realised until this inward view of consciousness, the inward point of view of the experient himself is fully grasped.\*

In his own peculiar way, Green connects the freedom of the Self with this feature of privacy in Self-consciousness. As a spiritual whole, self-distinct from circumstance and the train of unappropriated desires, *it* can be determined by these only in so far as they are brought under the conditions of self-conscious activity. On this view every self-conscious act is intrinsically self-determined, self-determined by self-appropriated motives. Some analogies may help to illustrate this view.

A plant is intrinsically self-determined in so far as it can tolerate nothing alien to its organic nature. The inorganic salts, etc., which are its food become so only after subtle transmutation, through digestive and assimilative processes, into organic products. Such processes are usually referred to by biologists as "vital processes." They are due to the characteristic activities of living cells. Biologists are constantly stumbling across this vital agency in all that is most inward in the subject they study. "In studying digestion we reach an understanding of everything until we come to the active, vital property of the gland-cells in secreting. In studying absorption we understand the process until

\* As Dr. Rashdall well points out, this difficulty is not met by Professor Royce in his great attempt to conciliate the world and the individual.

we come to what we have called the vital powers of the absorptive cells of the alimentary canal. The circulation is intelligible until we come to the beating of the heart and the contraction of the muscles of the blood-vessels . . . *Why* a muscle contracts or a gland secretes we have certainly not yet answered.\* When we come to consciousness or mind, we find a similar exclusion of what is alien to spiritual requirements. No mind, as such, can tolerate a *felt* contradiction, nor a *felt* confusion. It is only in so far as ideas are felt to be in harmony with our pre-acquired systematised knowledge that they can be assimilated into our mental tissue. It is this power to assert the intrinsic rights of its own nature against all intrusion which, when consciously exercised, constitutes the prerogative of freedom. In the moral consciousness, where the decisive factor is a sensitive Conscience, the exclusion of the alien, the immoral, becomes peculiarly imperative, and the Self free in proportion to its sensitiveness and the sincerity with which it insists on preserving inviolate the purity of its own nature.

This maintenance of self-integrity represents what we might call the negative office of the principle of freedom in self-conscious activity. Its positive function is frankly teleological. To be a self at all, as the Greeks clearly saw—to be rational, as they put it—is to have an end and develop towards it. In the case of self-consciousness as morally directed,

\* "The Story of Life's Mechanism," by H. W. Conn, p. 66.

the positive self-conscious principle is the moral Ideal, the Idea of Perfection ever working directly or indirectly towards its own fulfilment as the soul of moral progress. Green is emphatic on the close, inherent, connection between teleology and self-

consciousness. "To conceive his life as an end, to conceive ends for which he seeks to live, are clearly the functions only of a being who can distinguish the manifold of his experience, actual and possible, from himself, and at the same time gather it together as related to his single self."

id. p. 129. It will already have become apparent that in thus concretely developing the significance of self-consciousness as a spiritual whole of the kind we have been outlining, Green has amply secured himself against that "legend" of his views which represents his eternal consciousness as "an atomic nucleus within each finite centre of consciousness." I should accordingly fall in entirely with Prof. Bosanquet's defence of Green's "Eternal Consciousness" in his Aristotelian paper so far as it exculpates Green from atomizing the fact of self-consciousness. Prof. Bosanquet rightly maintains that Green's Eternal

Self is conceived as "a system, or some-  
id. p. 30. thing closer than a system, all inclusive and thoroughly one," "eternal" in the sense that it is present to itself in all its parts . . . . with an intimacy which we cannot imagine, but can more or less remotely illustrate from our highest experience, say, of knowledge and of love. "Eternity," he

argues, "is the name given to that characteristic of a true whole by which its parts (if we may id. p. 32. use such a term) are in absolute intimacy of unity with one another. And the human mind, as such, appears to be distinguished by the capacity for apprehending a whole of this nature, and therefore so far, and in this partial sense, it may be considered as eternal."

There is, however, an important criticism to make upon this apology for Green. It is really only an apology for Green's "self," not for Green's "eternity." If we drop the word "eternal" in the first quotation, and make it apply to the "self," and if in the second quotation we put "self-consciousness" in the place of the word "eternity," we get what seems to me to be the real point of Prof. Bosanquet's apology for Green, his defence of Green's self as systematic, as "a spiritual whole." \*

The essential difficulty in Green's treatment of the eternal self is indeed not overcome in any way by this just apology. It still remains timeless and changeless in a sense which Prof. Bosanquet undoubtedly accepts along with Green, but which I find myself unable to accept.

Green's main argument, as we have seen, is that that which is the principle that makes possible a certain type of experience, cannot itself be cf id p 82 qualified by the predicates of that experi-

\* Green himself seems to me to commit the same confusion, (cf. Proleg. p. 66, p. 71). "For fact . . . universe."

ence. Thus that which conceives time cannot for that very reason be in time.\* The eternal <sup>\*cf id p</sup> consciousness, he tells us, "if for no other 55 reason than that it conceives time, cannot itself be in time." For a similar reason the eternal consciousness is changeless. As Green pointedly <sup>id p 72</sup> insists: It has no history. Similarly, as we have seen, the eternal consciousness is "a subject of which outsideness to anything is not a possible attribute; which by its synthetic action <sup>cf id p 55</sup> constitutes that relation, but is not itself determined by it."

There is, in my opinion, a fundamental fallacy involved in this famous line of reasoning. It presupposes the untenable Kantian distinction between the understanding and the reason, the empirical and the pure ego, a distinction which is bound, logically, to issue in the Kantian formalisms with all the insuperable difficulties they involve. Indeed, Green himself maintains stoutly that there is only *one* consciousness in each of us (the fact of having to maintain it, is itself significant) and is hard put to to explain how, notwithstanding, there should be these two aspects of it, the empirical and the eternal.

There is not a double consciousness <sup>id p 73</sup> he tells us, but "the one indivisible reality of our consciousness cannot be comprehended in a single conception. In seeking to understand its reality, we have to look at it from two different points of view; and the different conceptions that we form of it, as

looked at from these different points, do not admit of being united, any more than do our impressions of opposite sides of the same shield." But surely the unifying principle par excellence, is not to be overcome by a difficulty like to that which we experience in seeing round a corner, a difficulty which may be practically compensated for by a judicious use of mirrors!\* Green has apparently forgotten the supreme characteristic of self-consciousness, of being a unity in multiplicity, of being a perfect spiritual whole. It is quite true that our imperfect selves must be content with fragmentary realisations of such a whole in our own lives, but surely what glimpses we *do* catch of our spiritual wholeness are gained in and through the experience of the empirical self, the only self we can know, unless afflicted by the disease of multiple consciousness.

But if we accept the singleness of our consciousness in a perfectly unambiguous sense, rejecting all incomprehensible severance between the empirical and the transcendental self, Green's argument ceases to be even plausible. If I apprehend a time succession, it is because I, the only I, am equipped with a time-form or some such capacity for time-experience. Am I then to say that this indispensable attribute is not *myself* at all, that I, the substance, lie outside my attributes? But if we are *intrinsically* adapted for

\* Moreover some people, apparently, can, under certain conditions, see "all round things,"—cf. James "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii, p. 54.

time-experience, then, unless we wish to cling to the theory of a phantom *δύναμις* that is not also an *ἐνέργεια*, we must admit that we are creatures of time-experience in so far as we have any existence whatsoever, and that the condition of the possibility of time-experience, far from being the timelessness of self, is the presence of a time-form or capacity of consciousness which exists only in so far as it is operative.

A similar criticism applies to Green's argument concerning the non-spatial character of self-consciousness. The space-form must again be conceded as inseparably involved in the possibility of self-consciousness, and it must be maintained at the same time that the space-form can be an attribute only in so far as it is operative. In so far, then, as we are conscious at all of things as external to each other, we are conscious of that inalienable characteristic of self-consciousness itself according to which it distinguishes itself from these spatial differences without at the same time annihilating them. Self-conscious experience, if it is to be in any sense effective, must be a space-experience.

But to return to the self, *quā* eternal. How, we may ask, does Green manage to give to his statements an air of plausibility? To a certain extent, undoubtedly, the systematic nature of self-hood is, *quā* systematic, as involving reciprocal and not merely successive determinations, clothed *eo ipso* with the *semblance* of the eternal. I say "semblance," advisedly, for these reciprocal determinations, though

not successive, are at least simultaneous, and in so far as they are represented as changeless, they have at least permanence or duration.\* An eternity that is characterised by relations of simultaneity and duration is an eternity in time, and yet it is precisely by these characteristics that Green is constantly representing his eternity. Thus (close of § 31) we read the following :—"In other words, a succession always implies something else than the terms of the succession, and that a "something else" which can simultaneously present to itself objects as existing not simultaneously but one before the other."†

We feel ourselves justified then in insisting that the self must be a time-self, and content ourselves with endorsing the following words of Dr. Rashdall: "Any sense in which God is (to use the mediæval expression) *supra tempus* must be a sense which is compatible with leaving to the time-consciousness in which individuals undoubtedly live, true reality likewise, though there may and must undoubtedly be aspects of this reality which we do not fully under-

\* As concerns duration—cf. p. 37. "The only agent we know as maintaining an identity with itself throughout a series of changes;" p. 74 "The eternal consciousness subsists throughout all the changes;" p. 75. "It is operative throughout succession;" quoted by Mr. E. B. McGilvary. Article on "The Eternal Consciousness." "Mind," Oct., 1901.

† For the particular emphasis Green lays on *sequence*, as representative of time-process, see bottom of p. 70; cf. also p. 105 where we read, "The act itself is not in time in the sense of being an event determined by *previous* events.

stand." If we give up time, then, we are prepared to Heg. and say with Prof. Pringle-Pattison, "we move out Pers. of reality altogether." . . . "Only an p. 183. abstraction can properly be spoken of as id. p. 236. out of time."

The "changelessness" of Green's eternal self follows of course on its timelessness, and is equally inconceivable except in so far as it implies that timeless dialectic which, as Prof. Pringle-  
id. p. 182. Pattison lucidly points out, is simply "logical implication."

We have now to consider in what way Green's theory of the relation of the absolute to the individual self is affected by the conclusions which we have already reached.

We may allow at once that such criticism of Green's absolute self as proceeds from the assumption that Green's transcendental analysis of experience is, like Kant's, a purely logical affair with a formal subject-matter and a formal issue in the sense we have already discussed, commits necessarily an ignoratio elenchi. It proves a course of reasoning to be false for which Green is not answerable. Prof. Pringle-Pattison's criticisms, instructive as they are, seem to me, on this matter, to be of this kind.

"Green," he says, "explicitly identifies the id. p. 25. self which the theory of knowledge reveals—the "single active self-conscious principle, by whatever name it may be called—with the universal or divine self-consciousness." And a little further on

he points out that "it must be in the highest degree improper to convert consciousness in general without  
 id. p. 31. more ado into a universal consciousness;"  
 cf. id. "surely it does not follow," he adds, "that, because we are professedly abstracting from any particular self of experience, we are therefore analyzing the absolute or divine self-consciousness."

cf. id. We have seen however that though Green's  
 p. 31-35. language may have frequently implied that his transcendental analysis was a mere abstract enquiry, it is essentially a concrete one, and the self-consciousness he has in view as fulfilling the function of a unity of apperception is in the first instance, necessarily, his own, as he reflectively experiences its operation in himself, or rather *as* himself. We may agree then that when Prof. Pringle-Pattison eloquently argues

id. p. 125. that there is no evolution possible of a fact from a conception, that we must be on our guard against the idea that logical abstractions can  
 id. p. 132. *thicken* as it were into real existences, that  
 id. p. 133. knowledge is one thing and existence another, that no number of absolutes flocking together will  
 id. p. 136. constitute a fact,—his argument, though it  
 may hold good against Hegel's thickening of his absolute idea, does not fairly apply to Green's case.

The question therefore remains whether Green is justified in discerning the existence of God in the concrete implications of knowledge and of morality.

"The existence of God," says Prof. Pringle-Pattison, "must either be an immediate certainty, or it must be involved in facts of experience which do possess that certainty." This seems to me to be a sound statement, and I am convinced that from the idealistic point of view there is warrant in individual experience for tracing the presence of a spiritual principle, other than ourselves. I content myself here with noting the two lines of argument adopted or implied by Green himself.\*

There is in the first place that striking characteristic of self-conscious experience, nature's intrinsic independence of our finitude ; the fact too, that we are endlessly discovering the rationality of the universe under forms that we could never have ourselves imagined, much less instituted. Nature thrusts theism of some sort upon us, and in the light of the monistic postulates of science and philosophy we may say that it thrusts monotheism of a sort upon us. A spiritual principle in nature, other than ourselves, seems undoubtedly evidenced by the facts of experience. Again, the idealistic contention that spirit is indispensable to existence seems, as Berkeley, Ferrier, Green and others all insist, to point in the same direction. It is impossible to suppose that when my flickering consciousness wavers and dies, whether through in-

\* I do not myself consider that any *adequate* evidence for God's existence and holiness can be gained apart from an analysis of the *religious experience*.

cf. "The Problem of Conduct" p. 464.

attention, sleep, or death itself, its objects perish with it. And yet object apart from subject is unthinkable. The universe must therefore have its sustaining principle to which it is omnipresent—in a form of course very different from that which it bears to our conditioned powers of thought and perception.

These intimations of God's presence certainly point to the *Otherness* of God, but it is the imperviousness of the self *quā* experient which is, to my mind, the supreme evidence for it. This we have already discussed at some length. It seems to me conclusive that my experience is mine, and not another's *nor* God's. We are, I am convinced, at liberty to worship God without worshiping ourselves or anybody else.\* I see no philosophical difficulty in this fact of apartness. If externality and self-distinction enter into the structure of self-consciousness, I do not see a priori why the inviolable otherness and personal freedom of individual selves might not enter naturally, in keeping with God's own otherness and supreme dignity, into the structure of a loftier insight than is afforded by self-consciousness.

If we accept, however, this fact of God's otherness, we cannot accept, as it stands, Green's theory of the universal incarnation of the Deity in man as ade-

\* Cf. Hegelianism and Personality, p. 203, when we are warned against taking the process of human development as in very truth the evolution of God. "The development we can trace is not the development of God, but of man's thoughts about God—a development, therefore, which does not affect the existence of their object."

quate. As maintained by Green—and we have seen in what modest sense he maintains it—it has the serious defect of so identifying the two personalities, the human and the divine, as to do injustice to both. Prof. Pringle-Pattison's "Hegelianism and Personality," as the author explicitly asserts, is just an exposure, on historical grounds, of the radical error, subversive of all the lawful rights of personality, of identifying the human and the divine self-consciousness, by unifying consciousness in a single self—the attempt to unify the divine and the human subject being, as he insists, "ultimately destructive of the reality of both."

We need not enter into a detailed proof of Green's delinquency in this respect. When Prof. Bosanquet delicately admits the presence of the defect, we

may rely upon it that the defect is there. "It

Arist. almost seems as if Green thought at times  
Soc. Proc. that reality might fairly be described as a  
1901-2. self-consciousness (which we naturally think  
p. 43. of after the pattern of our own) considered as

the unifying principle of an unalterable system of relations. In the same way it would appear as if he thought that the supreme moral good could be conceived as realised in the divine consciousness without transcending its specifically moral nature."

Our complaint then against Green is, not that he traces God's presence in experience, but that his attempt to define, in formal outline, the relationship between the two personalities, human and divine, is

too hasty. We must excuse ourselves however from venturing any further into the many mazes of constructive theology.

## LECTURE VIII



## PREFACE

THE pragmatism and radical empiricism of Prof. James has *logical* affinities with naturalism which stand in the way of its assimilation with any form of idealism. Mr. Schiller's "Humanism," though it gravitates occasionally towards naturalism, is in essential agreement with the main tenets of personal idealism. Its main defect, which if logically followed out might require its alliance with naturalism, is its inadequate recognition of the necessity of a theory of categories in philosophical enquiry. The recognition that logical distinctions require reference to logical purpose, is a fundamental feature of pragmatist logic, but it cannot authorize us to dispense with a theory of the categories, the indispensable prolegomena to philosophy, apart from which indeed no sufficient justification can be given for the pragmatic position. We hold, however, that pragmatism properly "categorised" suggests the most effective form of which concrete idealism is capable, and, as the

representative of this concrete idealism, may well stand for the third main stage in philosophical thinking. Philosophy first appears as a theory of reality, then as a theory of reality conditioned by a theory of knowledge, lastly as a theory of reality conditioned by a theory of experience. Pragmatism, properly understood, stands for a theory of reality seen in the light of a theory of experience which adopts as its starting-point the human soul's immediate self-consciousness. And this is concrete personal idealism. Self-consciousness, as the pragmatist understands it, is "practical" self-consciousness in the sense that it is essentially a purposive activity. The self-conscious principle is concretely conceived as a principle of postulation whose supreme, unceasing demand is for spiritual perfection. In so far as the purposive reason is *not* conceived as a spiritual principle which gives real redeeming significance to the practical uses of life, but as a mere instrument in the service of human passion, pragmatism lapses into naturalism and forfeits the allegiance of all idealists. Only in so far as pragmatism insists on a wholeness of endeavour, to be tested by its organizing power over the life, can it stand as a philosophic theory of experience, and, as such, it is certainly not a pleasure-pain philosophy, for this insist-

ence on wholeness of experience implies the refusal to be led or misled by any pleasurable or painful *part* of such experience.

Again as thus insisting on wholeness of endeavour pragmatism is not a mere will-philosophy which emphasizes loyalty at the expense of wisdom, faith at the expense of reason. For such wholeness of endeavour is not the process through which will, as a fixed fiat, vindicates its capacity to maintain itself, *quā* will, to the end, and carry its fiat through to the letter, but the process through which the reasoned resolve to search out and fulfil *the main requirements* of a desired object or pursuit enables us to test the wisdom of our desires, and conform our loyalty accordingly. The integrity of purpose which springs from the spirit's demand for perfection means the resolve to thoroughly test the genuineness of an aspiration by living through its *whole* requirement, pleasurable and painful.

## LECTURE VIII

### PRAGMATISM AS CONCRETE IDEALISM

WE are now in a position to consider the principle of Self-consciousness more concretely.

Of the more recent attempts to do philosophic justice to the paramount claims of personality there is one that has particularly and deservedly attracted attention. I refer to what is known as Pragmatism. Pragmatism usually opposes itself to Intellectualism, and as such has quite recently been defined by one of its ablest exponents [F. C. S. Schiller "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics, International Journal of Ethics," July, 1903] as "the thorough recognition that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive activities." In "Personal Idealism"—a term independently originated on both sides of the Atlantic at the same time—we have the same main concern, "the development and defence of the principle of Personality," but with explicit recognition of the

fundamental truths of Idealism.\* Personal Idealism with *Man* as its starting point interprets its main position in equal opposition to Naturalism with *Nature* as its starting-point and Absolute Idealism with *God* as its starting point. A good brief account of the status of Personal Idealism will be found in a book of that name (1902) in the Editor's Preface. Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, perhaps the most weighty champion of personality in this country, inclines to "Ethicism," or "Ethical Humanism," as the appropriate label for his own views. Voluntarism is another alternative title; and quite recently (October, 1903), Mr. Schiller has come forward with the simple word "Humanism,"\* as in his opinion best expressing the soul of the new movement.

\* What these precisely are it would not be too easy to state. One writer [Prof. Pringle-Pattison "Man's place in the Cosmos," p. 10] defines Idealism as "the doctrine which finds the ultimate reality of the universe in mind or spirit, and its end in the perfecting of spiritual life," a definition I should consider quite adequate did it not rather suggest an independence of spirit from that which it spiritualises—or in formal terms, of subject from object, which Idealism is essentially concerned to disallow. The following modification of the above definition would, I think, be more satisfactory: "Idealism is a doctrine which finds the Ultimate Reality of the Universe in spiritual life, and its end in the perfecting thereof." The phrase "spiritual life" would cover the indispensable relation of spirit to the essential conditions apart from which it has no existence.

\* cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison "Man's place in the Cosmos," p. 42, "as against this naturalistic tendency, philosophy must be unflinchingly *humanistic*, anthropocentric."

Pragmatism, he tells us, is Humanism in its relation to Theory of Knowledge.

But Voluntarists, Personal Idealists, Ethicists, Pragmatists, Humanists, are all Personalists in one form or another, committed to a teleological Weltanschauung, and imbued with the most loyal respect for spiritual freedom and spiritual progress. Time and Change, for them, are the conditions not of phenomenal but of real existence, for they are the conditions of progress, and what is more real than progress? \*

We propose to adopt Pragmatism as the general title under which we may refer to this whole teleological, personalistic movement. In its earlier forms, as in the writings of Prof. James, it is confessedly antagonistic to the idealistic position we have been developing in these lectures, but as developed in the

\* Whilst emphasizing the reality of Time and Change we cordially welcome as most suggestive Prof. Royce's fascinating theory in the second volume of "The World and the Individual" concerning the relation of Time to Eternity, for the transcendence of Time here indicated does not imply that the time-element is not a form of real experience or will ever prove superfluous. That there can be no transcendence except through assimilation of what is transcended, is, I suppose, axiomatic for Concrete Idealism, the one rule of method which explains its progress out of Kantian Formalism. Mr. Schiller's ingenious theory on the transcendence of change (*Mind*, October, 1900. On the conception of *Ἐνέργεια Ακινητος*) appears to me to violate this rule. It stamps Becoming as in last resort unreal. Can the goal of change be adequately conceived as an Activity released from the privilege of Progress?

writings of Mr. Schiller, it shows a marked tendency to fall into line with the Concrete Idealism we have been urging. Pragmatism, we believe, is not only perfectly compatible with Concrete Idealism but of its very essence.

I make no attempt to trace the whole history of Pragmatism.\* Such an attempt would involve a critical estimate of Professor James's "Radical Empiricism," which I the more willingly refrain from giving as "Professor James's promised Metaphysics," [Schiller "Humanism," Preface, p. ix.] may present his position in a fresh light and make it necessary for critics to reconsider their past criticisms. I restrict myself to a consideration of the views of the most advanced exponent of Pragmatism, as developed in the two essays already alluded to: "Axioms and Postulates" and "The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics."

\* cf. The Popular Science Monthly "Illustrations of the Logic of Science," by C. S. Peirce, vol. xii. November, 1877, "The Fixation of Belief"; vol. xiii. January, 1878, "How to make our Ideas clear."

*William James*, "Principles of Psychology"—the concluding chapter. "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results." "The Will to Believe and other Essays."

*Professor Miller*, Philosophical Review, March, 1899 (under head of Discussions: Professor James on Philosophical Method).

*Caldwell*, "Pragmatism." *Mind*, October, 1900.

*H. Sturt*, The Logic of Pragmatism. Aristotelian Society Proceedings, New Series, vol. iii.

*F. C. S. Schiller*, "Axioms as Postulates" in "Personal Idealism," "Humanism," 1903.

The volume on "Humanism" was unfortunately not published in time for me to utilise, but I judge from the preface that its purport is a development of the view-point of those two essays—one of which is republished in the book—and in no way retracts their conclusions.

In this essay on the Ethical Basis of Metaphysics, we have the following significant statement, which, in my opinion, if consistently adhered to, would place Pragmatism in its true light as the proper expression for Modern Idealism :—"I should confidently claim," says Mr. Schiller, "that by Pragmatism a further step has been taken in the analysis of our experience which amounts to an important advance in that self-knowledge on which our knowledge of the world depends. Indeed this advance seems to me to be of a magnitude comparable with, and no less momentous than, that which gave to the *epistemological* question priority over the *ontological*. It is generally recognised as the capital achievement of Modern Philosophy to have perceived that a solution of the Ontological question—What is Reality?—is not possible until it has been decided how Reality can come within our ken. Before there can be a real for us at all, the Real must be *knowable*, and the notion of an *unknowable* reality is useless, because it abolishes itself. The true formulation therefore of the ultimate question of metaphysics must become—What can I know as real? And thus the effect of what Kant called the Copernican revolution in philosophy is that Ontology,

the theory of Reality, comes to be conditioned by Epistemology, the theory of our Knowledge." "But," he adds, "this truth is incomplete until we realize all that is involved in the knowledge being *ours* and recognise the real nature of our knowing."

We have then three stages traced 1° Ontology, 2° Epistemology, 3° Pragmatism.

There is undoubtedly something incongruous in having a triad of this kind in which the third member in chronological order appears entirely to lack the august dignity of the first two. It is like adding to the division of things into Ancient and Modern a third species "very up to date," the implication being that what was previously modern is now ancient, and what was previously ancient is now to be reckoned as antediluvian. We naturally ask whether we can possibly be justified in acquiescing in that supreme importance of the new Ethical Philosophy which could alone justify such a readjustment of philosophical perspective.

Let us at once confess that there is much in the language of the modern pragmatist to justify the conservative distrust with which his doctrine is received in many quarters. Conscious apparently of the inherent strength of its position, this upstart, called Pragmatism, has not infrequently shown a contemptuous disregard, I will not say for its predecessors, but for its own natural co-workers in philosophy. Conscious again of the relative novelty of its form of appeal, it has, in my opinion, exaggerated

the force and the freshness of this latest development of Idealism into the revolutionary glory of a new Philosophy. I consider this splendid isolation of pragmatism a harmful fiction, and personally identify myself with the movement only in so far as it connects itself explicitly with the development of modern idealism. Pragmatism has been passing through a crisis. It has long been hesitating (in so far as such a term can be applied to Pragmatism at all) between casting in its lot with Evolutionistic Naturalism on the one hand, or with Ethical Idealism on the other. The midway course is kept, by Prof. James, for instance, only by a frank revolt against the logic of his own naturalistic foundations, by a "Thou shall not" of a sudden indeterminism tyrannically checking the disconcerted issue of his own previous thinking. Through this abrupt exercise of philosophic justice, however, the logic of facts has come to James's rescue, and the brilliancy with which these new resources have been handled has cast a protecting shadow over the treacherous bases of his radical empiricism. We do not care to ask for too much system from so attractive and original a thinker. But a prosier exponent of the professor's creed will find himself, we fear, in a position of most unstable equilibrium, and will be compelled in the name of reason to choose between a systematic completion either of the naturalistic basis or of the spiritualistic aspiration.

With Mr. Schiller, who, by the way, lacks all prosi-

ness to an extent that must sometimes scare even his best friends,—there is, I firmly believe, despite much apparent evidence to the contrary, clear signs of the felt need of reinstating pragmatic philosophy on its natural idealistic basis.\*

But when this is done,—and this brings us back to the extract above quoted, pragmatism will take its place as the movement which more than any other, perhaps, has served to direct the course of idealism along sound lines, and we shall see more clearly and with broader vision that the one comprehensive sequel to a transcended Epistemology is just that concrete teleological idealism to which in various ways all idealism from the date of the second critique has been in various ways contributing, a movement which in potency and promise, if not, as yet, in uncontested achievement, would fully sustain the dignity of con-

\* I notice, however, with some disquietude, in the preface to "Humanism." p. xxiv, that Mr. Schiller steers nearer to Scylla than to Charybdis. Naturalism is allowed to be "worthy of respect for the honest work it does," and to have "a real use," whereas absolutism 'has no use.' Dr. Hodgson's naturalistic

Ar. Soc. conception of the end of philosophy as that of "attaining a Rationale of the Universe, as mentally visible  
 Pres. Ad. from a *human* centre" and of its attitude towards  
 1903 p. 3. the Universe as "*practical* instead of speculative" runs the corresponding ones of personal idealism so near, in  
 id. p. 13. form of expression (especially those of Mr. Schiller's) that "Humanism," unsupported by the philosophical categories may very well drift into naturalism and so stultify its true philosophical mission.

stituting a third stage in the history of philosophic thought.

If we go back to the quoted extract and its closing sentence, we see that Mr. Schiller explicitly refers to pragmatism as the completion of the epistemological readjustment of the philosophical problem, and as a completion consisting in a more adequate realisation of the concrete character of knowledge as the knowledge characteristic of moral personalities. If this were accepted as the true pragmatic standing-point, pragmatism would not lack adherents.

This same adhesion to a concrete philosophy is characteristic of the earlier and more important essay

on "Axioms as Postulates." There we read  
<sup>id. p.</sup> <sub>127-128</sub> that "it is the individual concrete experience

in all its fulness which every man wants Philosophy to interpret for him." This declaration I would whole-heartedly accept. We cannot think the world truly without acting in it rightly, and the true philosophical theory of life must issue out of life itself, lived in accordance with philosophical principles. Only so can we hope to see the philosophic spirit brought adequately to bear on the solution of life's main problems. The logical conclusion from such an outlook is that philosophical problems are adequately treated only when they are treated in relation to the interests of spiritual experience, all other solutions being provisional, or else subsidiary. This is the central conviction of pragmatism and constitutes the

gist of its theory of reality, the theory, namely, that reality is relative to interest or purpose, that nothing is real to us except in so far as we *realise* it and sustain it through our own conscious activity. "Reality as it is in itself and apart from our interests," "Reality existing for itself apart from our agency," these are

E. basis of Met. p. 439 the pragmatic inconceivables. "For our interests," argues Mr. Schiller very pointedly, "impose the conditions under which alone reality can be revealed. Only such aspects of reality can be revealed as are not merely knowable but are objects of an actual desire, and consequent attempt, to know. . . Reality and the knowledge thereof. . . essentially presuppose a definitely directed effort to know." It is in vain to adduce the passivity of sensation as a difficulty, for sensation is essentially an active process, a *reaction* upon a stimulation. Moreover even our most passive receptivity of sensation, in which we do not feel ourselves to be reacting at all, can and should be construed, in Mr. Schiller's opinion "as the effortless fruition of what we once acquired by strenuous effort." Our receptivities are thus acquired habits of reaction. All our experience consists in acquiring habits or utilizing them. All experience is either experiment or reaction.

Pers. Id. p. 56 id. p. 55

Practical self-consciousness, and all self-consciousness is at bottom practical on the pragmatic view of reality, is essentially a creative principle. Our action

is a real factor in the course of events. Such moral shaping as we give to the Universe is not predetermined for us, but essentially determined by us. Cf. Heg. of Met. p. 440. "We must discard, therefore, the notion, that in the constitution of the world we count for nothing, that it matters not what we do, because reality is what it is, whatever we may do. It is true on the contrary, that our action is essential and indispensable, that to some extent the world, (our world) is of our making." Pragmatism, in fact, cannot tolerate a reality that is not relative to our purposive activity.

Hegel was fond of insisting against Fichte's attempt to interpret the universe through the notion Cf. Heg. of duty, *i.e.*, through something that is not and Pers. but is to be, that it was "absurd to place the p. 192 reality of the Universe in an end which is nowhere as yet realised." "The idea is not so id. p. 206 feeble," he writes, "as merely to have a right or an obligation to exist without actually existing." Admitting that Hegel is in the right, are we to accept his statement as implying that an ideal order eternally exists independently of our puny strivings? This is certainly not necessary. We have only to insist once again on the fact that the ideal order is perpetually *being realised* wherever, through the agency of self-conscious individuals, the principle of good is determinative in the shaping of events. The achievement of a realised ideal of perfection is a progressive achievement and depends upon ourselves, but the

ideal is never at any time "something that is not but is to be," but "something that partly is already and shall be ever more fully."

### THE PRINCIPLE OF POSTULATION

The concretest and most fundamental expression of self-consciousness, according to pragmatism, is the postulate. The postulate is essentially life's spiritual principle. "The unity of the agent," Pers. Id. writes Mr. Schiller, "is emphatically affirmed p. 133. in the principle of postulation, which pervades all theoretic activity, generates all axioms, initiates all experiment, and sustains all effort."

What then precisely is this postulate, and in what relation does it stand to the spiritual ideal?

The first brief answer must be that there is the same relation between the ideal and the postulate as subsists between the *idée* and the *idée-force*. Once the ideal is conceived, not as an ever-receding dream of perfection but as the structural principle of personal life, it is more truly termed a postulate than an ideal. A postulate is an ideal that has matured its motor factors, an idea in the attitude of self-realisation or of "working itself out." In this sense it seems to me almost if not quite identical with the *motive* in Green's use of the term as a self-appropriated motive, the motive with which the self has identified itself.

It is, however, essential to the proper conception of the postulate to conceive it as being the self's own free expression and not as a principle which works

incarnate, in and through the self. It is an end or ideal of action accepted by the individual's practical consciousness as a right of its own rational nature, and through this very acceptance transmuted into a moral imperative. If we bear in mind that as interpreted by a concrete idealism, such imperative cannot be expressed once and for all in a stereotyped formula, but only *progressively* as the imperative of a growing experience, as an imperative that, despite endless variety of formulation, may yet be the same for all men at all times and for each of us at all stages of our freedom, we could identify the ultimate postulate of perfection with a categorical imperative. To believe in any such ultimate postulate is to hold the realisation of our rational nature as an end in itself, and the postulate which claims for such nature its unconditional right to fulfilment, as a categorical imperative, absolute at least within the limits of our experience.

The ideal then is the postulate in germ. The ideal, self-consciously claimed, becomes the postulate or demand for its fulfilment. Such a demand cannot be adequately conceived as a mere *fiat* of the rational will or practical reason. The pragmatic postulate is more than a mere *attitude* of self-determination : it is a concrete universal, the principle that "sustains" as well as "initiates" the carrying through of an adopted ideal, for better or for worse. Thus the demand for perfection is essentially the demand, persistently maintained and renewed, for that which can

harmonize the *whole* of life, stand *all* tests, "maintain its predicates" in the most varying contexts, the demand in short for the true unity of the growing life.

So conceived, the principle of postulation acquires its true objective significance. Failing to distinguish clearly between a man's appetites and his aspirations, between his animal and his spiritual needs, between man as the slave and man as the lord of evolution, pragmatism must have often seemed to consist in a vindication of man's rights to have all his felt needs gratified. The insistence laid by Mr. Schiller however, on the fact that pragmatism is a philosophy "that seriously strives to comprehend the whole of experience," sufficiently shows that pragmatism has no intention of adopting such an ultra-naturalistic credo. Here again the lack of an epistemological theory of categories makes itself felt.\* We want to see the self-conscious need justified as against the "merely natural need," on the ground of its being the "natural need spiritualised," the true concrete natural need. The postulate could then be established as the spirit's *concrete* claim for satisfaction. The analysis

\* Mr. Schiller's remark ("Personal Idealism," p. 125), that "so long as the structure of knowledge is not completed, the final significance of its forms cannot be clearly mirrored in its structure," and his similar remarks on p. 53-54 that self-knowledge in any complete sense is impossible so long as one continues to have new experience, are no doubt true enough, but they surely give no reason for dispensing with a theory of categories or of degrees of reality. I am not quite sure of Mr. Schiller's own convictions on this point.

of self-consciousness would convince us that the "needs" which may unconditionally lodge this claim for satisfaction are the needs of the animal for its spiritual fulfilment, of the body for the spirit's control, and of our broken visitations of spiritual insight for the spirit's permanently effective presence as life's unifying principle.

The point at issue here is so important that it may well bear further illustration. The pragmatic idea has superficially associated itself in many minds with a certain spirit of haste that rushes to soothe the cry of the emotions much as an over-fond or over-taxed mother might hasten to comfort her crying child,—governed more by the emotional instinct for prompt relief than by the rational desire for the child's more permanent good. There is no doubt good ground for some such misconception as this in the language of the exponents of Pragmatism. It seems at times as though the reason were being degraded to being passion's slave and we were being drawn back under Hume's shadow once again. "I cannot but conceive

the reason," says Mr. Schiller, "as being E. basis like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in of Met. the struggle for existence, and a means of p. 436-7. achieving adaptation. It must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmost structure." Now statements of this kind do not do justice to Pragmatism as a *philosophy* of life. In a theory of evolution, developed from the scientific, external point of view

the statement would be forceful and apposite. But what is a full-blown truth from the superficial, naturalistic point of view may well be a thin half-truth from the concreter philosophical standpoint. No philosophy worthy of the name could surely consent to the degradation of reason to a mere means. It is true that in the passage just quoted, Mr. Schiller includes "the rest of our equipment" under the same category of "means," but it is obvious from the context that "practical purpose," is excepted. A contrast is thus set up between practical purpose and reason which is entirely antagonistic to the avowed aim of pragmatic philosophy, "to weld together thought and deed, or rather, to Pers. Id. resist the forces that insidiously dissever p. 133. them and pit the intellect against the will in meaningless abstraction."

In the interests of true Pragmatism we would therefore insist, as Mr. Schiller would, we believe, be the first to do, that though it is undoubtedly true that the reason *has* developed under practical conditions, and that these conditions have kept the purposive reason from cherishing its wings unduly at the expense of its feet, it is still more profoundly true that it is the purposive reason *quā* spiritual principle that has given redeeming, progressive significance to the practical uses to which the conditions of its healthy growth have so largely restricted it.

Another source of misconception is undoubtedly to be found in a tendency, common both to pragmatists

and their opponents, to fasten a party-meaning to the opponent's terminology. Thus, to take a notable instance, "pure reason," or "pure cognition," is the "pure figment," of the pragmatist, because he understands by it a reason emptied of all teleological import, whereas to some distinguished absolutists, at least, it is the "spiritual principle," and so profoundly teleological that their only fear is lest it be interpreted as countenancing a merely practical, utilitarian teleology that has no spiritual reach beyond the grasp of immediate interest. It is hardly surprising that misunderstandings should, under these conditions, tend to widen unnecessarily that breach between personal and absolute idealism which essentially consists in a simple though important difference of starting-point.

In some remarks published in the Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1902-3, p. 185, Prof. Bosanquet has given clear expression to the misconception referred to. "It is being suggested on all sides," he writes, "that 'purpose' helps to define and regulate cognition, that cognition is rather organic to purpose than self-determining;" and he goes on to argue that the character of a true end belongs much more really to "pure cognition" than to "purpose." The whole tendency of the argument is to support the conception of being an "end in itself" as a worthier expression of the teleological idea than that of being a definite purpose directed to some practical end. With this I most cordially agree. It is more truly

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purposive to aim at purity of heart than to set about building a house or planning a journey. If in planning an expedition, or seeking for a home, we sacrifice in any way our spiritual integrity there is no effective spiritual principle in our lives at all. If then by "practical purpose," we mean a purpose which gains its definiteness, not from any indwelling ideal, but from the content it seeks to realise—a house, a journey—such purposing, we may allow, leaves us far indeed from the springs of our spiritual existence. We may, and do cordially welcome against all such restrictedly partial conceptions of purpose the nature of "pure cognition," as Prof. Bosanquet, with perhaps too much deference to Platonic usage, understands the term. We would only request, as Pragmatists, that the teleological significance of such pure cognition be brought prominently forward in such a way as to shed spiritual light on the pressing problems of human existence.\* This, I consider, Prof.

\* In particular, by interpreting "relation to consciousness" as "relation to purpose," and this in the detail of intellectual enquiry just as much as in apparently more practical matters. Much confusion is caused in logical discussion, for instance, by the endeavour to justify accepted logical distinctions such as that between intension and extension without a direct reference to the purpose (*e.g.*, the interests of classification) which such a distinction may be intended to answer. I fail to see how the meaning of any logical distinction can be properly grasped apart from some guiding reference to the *function* it is to fill. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative terms, between abstract and concrete terms, is surely not on a par with the given distinction between a pearl and a diamond, or a horse and a

Bosanquet has himself done most effectively through his recent articles in "Mind," in his explanation of the sense in which a spiritual idea may play the part of a *practical* criterion of conduct in the individual's own life. Nothing more pragmatic, in the best sense of that term, could be desired by the most ardent Pragmatist.

The practical attitude which the perfection-postulate requires of us seems to me to be best characterized by the simple watchword, "For better, for worse," and that in **WISE RESOLVE LOYALLY TESTED**, we have the one sure means of realising the perfection that we postulate. Does not the very name "Perfection" tell us that it is essentially the habit of carrying our ideas through, of carrying them out to the end?

The conflict between wisdom and loyalty, that conflict of perfection's very elements, of which the perfect life is the successful issue, a conflict closely analogous to that between Reason and Faith, though of perennial interest to all forms of human striving, is perhaps of special interest to Pragmatism. For the Pragmatist manifesto entitled "the will to believe" has left many with the impression that this new Philosophy of Faith and Risk is an *apologia* of loyalty at all costs, though it be blind and headstrong and not able to give an account of itself. And the romantic

donkey. In his persistent insistence on this point in his various treatises, particularly the last on "The use of words in Reasoning," Mr. Alfred Sidgwick has, in my opinion, done excellent service to the cause of logic.

element *is* palpably present in Pragmatism. Here is a passage from Mr. Peirce's first article in the "Popular Science Monthly," the first of that series of articles to which James refers as the herald of the whole Pragmatic movement of to-day:—"The genius of a man's logical method should be loved and reverenced as his bride, whom he has chosen from all the world. He need not condemn the others; on the contrary, he may honour them deeply; and in doing so he only honours her the more. But she is the one that he has chosen, and he knows that he was right in making that choice. And having made it, he will work and fight for her, and will not complain that there are blows to take, hoping that there may be as many and as hard to give, and will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage."

In its insistence on loyalty this is splendid. But what about wisdom? Are we to have a little exercise of wisdom first and then have done with it, our whole soul then passing blindly into the arms of loyalty? In his second article, Dr. Peirce speaks of the mediæval days when all the efforts of scholasticism were directed towards harmonizing its faith in Aristotle and its faith in the Church, where truth was for the philosophical professor his own particular stronghold in which he intrenched himself, and from time to time sallied forth to give battle to the others—a picture of loyalty to which the graphic touch is given by the

reminder that renegades were in those stalwart times looked upon with contempt, even by the party whose belief they adopted. This method of philosophizing does not it is true, meet with Dr. Peirce's approval, but unless Pragmatism insists that wisdom must sustain loyalty all through its exercise, and by such strong maintenance growing wiser, utilize its gathered insight to correct or if need be to divert the direction of loyalty, then the mediæval days, with their loyalties unpenetrated by wisdom, may yet visit us again. If Pragmatism is to be the *Renascence* it claims to be, and not a Romantic movement or a lapse into mediævalism, it must allow that free wisdom is the soul of loyalty, and loyalty only the motor element in wisdom itself.

As an illustration of this inward conflict between wisdom and loyalty which the Postulate of Perfection by its very adoption brings at once into our life, we may suitably take that rivalry and conflict of the different empirical *Me's*, of the various calls of life upon our faculty, which constitutes the crucial problem for all of us as we pass into manhood or womanhood. Wisdom in the choice of a career is here the obvious first good. After the first blush of that early youth when no walk of life seems beyond us and we aim at an all-inclusive destiny, we begin to feel the necessity, as James puts it, of standing by one of our empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. We have to find that function which we are pre-eminently fitted by nature to discharge. To succeed in life at all we

must be prepared to select one or a few closely allied destinies and back ourselves resolutely to develop the specific *Me* or *Me's* to which those destinies are yoked.

Such dedication brings as a rule a great relief to the conflict-worried depths of self-feeling. Ruskin tells us in his "Praeterita" of the great relief to his inner feeling that ensued on his giving up once and for all the ambitions of a poet. The usual difficulty in dealing satisfactorily with this "conflict of studies" is the difficulty of quenching by violence any deeply-ingrained feeling. The ardour for sonnets and odes, once it has been sufficiently nourished, may be firmly kept under when the mind is compulsorily fascinated by the spell of an examination or some other binding claim upon one's time, but with leisure and an easy mind what a spring-like renewal of the old ardour is like to burst forth again and drive its willing victim back once more into the loved solitude of the poet's world. And so the soul oscillates between two vocations, the one necessary but unloved, the other loved but impossible. Such rivalry, if too long continued, spells a wasted life. Now it is just here where our wisdom is intellectually self-distracted, that wisdom must become an *idée-force*, develop its motor factor or cease to be wise. The way of perfection here would lie, in my opinion, in striking out along the line of least resistance but in striking out boldly. Let us at our first leisure follow up the coveted pursuit *into all its responsibilities*, pierce beyond the unlaboured thrill

have used it as an argument against dalliance with the mere pleasure-side of a pursuit. It is equally valuable, we may add, as an argument against continually shirking the mere pain-side of a destiny, and so missing a right vocation altogether. In both cases what is necessary is to make courageous experience with the whole issue, to fix one's eyes on the whole meaning, worth and requirements of a career, to see that special potential *Me* as a whole, and to judge finally after deliberate experience of its *main* requirements.



## LECTURE IX



## PREFACE

THE true prolegomena of moral philosophy are a philosophical logic and a philosophical psychology. The former fulfils its function most adequately as a theory of the categories or principles of unity through which we may seek to unify experience; in particular by bringing out the true meaning of a concrete principle and making clear the teleological point of view which is so essential for philosophical thinking.

The conception of a philosophical psychology proves a stumbling-block to many. Mr. Bradley, for instance, maintains that when psychology ceases to be phenomenalistic, it ceases to be psychology and becomes metaphysic. As against such a view we maintain that it is both possible and desirable to treat of *real* personal experience in the general manner characteristic of all psychological method without treating of it as maximally real, as the subject matter, that is, of metaphysic. Professor Stout's Psycho-

logy, so far as it is based on his theory of conation, is essentially a philosophical psychology of this kind.

The theory of Conation, which is central in Prof. Stout's Psychology, is essentially teleological in character. Mental power is in all cases a process directed towards an end, and by reason of the very purposiveness of its activity, both initiating means for attaining the end, and varying such tentative efforts as fail to prove purposive. The guiding factor in such process is an indeterminate total apprehension which, by its natural differentiation, determines the order of the development, and is referred to by Prof. Stout as "a principle of finality." To the essential nature of conation, conceived as above, Prof. Stout habitually refers for his "ultimate" psychological explanations. In the case where conation is governed by ideas, progressive mental development means not only extension of productive activity, but a deepening of motive which in last resort as an ideal of spiritual perfection comes to control all the endeavour of one's conscious life.

We thus pass by a natural transition out of teleological psychology into moral philosophy.

## LECTURE IX

### THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO THEORY OF EXPERIENCE AND TELEOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

WE have, throughout this whole course of lectures, been endeavouring to bring out the importance of the *spiritual idea* in conduct, and our conclusion has been that in so far as insistence on such a spiritual principle means the basing of ethics on metaphysics, we would unhesitatingly urge the need of a metaphysical ethic.

We are now prepared to state our views on this point in a more definite and practical manner.

A science of ethics, as distinguished from a philosophy of ethics, is required, as we have seen, for dealing with ethical data by the ordinary inductive methods of science. The only restriction we should insist on here would be the very natural one that such a science should not attempt to pose as a *final* theory of conduct, and that it should appropriately refrain from philosophically criticizing its own assumptions. Its working principles are sufficiently justified if they work well.

A moral philosophy requires, however, a more adequate foundation, and is naturally based on such disciplines as aim at justifying or applying the concrete view of mind as a spiritual development.

The proper propædeutic for a course in moral philosophy would, in my opinion, consist of a theory of experience (or *philosophical logic*), followed up by a teleological (or *philosophical*) psychology.

I say "theory of experience" instead of theory of "knowledge" or "epistemology," in order to include the theory of action or "praxology." A theory of experience is the natural introduction to philosophy proper, for since the spiritual element is ignored in all scientific investigation by a methodological necessity, it is indispensable in passing from science into philosophy to acquire some familiarity with its significance in experience, to be introduced in fact to that fuller, richer experience whereof spiritual principles of unity are the functional essentials. By such a discipline, the student, already more or less versed in the scientific categories, and familiar with that form of causal explanation which accounts for a phenomenon by adducing the totality of the relevant antecedent conditions, is introduced to the philosophical type of explanation in terms of final causes.

The importance of the teleological point of view for philosophy can hardly be over-estimated. Those who may have spent some years in strictly scientific or mathematical studies, prior to entering upon philosophy proper, will probably agree with the

present writer in tracing their first genuine philosophical conversion to the time when the meaning of final causation first became intelligible to them. It was the second chapter of Dr. Caird's "Evolution of Religion" in which he makes it clear that the only adequate way of defining religion is not to seek for the elements *common* to all religions, but rather for the differentiæ of the highest forms, that effected my enlightenment and initiation into philosophy.

Fiske, in his preface to "The Idea of God," confesses to a quite similar experience. He points out how in his "Cosmic Philosophy"—a pre-teleological work on Spencerian lines,—he had been working towards the teleological idea but had not succeeded in bringing it into clear self-consciousness. "When, after long hovering in the background of consciousness, it suddenly flashed upon me two years ago, it came with such vividness as to seem like a revelation." "This conclusion," he goes on to say, "as to the implications of the doctrine of evolution concerning man's place in nature supplies the element wanting in the theistic theory set forth in "Cosmic Philosophy," —the teleological element."

These confessions may arouse a smile in the many favoured philosophers who have approached their subject through the illuminating guidance of Aristotle, and to these the philosophic thrill may have come in other ways;\* but for the mind long accustomed in

\* Cf. Prof. Pringle-Pattison ("Hegelianism and Personality" p. 63.

thought and practice to reduce causal connections to abstract energy equivalences, the philosophical baptism, par excellence, is that which confers the grace of teleological insight.\*

Closely bound up with this first teleological illumination is the lesson concealed in "The Secret of Hegel,"—the principle of the concrete universal. This latter expression is, in fact, tautological, as a "principle" just *is* a "concrete universal," and to understand the one is to understand the other. In the writer's own experience, however, a working grasp of the distinction between a formal and a concrete principle came long after the transition from mechanism to teleology. And yet, on looking back, it seems clear that the later distinction was involved in the earlier. To have been warned off from seeking the characteristic definition of religion in the elements common to all religious was to have been cautioned not to accept the abstract universal, the universal gained by eliminating differences and retaining mere resemblances, as an effective conception in dealing with final causation.

Speaking then from personal experience, I would urge that in these scientific days, when initiation into philosophy means, essentially, the acquired capacity to transcend the mechanical, scientific point of view,

\* Cf. Prof. Pringle-Pattison. "Man's place in the Cosmos." p. 39:—"Any system which abandons this [*i.e.*, the teleological] point of view lapses thereby from philosophy to science"—weighty words I would most emphatically endorse.

a theory of experience, as prolegomena to philosophy, be in particular a theory of the categories or unifying principles.

From the theory of experience the natural transition would be to a teleological psychology. After the philosophical logic comes the philosophical psychology.

The conception of a teleological psychology may seem to need a certain justification. To many indeed, *e.g.*, to Mr. F. H. Bradley, it seems about as reasonable to talk of a teleological psychology as it would be to talk of a teleological astronomy. Mr. Bradley, it is true, does not *directly* attack the adoption of a teleological method in psychology, but rather what he holds to be the confusion of psychology with metaphysics. Psychology, he maintains, must deal with phenomena only, *i.e.*, with "the mere course id. p. 28. of psychical events, as such, happening within a single organism." These and the laws of co-existence and sequence constitute between them the legitimate object of psychology. But as such a description is open to many misconceptions, the author connects phenomenism rather with the type of explanation appropriate to it than with the more or less of abstractness of the phenomena considered. Explanation of phenomena must be by working hypotheses only, *i.e.*, by hypotheses whose sole validity consists in their working well in explaining "the course of mere events." A purely fictitious hypothesis is, within the confines of phenomenism,

more acceptable than the most palpable *vera causa* if only it can be shown to *work* better. There is no dallying with "pure experience" here. Psychology, like all empirical science, is concerned not with the reality of its hypotheses, nor indeed with id. p. 27. their truth, "except so far as truth means whatever serves best to explain the course of mere events." Mr. Bradley condenses this thought into a id. p. 35. striking phrase: "What in short we want in psychology are explanations that truly explain, and above all things we do not want true explanations." Thus a theory of dispositions may id. p. 30. do excellent service in "truly explaining," but such dispositions are only admissible as "legitimate fictions used to explain the happening of phenomena." Keep your hands off reality, is Mr. Bradley's one warning word to the psychologist, and id. p. 33. avoid in particular pressing the soul to disclose its real nature. "If you ask about the soul unconditionally, what is the truth about its nature, the enquiry is metaphysical. But if on the other hand, you confine yourself to a limited kind of question about the soul, that limitation keeps you within empirical psychology, and is the boundary of your science."

Mr. Bradley's article will commend itself by its force and lucidity to all who read it. And in large measure we would fully admit the cogency of the reasoning. By all means let us have strict phenomenism in that psychology without a soul which prides itself on

its strictly inductive method. The soul is simply not amenable to the verification-tests of strict scientific method. It must therefore be ignored by the empirical psychologist. But this does not of course imply any forfeiture of its spiritual existence, but means simply this, that being spirit and not sense-perceivable, it is not the sort of "fact" the inductive method can deal with. Let empirical psychology accept the proper limitation of its own scientific method, and may its harvests be increasingly fruitful.

But there is room for a new rational psychology, a concreter psychology, a psychology with a soul, or at least treating of that which can *adequately represent* the spiritual principle, a psychology which is at once teleological and philosophical in character, and is yet *not* a metaphysic.\*

Let us first distinguish between three ways of

\* Mr. Bradley's aim in the article discussed, is to justify the widening of the *sphere* of empirical psychology so as to include the study of mental activity *quā* subjective feeling, not *quā* object before the mind. This however does not touch the question of *method*, which remains for empirical psychology inductive, and not teleological. cf. id., p. 41. "It is only for a false view then that phenomena consist merely of objects. The experienced contains in itself very much more than these. And it is the whole content of the experienced which, when regarded in a certain way, becomes a co-existence and succession of events and forms the subject matter of empirical psychology." The whole question is whether, regarded in that way which compels us to conceive of experienced content as a "co-existence and succession of events," we can possibly be doing justice to the *facts* of spiritual experience.

handling experience as a subject-matter of enquiry. Let  $\sigma$  stand for the spiritual element in experience,  $\pi$  for the phenomenal. Again let  $\sigma_c$  and  $\pi_c$  stand for the same constituents when taken in their concrete significance, and  $\sigma_a$  and  $\pi_a$  for these when taken in less than their concretest significance, *i.e.*, more or less abstractly.

Then we may take *experience* to mean, either:—

- 1°.  $\pi_a$ : (The meaning given by empirical psychology to experience when it abstracts entirely from the spiritual factor in experience). This is the point of view of phenomenism.
- 2°.  $(\sigma\pi)_a$ : (The meaning given by teleological psychology to experience when it abstracts, *e.g.*, from the *normative* aspect of experience and from its relation to the *divine* experience).
- 3°.  $(\sigma\pi)_c$ : (The meaning presumably given by metaphysics to experience, conceived with the maximum of concreteness).

Now I should call *both*  $(\sigma\pi)_c$  and  $(\sigma\pi)_a$  *real*, and  $\pi_a$  alone non-real, in the sense of phenomenal. In  $(\sigma\pi)_a$  we are treating of personal experience as a whole, though we treat it abstractly, *in the sense of* "generally" or "formally."  $(\sigma\pi)_a$ , that is, is just a general treatment of the unity of experience.  $\pi_a$ , on the other hand, is a treatment—a general treatment also—of the "lesser half" of experience, and as dealing with a fragmentary subject-matter, is abstract in the more natural sense of the word when it means "partial" as opposed to "general."

Any treatment of experience as a whole, whether more or less generalised, whether general or individual, I would call a treatment of experience as *real*. Is it not just to consider that the essential characteristic of *real* experience is its spiritual integrity, and that when this is present, and experience is studied, however generally, in the light of its spiritual principle, we are no longer dealing with phenomena but with realities? We hold then that there must be a psychology which deals with experience as real, and yet is not as concrete a study as moral philosophy and still less so than metaphysics or systematic philosophy. And what this distinction really amounts to is this, that natural science deals with the phenomenal, philosophy with the real, but that there are many philosophical sciences, each dealing with a conception of experience one grade or degree more real than its predecessor. Teleological psychology would on this scheme, next to the theory of the categories, which we might well eliminate in this connection as being rather of the nature of prolegomena, be the fundamental\* philosophical science, and therefore of supreme importance for the proper development of the concreter philosophies (moral philosophy, philosophy of the beautiful, metaphysics) that presuppose it.

In the article already referred to, Mr. <sup>id. foot-</sup> Bradley, shrewdly suspecting Prof. Stout of <sup>note p. 27</sup> heresy, challenges him to confess publicly the phenomenalistic credo. "The vital question," we

\* And therefore of course, the least truly explanatory.

read, "seems to be this: Does Dr. Stout mean to confine psychology to events and the laws of events? Does he mean to assert that, since psychology is not concerned with more than this, it is at liberty to use fictions, and that the question of truth is not to be raised in it except so far as truth means whatever serves best to explain the course of mere events? I cannot understand how it is that, if Dr. Stout really holds these doctrines, he should not have expressed them more clearly."\* I cannot of course speak for Prof. Stout himself, but I am personally convinced that he is definitely committed to the teleological heresy, and that his theory of conation, *i.e.*, his whole psychology, is  $(\sigma \pi_a)$  not  $\pi_a$ . To me such delinquency presents itself as a supreme virtue, and I am profoundly persuaded that when concrete idealism settles finally into a relatively stable position it will discover, we hope with due gratitude, that its foundations have been already thoroughly laid in Prof. Stout's teleological treatment of experience.

It is a very strong weakness in Prof. Stout's procedure that he should have been more interested

\* It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Bradley would characterize Bk. II., ch. ii., of Green's "Prolegomena" as metaphysics or as psychology. To the present writer, that chapter is a striking witness to the truth that a moral philosopher who requires to develop the psychological side of his subject finds the current empirical psychology too abstract for the purpose, and is compelled to build up a concreter psychology characterized by its recognition of the spiritual principle in experience.

*Cf.* also the interesting section § 71.

in developing his subject adequately than in disentangling the teleological elements of his treatment from the phenomenalist; yet we do feel that it is a weakness, and a source of natural perplexity to such critics as Mr. Bradley and Prof. Münsterberg who are interested in the Methodology of Psychology. I propose, therefore, to typify by a reference to Prof. Stout's theory of Conation, as developed in the "Analytic" and in the "Manual," how I understand this teleological element to be pervadingly present in his psychology.

With Prof. Stout, the central interest of psychology is the self-fulfilment of conscious striving. Such striving tends invariably towards an end in one or both of the two senses of that word "aim" or "ending." All consciousness, with Prof. Stout, is conative consciousness, consciousness of which the

*Manual* general character is an "intrinsic tendency" p. 66. to develop towards its own natural consum-

*ation.* "A thought-illuminated conation, An. Psy. such as the definite desire for food, runs its I. p. 190. course and reaches its natural ending just as the blind craving does. When a man's id. I. appetite is fully appeased, he ceases to think p. 265. about his dinner." Again we read that all conative processes cease when and so far as their end is attained, "their end in the teleological sense" being "also their end as occurrences in time."

The teleological character of conative process is brought out by Prof. Stout in four main ways:—

1° It is as we have seen a process directed blindly or deliberately towards an end. It is indeed only in the latter case, in the case of the thought-illumined conation, that we can strictly speak of the activity being teleological, but in either case it is manifestly

purposive, and though Prof. Stout's language does not seem to me to be quite decisive on this point, he would, I think, be quite ready to allow the synonymity of the two expressions "conative" and "teleological."

2° It is a process which, on the analogy of a disturbed equilibrium, initiates by its very activity such processes as tend to its restoration. To be striving towards an end is *eo ipso* to be setting in motion the means whereby the end is to be attained. In particular we read that it belongs to the very nature of persistent conflict to set in motion processes which lead to its own cessation.

3° Prof. Stout in his analysis of conative process lays it down as a general principle "that where the course of mental activity is obstructed in one direction, it seeks other channels." "Our total mental activity," he adds elsewhere, "is like a stream with a current, which, when its course is barred in one direction, seeks other channels." This is excellently brought out in a page of the Manual in which Prof. Stout is considering that "persistency with varied effort" which is so characteristic of the

appetitive actions of animals. "Persistency with varied adaptation," we read, "is an adaptation which can only be understood by reference to the continuous impulse or conation which pervades and constitutes perceptual process. Just because the impulse is a tendency towards an end, it guides the course of the action. When the action enters into a phase which checks instead of furthering the return to equilibrium, the current of activity diverts itself into a relatively new channel. *The process would not be a process towards an end, if it could persist without variation in an unsuccessful course.*" In this latter sentence we see how Prof. Stout connects the general principle in question with the very nature of conative process itself. Conation implies adaptive variation.

4° *The teleological process defines itself through attention.* If it is true that percepts and ideas tend to act themselves out in some form of conative process, it is equally, indeed identically true, that conative

An. Psy. process defines itself in and through percepts  
II. p. 107. and ideas. "The conative state defines  
itself in the cognitive," and it is on this  
account that conation develops itself in the form of

Manual. attention-process. Conative process is in fact  
p. 247. *self-guided* by the ideas through which it de-

p. 247. velops, attention being metaphorically likened  
by Prof. Stout to "the light used by cona-

An. Psy. tion to make out its path." The original  
II. p. 84. conation tends to define itself, "and the  
gradual acquisition of knowledge through experience

is but another expression for the process whereby the originally blind craving becomes more distinct and differentiated."

The attentive principle which Prof. Stout *An. Psy.* discusses under the name of noetic synthesis, *II. p. 41.* and alludes to as a distinct kind of mental factor, is just that "apprehension of the whole which determines the order and connection of the apprehension of the parts." It is James's fringe-consciousness animated by a purposive tendency, and as developed by Prof. Stout seems to me to give the most suggestive clue yet given to the question as to what we mean by the felt inward experience of a spiritual principle.

This *total* or *implicit* apprehension, as Prof. Stout conceives it, is of course no mere awareness, but an *idée force* in the most generalized sense of that word. It is a total interest whose intrinsic nature it is to work itself out to a satisfactory fulfilment.

The dominant part played by this "principle of finality" in mental development is familiar *An. Psy.* to all acquainted with Prof. Stout's psychology. *I. p. 267, 268, 272.* Attentive interest is here consistently exhibited as the unifying principle of the whole process of acquiring experience, *e.g.* in the building up of associations and in their reproduction under changed conditions. With Prof. Stout there is no ultimate explanation in any problem of psychology apart from a reference to the

essential nature of conation, in marked contrast here with Prof. James, quâ psychologist, who seeks his ultimate explanations in "laws of neural habit." [cf. *Principles of Psychology* I. p. 566, 653].

We propose however to restrict our vindication of the essentially teleological character of Prof. Stout's psychology to pointing out in what sense it can be accepted as a peculiarly appropriate introduction to moral philosophy. Moral philosophy we take to be rooted in the idea of perfection, of a common good, as it is sometimes more specifically called; in a principle of finality which dominates the whole practical life. Now Prof. Stout's psychology leads us precisely up to this point through its concrete philosophical treatment of mental development. For it presents us not only with a principle of finality as everywhere dominant in mental development, but enables us to see how it is that in proportion as our experience becomes more comprehensive and more organized, the teleological motive deepens till it becomes deep enough to embrace all the purposes of life. With the organized differentiation of the mental life we can trace the concomitant integration. We ever find the principle of purposive, constructive interest at the working frontiers of the mental life, yet gaining at the core of one's being a correspondingly progressive depth of purpose and width of reach.

In support of the above, we may take Prof.

Stout's treatment of the relation of habit to adaptation.\*

Prof. Stout clearly points out that the mere fact of *repeatedly* performing an action of a certain specific kind cannot, except in the very simplest cases—as in idiot life for instance—account for the character of the formed habit. If repetition were everything in habit, there could be no such thing as the formation of a habit, but only a constant repetition of certain movements without any progress whatsoever. By mere repetition we can stiffen certain well-marked tendencies but we cannot make of them tendencies towards an *end* or *goal*.

To understand what habit, even the simplest habit, means, we must recognise the purposiveness of the process by which habits are formed. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the purposive character of the habit when it has come to be quite unconsciously performed. Habit has its roots in our striving purposive activities, and the term “habit” in its most general sense means just that condition of our purposive activity when it has learned to function according to its nature, smoothly, economically, pleasurably.

\* Prof. Stout's treatment of this point agrees fundamentally with Aristotle's in Book II. of the Ethics. It is probably superfluous to remark that Prof. Stout's interest-series has essential points of similarity with the *έντελέχεια* of Aristotle. That Prof. Stout's psychology should remind one of Aristotle as it has reminded others of Hegel, is, I venture to think, a significant indication of its essentially teleological, philosophical character.

Again, it is only by conceiving habit in closest connection with conative process that we can understand why our habits tend to become less and less consciously performed in proportion as they are more skilfully carried out. The secret lies, as Prof. Stout points out, in the teleological character of the attention-process. Since all conative process ceases when and so far as its end is attained, the formed habit in these simple cases no longer requires to be guided by the original purpose, and the original purpose as such is no longer felt. Prof. Stout *An. Psy.* gives as an illustration "the development of I. p. 266. a habit of always performing an act upon a certain occasion, *e.g.*, the custom of answering letters by return of post." He points out that "the *original* conation, the desire to be business-like, or whatever else it may be, has attained its end and therefore disappears."

Completing Prof. Stout's thought, entirely in the spirit of his own distinction between automatic habits and habits of thought and volition, we would propose to distinguish here two typical cases.

1° The habit may express an interest that does not enter into the main stream of our purposive life, in which case, the original conation once satisfied, no other interest arises out of it. Once I have reached a certain sufficient dexterity in tying my tie, desire for improvement in that direction passes from me, and I end therefore in performing the action mechanically. Moreover, I do not connect the tying of my tie with

any one of my large interests in life. The consequence is that this formed habit remains a stiff, conservative propensity to perform an action in a certain way. My purpose is preadjusted to a certain set of conditions which never vary, and my consciousness of this process tends to reduce itself to a mere set of subconscious sensations probably regulated entirely by the lower non-cerebral centres.

2° The case is different where the habit in question *does* express an interest which enters into the main stream of our purposive life. Here, in proportion as the *original* purpose is satisfied, a fuller, larger purpose takes its place. The formed habit no longer harbours the original purpose in the form of a stiffened propensity in a fixed direction, but is instinct with the larger purpose which is now able to utilise it as a fit organ for its own needs. I have acquired, say, the habit of answering letters by return, and my desire to be business-like is satisfied. I have in this respect become business-like by instinct. But this acquired tendency is now put to the uses of the larger purpose to do to-day's work to-day, and the old habit enters now as a trained factor into the sphere of action of the new generalised purpose. The principle of finality asserts itself afresh within the habit; the conditions which are to be met are now very much more varied; the old preadjustment has therefore to readjust itself and a *new* period of habit-formation has set in.

We see then that as the moral horizon enlarges, the moral purpose deepens. The purpose to be business-

like in a certain specific direction once achieved, the acquired disposition persists as a purpose to be business-like in other spheres, involving the tendency to be business-like in all spheres. But with the formation of other habits for other purposes we are likely to experience a deepening of motive in other directions, and a consequent conflict of general motives which, in Prof Stout's phraseology, by the very nature of conflict-process "sets in motion processes which lead to its own cessation." A motive that can utilise all acquired habits and dispositions as organs for its own single self-expression, and maintain itself consistently through the endless diversity of life's varied activities, becomes the psychological imperative, and in this deep reconciling purpose, which is the very essence of our practical consciousness, we thus come to recognise a spiritual principle that is life's *summum bonum* and supreme criterion. We see then that from teleological psychology the transition to moral philosophy proper is not only not difficult, but inevitable.



## **LECTURE X**



## PREFACE

As concerns the relation of moral philosophy to metaphysics we may say that whilst moral philosophy is *based* on philosophical logic and psychology, it is *rooted* in metaphysics, where by metaphysics we understand philosophy in its concretest form. The contrary view that metaphysics is rooted in moral philosophy loses its apparent force so soon as this concrete character of metaphysics is realised and granted. Ethics, *quā* Natural Science, is, of course, neither based upon metaphysics nor rooted in it.

To be rooted in metaphysics means to be rooted in the monistic postulate with all that that postulate ultimately involves. Both Absolute and Personal Idealism, as I conceive it, agree in sharing the monistic postulate, but differ in starting-point and method. Whilst personal idealism takes personal experience as its datum and adopts an essentially teleological method, absolute idealism starts with the whole or the absolute as its datum, and proceeds by the help

of an ontological method. Both the datum and the method of the absolutist appear untenable, the fundamental inadequacy of absolutism consisting in its failure to distinguish clearly between my experience as it is for myself and my experience as it is for another. The essential differentia of personal idealism is that it starts from the individual's immediate experience and insists on the difference between the respective points of view of experient and of external observer as essential and fundamental.

## LECTURE X

### ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS\*

OUR previous discussion would seem to have led to the following conclusion, that since the essential object of ethical prolegomena—the adequate recognition, namely, of the spiritual principle in experience, is sufficiently gained through a theory of experience and teleological psychology, moral philosophy is really based on these and not on metaphysics properly so-called. This in a sense is true: as students eager for progressive enlightenment, we pass naturally into moral philosophy out of philosophical logic and psychology.

And yet in the deeper *teleological* sense of the term, we must admit that moral philosophy is *rooted* in metaphysics or rational theology, though it may be *based* on the more formal enquiries already referred to. The mechanical metaphor of a “foundation,” though it is well suited to represent the relation in which the simpler and more general philosophy

\* Throughout the discussion that follows the term “ethics” is used as synonymous with the term “moral philosophy.”

stands to the more complete and concrete, in the gradual process of acquiring knowledge, is in another and more essential respect inadequate. The organic metaphor of a "root", with its implication of a teleological as opposed to a mechanical connection, seems better suited to represent the relation in which the concrete whole stands to its partial derivations. The part must be rooted in the whole, not the whole in the part. But if we admit that to get to the *root* of a matter is to see that matter in the light of its final cause, and admit that the more concrete and developed is alone capable of explaining in this sense what is less so,—we will admit the suitability of saying that ethics is rooted in metaphysics, metaphysics being the concretest, the spiritually richest of all studies. At the same time, even the *root* metaphor is not sufficiently "*inward*" to do justice to the teleological relation here involved. It would be perhaps less misleading to say that ethics is organically implicated in metaphysics.

This way of stating the relation may help us in answering a further question as to whether it is not really metaphysics that is rooted in ethics, and not vice-versa.

The view that metaphysics has an ethical basis is maintained by Mr. Schiller in his paper on "The Ethical basis of Metaphysics," [ "International Journal of Ethics"—July, 1903—(reprinted in "Humanism.")] Mr. Schiller's point may be briefly stated as follows:—

"The metaphysical conception of *real* is dominated

by the ethical conception of *good*, and the teleological valuations which issue from this conception enter into the very tissue of such knowledge of reality as we attain to. Knowledge is a form of value, reality an expression of the good. Hence, the foundations of metaphysics, as Lotze anticipated, are found to lie in ethics."

Now it seems important to consider in the first place what meaning we are to give to the term "good." If by the "good" we mean that which gives conduct its value, in opposition, say to some other ideal, that of beauty, then Mr. Schiller's view illegitimately implies the primacy of one aspect of man's spirit over the others. If on the other hand we mean by "the good" that which is the source of *all* value, then the good is just "the ideal in experience," and Mr. Schiller's statement\* that the conception of *real* is dominated by the conception of *good*, simply amounts to saying that the conception of the *real* is dominated by the conception of the *ideal*. But this does not appear a sufficient reason for subordinating metaphysics to ethics rather than to logic or æsthetics. At most, it could only justify the statement that the foundations of metaphysics must be laid in a theory of teleology.

And this brings us to a second point. Has Mr.

\* "At a blow it [*i.e.*, Pragmatism] awards to the id. p. 438. ethical concept of *good* supreme authority over the logical conception of true and the metaphysical conception of *real*."

Schiller grasped the true concrete character of metaphysics? Granting that we must advance from a theory of teleology as basis in order to deal effectively with the concreter problems of metaphysics, this in no way affirms the intrinsic dependence of metaphysics on ethics. It does not mean that we are therefore entitled to *deduce* our metaphysical system from our ethical. The very reverse. It implies only that we must take up into our study of metaphysics the teleological idea as a steadyng conception to be reilluminated in the light of the larger metaphysical outlook, not that we import it into metaphysics as its taskmaster, and dictator.

The postulate of concrete idealism obliges us to conclude that whilst metaphysics may truly be said to be *based* on a theory of teleology, such a theory of teleology is really *rooted* in metaphysics. Or again, since the conception of a concrete metaphysics, as we conceive it, absolutely precludes its dealing with the real in any sense of that word which does not include the good, we conclude that when Mr. Schiller asserts that the *metaphysical* conception of the real is dominated by the *ethical* conception of the good, he is simply pointing out that the dominating factor in concrete real experience is the teleological spiritual principle which gives the experience its aim and value. It may well be, for instance, that love—the last word of moral philosophy, is the life-secret of metaphysic, playing the part of the heart-beat to the whole system of systematic philosophy. For does

not love, it may be said, embrace within itself the harmony of all other ideals—wisdom, beauty, effective labour, as the idea of justice in Plato's commonwealth is the harmonizing principle apart from which there would be neither wisdom, temperance or courage? May there not be a spirit of spirit, and love be the breath of the spiritual cosmos? It may be so. But in any case both the love-problem and its solution, concerning as it does, in prospect at least, the whole cosmos in its concretest aspect, belongs, in the form in which it is here set, to metaphysics.

We conclude then that though metaphysics as the concretest of the philosophical sciences may be said to be *based* on moral philosophy in the sense that to reach the whole we may well be compelled to push from the part outwards, our final word on this point must be that moral philosophy, the ethics of man as spirit, is *rooted* in metaphysics.\*

And yet even a last word may need elucidating. When we assert that ethics is rooted in metaphysics what we really mean is that it is rooted in the *monistic postulate*, of which concrete metaphysics, even at its best, is but the attempted justification. This monistic postulate is, as I take it, the common root

\* Quā Natural Science, ethics can of course neither be said to be based on nor rooted in metaphysics. No science with an inductive, mechanical method can have anything to do, quā science, with philosophy and its teleological method. Ethics as a natural science *may* be based on empirical psychology and rooted in sociology but neither based nor rooted in any kind of philosophy.

of both absolute and personal idealism. Both are monotelic idealisms, monisms in aim and tendency, for I am unable to consider the so called pluralism of certain personal idealists as anything more than a half-way house on the inevitable road to monism of one kind or another. Idealism, the categories and monism appear to me to be mutually co-essential. Apart from an appeal to philosophic conceptions of unity, I cannot see how idealism can justify itself against the naturalism which grows directly and naturally out of the abstract scientific standpoint, nor can I see how apart from the monistic *postulate*, idealism or any other philosophy can make headway at all. For is there any test of metaphysical theory other than its harmonizing power over the ultimate problems of experience, and the monistic postulate just is the intrinsic demand of our philosophic nature to apply the harmony-test to its most comprehensive views of experience. That the monistic postulate needs reinterpreting is most true: philosophy has indeed still to decide *what sort of unity* it is that the philosophic nature requires; and the difficulty which the problem of monism presents when looked at from the point of view of immediate personal experience is evidence enough that the conception of a unity of experience needs reanalyzing and deepening, but it in no way justifies the abolition of the monistic idea but simply its revision.

The only conceivable refutation of the monistic *postulate* would be to show that our philosophic nature

has no right to demand it, and that the demand for a pluralistic solution interprets that nature more truly.

It is not the difference in *postulate* that divides the personal from the absolute idealist. The real initial difference lies in difference of starting-point. The personal idealist is unable to convince himself that in any intelligible sense of the word he can take the absolute as a *datum*, or discuss 'the whole' as though it were a given 'fact' instead of a baffling problem. In Prof Henry Jones's able article on "Reflective Thought and Religion," in the "Hibbert Journal" (October, 1903)—an article representative of the Absolutist point of view—we have the Absolute characterized as "the first datum" of know-

**p. 34** ledge "as well as its final result," and on the same page we have the Absolutist method characterized as "a metaphysical and ontological method which *begins* with the *whole*, with the real,\* with God, as the datum on which all experience is engaged, and which all experience only explicates and realises more fully as it advances."

Now, if the absolute is to be our datum, it can hardly be a form of *experience* that we are analyzing. We can surely not pretend to start from God's own immediate experience, from what God is for Himself. But if we do not do this, we seem logically thrown back

\* The two methods, the teleological equally with the ontological, profess to deal with reality directly, and not, as with the older epistemology, through the medium of a representative world of ideas.

upon the scientific standpoint, from which the "data" are held as external to the mental activity directed upon them. And indeed, Prof Henry Jones's *language* in the quotation just given really implies this standpoint. The absolute is "the datum *on* which all experience is engaged, and which all experience only explicates and realises more fully as it advances." The standpoint of personal experience avoided, there seems no option but to conceive the datum externally in this way, for the concreter datum we have emphasized all along as the characteristically philosophical datum is the fact of experience *as it is for the experient himself*.

The inherent inability we labour under, having regard to the Otherness of God, of placing ourselves at the Deity's own standpoint, makes it very hard to see what the theocentric point of view of the absolute idealist can really mean. The theocentric point of view would be incontestably the most admirable could we but share God's experience, as it is for Himself. But as this is presumably impossible, the *theocentric* point of view seems to identify itself with the *impersonal* point of view of Natural Science, or, failing that, with that formally epistemological point of view of experience in general, which concrete idealism has so effectively discredited. Neither refuge is open to Professor Jones, whose point of view is eminently that of the concrete idealist (cf. the excellent remarks, *id. p. 27-28* *re* the existential reality of the scientific datum) and I fail to see how it can mean for him

anything more than the monistic postulate combined with the datum of "immediate personal experience." This is the datum of the personal idealist, and it is a datum for him, not in the sense of being already adequately known, but as being his own immediate experience, the experience with which his own personality is identified. But if this "personal" point of view is adopted, another important consequence seems to follow: the ontological *method* of the absolutist ceases to be distinguishable from the teleological method of the personalist. For the datum determines the method in this sense at least that the method must be adapted to fit the datum. An ontological method would no doubt have its *raison-d'être* if it could be wielded from the point of view of the absolutist's own immediate experience. But if it cannot otherwise be justified, it remains an ideal conception of method which can never be actually applied for lack of the requisite fulcrum on which to rest it. If there were *three* ultimate definitions of "a fact of experience" instead of *two*, the scientific and the philosophical, there would be room for this third method. But as only two are possible, the distinction between the two types of philosophical method, the teleological and the ontological necessarily, proves to be a distinction without a difference.\*

\*The repudiation of the ontological *method* does not, of course, involve the confession that the starting-point of personal idealism is ontologically deficient, so as to necessitate a going outside and beyond the original datum for one's material. (V. The concluding paragraph).

We maintain, therefore, that it is an injustice to Personal Idealism to oppose to its human standpoint a divine point of view which transcends it as God transcends man. Personal Idealists would eagerly welcome the theocentric view-point, were such a point of vantage attainable to human insight. Moreover, in its monistic postulate, it possesses the one sufficient though indispensable passport for traversing the furthest frontiers of experience, the one requisite for indefinitely deepening the meaning of the personal experience from which it starts. Hence to interpret the "anthropocentric" position of the Personal Idealist as making man sit at the centre of the universe in the place of God is to misinterpret it. It would be contrary to the whole progressive spirit of the modern Voluntarism to identify the starting-point with the goal. The plain fact seems to be that man does sit at the centre of his own immediate experience, and that by starting in thought from that centre he is best able to guarantee his personal freedom and integrity against the pantheistic encroachments of a Divine Immensity. The objection that God cannot be *logically* reached by adding successive accretions from without to the limited experience from which one starts, and that any such attempt must infallibly end in that "Deus ex machinā" solution known as Occasionalism—as witness the whole story of Cartesian Rationalism, may be fitly answered by asserting the essentially limitless character of our own spiritual experience as seen in the light of the monistic postulate, and by the further

reminder that we do not desire to confuse a *knowledge* of God or consciousness of His intimate presence, to be reached through an analysis of the import of our own religious experience, with any pretence at actually experiencing the inviolate inward experience of God Himself.

*Within* man's own spiritual experience there may no doubt be a legitimate distinction made between a Ptolemaic and a Copernican interpretation of such experience, and Personal Idealism may have erred somewhat in being too ptolemaic. But it should surely be granted that the true Copernican solution will not have been given until God's central supremacy is vindicated without damage to the essential interests of man's free, inviolate personality.

THE END









